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Sun, July 25, 2010 | Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center

The “bottom line” of the second arrest warrant against Al-Bashir (ICC website, July 15, 2010)

Hamas and Hezbollah expressed sympathy with the president of Sudan over the second arrest warrant issued against him by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for counts of genocide

Overview

On July 12, 2010, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a second warrant of arrest against Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir for three counts of genocide. Soon after, Hezbollah and Hamas expressed unequivocal solidarity with the president of Sudan, condemning the international community (mainly the US) and the international system of justice, claiming it serves political elements of world powers.

Hamas’ support for the president of Sudan despite the serious genocide allegations, as well as its harsh statements against the international system of justice, is all the more notable considering Hamas’ worldwide efforts to undermine the legitimacy of the State of Israel and its leaders. Those efforts include making use of international and country-specific systems of justice to sue Israeli top officials.

Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir

The arrest warrant

On July 12, the ICC issued a second arrest warrant against Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir for three counts of genocide committed against three different ethnic groups in Sudan. The counts include: genocide by killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, and “deliberately inflicting on each target group conditions of life calculated to bring about the group’s physical destruction”.

Al-Bashir still faces another ICC arrest warrant, which is not revoked by the one issued on July 12. The previous warrant, dated March 4, 2009, was issued against Al-Bashir for five counts of crimes against humanity (murder, extermination, forced transfer, torture, and rape) and two counts of war crimes (intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities, and pillaging).

The cover page of the arrest warrant against Al-Bashir (ICC webpage, July 15, 2010)

The reaction of Hamas

Speaking at a ceremony naming a street after the shaheeds of the “Freedom Flotilla”, the Hamas de-facto administration chief Isma’il Haniyah said the following:

“Even as the international community remains silent over real crimes and state-sponsored terrorism directed against the Palestinian people in Gaza and those who sympathize with them, [false] allegations are leveled against the Sudanese president, Omar al-Bashir”.

He further expressed complete solidarity with the Sudanese president (Ma’an, July 14, 2010).

The original Arabic text of the announcement (Ma’an, July 14, 2010)

Haniyah’s speech at the street naming ceremony (Palestine-info, July 15, 2010)

This is not the first time that Hamas has expressed sympathy with Al-Bashir. When the first arrest warrant was issued against him for crimes against humanity and war crimes, Hamas called on Arab countries and the world of Islam to stand up for Al-Bashir and Sudan against the “unfair attack on it”. Hamas declared “unequivocal solidarity” with the president, rejecting the “unfair allegations against him”. According to Hamas, those allegations serve a system of international justice that “reflects the interests of the US and ignores the doings of the true criminals”, i.e., Israel (Aqsaa.com, July 15, 2010).

The reaction of Hezbollah

On July 13, Hezbollah published the following announcement on its website (Al-Intiqad), expressing solidarity with the president of Sudan: “Hezbollah is hereby expressing complete solidarity with Sudan—with its president, its government, and its people—over the new allegations leveled against the president of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, by the International Criminal Court. Those allegations are a new form of verdicts issued by international elements according to the whims of their superiors, with the purpose of furthering political objectives. Hezbollah condemns the silence of the international legal institutions over the ongoing and escalating Zionist crimes, a silence motivated by the instructions of arrogant countries. Yet those [international legal] institutions act in accordance with political interests in Sudan and in other countries to serve those ruling countries [i.e., the US and Western countries]. This makes those courts biased and unquestionably political” (Al-Intiqad, July 13, 2010).^[1]

Hezbollah’s announcement, as it currently appears on the website (Al-Intiqad, July 15, 2010)

1 Hezbollah published the announcement on the Arabic version of its website. It is nowhere to be found on the English version.

Related posts:

1. Egypt President Hosni Mubarak Attacks Hamas
2. Operatives of a Hezbollah Group Sentenced to Prison Terms
3. How Hezbollah Uses Lebanese Villages as Military Bases

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Sun, July 25, 2010 | Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center

The Nagi al-Ali (Julia) anchored in the port of Tripoli (LBC, June 29, 2010)

Yasser Qashlaq, the Lebanese flotilla organizer, claims the ships will soon set sail for the Gaza Strip. Syria and Hezbollah are involved. Considering Qashlaq’s anti-Semitic stance and links to terrorism, he apparently wants a violent confrontation (possibly contrary to the wishes of many of the passengers)

Yasser Qashlaq, chairman of the Free Palestine Movement and organizer of the Lebanese flotilla to the Gaza Strip, said the ships would leave within a few days. Qashlaq asked Lebanese politicians not to make difficulties, but rather to cooperate so the flotilla might succeed (DayPress news website, July 20, 2010). His previous declarations about its sailing were not realized, but nevertheless it is possible that this time the ships will set sail, despite a large number of international objections.

The current situation of the flotilla is as follows:

A. The ship called Maryam reached Tripoli and is currently participating in the routine processes required by law before a ship set sail. Rima Farah, ship spokesperson, said that contacts had been made with a number of countries to acquire authorization for the ship to be received at their harbors, because it cannot sail directly from Lebanon to the port of Gaza. Samar al-Hajj, coordinator for the organizing committee, is the director of the ship’s logistic activities. Note: The ship will carry only women passengers (Al-Diyar website, July 21, 2010).

B. The ship called Nagi al-Ali (formerly Julia) is ready to set sail, and according to the organizers all that remains to be done is to load the cargo. Most of the passengers will apparently be correspondents.

C. The organizers may have another ship, but they are not divulging any information about it.

Yasser Qashlaq said he did not rule out the possibility that Israel would try to halt the flotilla because “there is no limit to the crimes of the entity of the occupation.” He also said that there would be peace activists aboard the ships and that the cargos would include humanitarian equipment, and that any attempt to stop them would be “a terrorist action” (DayPress news website, July 20, 2010).

In our assessment, the ships were purchased and the flotilla organized with the involvement and support of Syria and Hezbollah, although both do not want to expose their roles and use organizations like the Free Palestine Movement as fronts for their activities.

Qashlaq revealed his position in an interview with Hezbollah’s Al-Manar TV on June 19, 2010. He said that “the day will come when the ships [which arrive at the Gaza Strip] will take the remainder of the European garbage which came to my country [i.e., Israel] back to their homelands, Gilad Shalit will return to Paris and they [the leaders of Israel will return to Poland. Let the murderers go home. After they return we will pursue them everywhere all over the world and try them in court for the slaughters they have carried out from Dir Yassin to this day."

Considering the stated positions of Qashlaq and some of those involved in the flotilla, and especially their close ties with Syria and Hezbollah, he apparently wants a violent confrontation between the passengers and the Israeli Air Force and Navy with a lot of media coverage. His intention is to defame Israel, even if his agenda is not necessarily that of the other passengers aboard the ships.

More proof that this flotilla, like that of the Mavi Marmara, is meant mainly to create a media circus and incite anti-Israeli propaganda, and not to bring humanitarian assistance to the Gaza Strip was made public by an Al-Jazeera TV investigative report.

The Al-Jazeera TV's Gaza Strip correspondent, revealed that the Gazans responsible for the ministry of health of the de facto Hamas administration were resentful because 70% of the medicines which arrived in the Gaza Strip from the aid convoys from various countries, especially Arab countries, could not be used. They were either unfit for use or their expiry dates had passed by months and sometimes years. They said that one of the convoys had brought dialysis machines which could not be used. The report was also quoted by a daily paper affiliated with the de facto Hamas administration (Al-Jazeera TV, July 20, 2010).

Left: Useless dialysis machines. Right: Drugs whose expiry dates have passed (Al-Jazeera TV, July 20, 2010)

Related posts:

1. How Hezbollah Uses Lebanese Villages as Military Bases
2. Lebanese Gaza-Bound Ships Maybe Cancelled
3. The Flotilla to the Gaza Strip

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Sun, July 18, 2010 | Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center

Mehdi Karoubi, one of the leaders of the reformist opposition

Opposition leaders step up criticism of government policy following resolution on sanctions against Iran

Mehdi Karoubi, one of the leaders of the reformist opposition, has strongly criticized last week the government’s stance on the nuclear crisis. Speaking at a meeting with families of political prisoners, Karoubi said that the reckless foreign policy and lack of sanity in President Ahmadinejad’s words and actions have caused considerable damage to Iran in recent years. That policy, coupled with the violent suppression of citizens over the past year, has created a particularly worrisome situation for Iran. He said that Iran must avoid making shallow statements or displaying lack of ability, which could give others a pretext to easily impose sanctions on it.

Karoubi further claimed that some elements in the Iranian regime, including the Revolutionary Guards, support the sanctions because they make “exorbitant profits” from them, while the public pays the price (Kalemeh, July 11).

Karoubi’s statement came days after opposition leader Mir-Hossein Mousavi lashed out against the government’s policy, claiming that the president ignores the impact of the international sanctions. Describing the resolution on sanctions as a “piece of used paper” will not solve the problems plaguing the people and the country, and will not alleviate the damage caused as a result of the government’s demagogic policy, Mousavi said, referring to a statement made by President Ahmadinejad. He claimed that the UN Security Council resolution would have severe consequences for Iran’s national security and economy. There is no denying that Iran is now more isolated than it has ever been since the Islamic revolution, Mousavi said. Iran must learn from the fate of other peoples in the region that had fallen into the trap of their governments’ hollow words of pride. Under current circumstances, he added, it is necessary to consider solutions that would diminish the threats to Iran’s independence and territorial integrity and guarantee its legitimate rights while maintaining the rights of liberties of the Iranian people, since maintaining national security is impossible without supporting free, informed citizens.

Leading reformist, Mir Hossein Mousavi, speaks during a meeting with professors at Tehran university in Tehran, May 7, 2009. (AP Photo/Hasan Sarbakhshian)

Meanwhile, Mousavi condemned the UN resolution, saying that it hurt the Iranian people. He stressed that one cannot condemn Iran and rob it of its legitimate right for peaceful nuclear technology while crimes are committed in “occupied Palestine” and while nuclear weapons held by other countries are being ignored. He added, however, that there is no denying the consequences of the adventurous policy of Iran’s government.

Mousavi also called on the government to inform the Iranian public about the consequences of the sanctions, saying they are likely to cause an increase in unemployment and decrease in economic growth, making the lives of Iranians more difficult and widening the gap between Iran and developing countries, mostly its neighbors. He noted that the Iranian people have the right to know what impact the sanctions will likely have and how they will influence their lives as well as the progress and security of their country. The public cannot be expected to oppose the sanctions if the government does not tell Iranians the truth about their consequences. Many Iranians are unaware of the dangers inherent in the path Iran follows due to lack of ability and bragging. If the government cannot do it, Mousavi said, the least it should do is allow non-government media to provide Iranians with information and assessments regarding the sanctions in a clear, non-exaggerated manner.

Mousavi stressed the need to expand the circle of advisors on the nuclear issue, claiming that the issue is currently handled by a small group of inexperienced advisors. The Green Movement must continue expressing opposition in view of the external threats facing Iran, showing that the way to end the crisis and the threats is to return to the principles and solutions it proposes. The movement must enlist all of its international capabilities to let foreign powers know that it will not let them exploit the weakness and illegitimacy of the current government to compromise Iran’s independence, territorial integrity, or national interests (Kalemeh, July 7).

The conservative daily Keyhan strongly lashed out against Mousavi for his statements this week, claiming they reflected the analyses published by “Zionist media” about the sanctions and their effects. The admission of Western leaders that the sanctions would not result in the cessation of Iran’s nuclear program left Western intelligence services no other choice but to launch the second phase of their plan, designed to influence Iran’s domestic public opinion. That phase is supposed to be implemented by their agents in Iran. Mousavi and his supporters are now acting on behalf of the US and Israel, after those two countries’ efforts to enforce effective sanctions against Iran had failed. However, Keyhan claims, the West ignores the fact that Mousavi no longer enjoys any status or influence in Iran (Keyhan, July 13).

Related posts:

1. The Iranian government continues to strike hard at the opposition
2. Has the Opposition in Iran Reconsidered its Stance?
3. The Riots of Ashura: Reformist Opposition continues in Iran

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Fri, July 09, 2010 | Rubinreports | By Barry Rubin

The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (CCASG)

Kings, Emirs and Shaykhs: the Survival of Traditional Regimes in the Persian Gulf

During the early 1980s I was asked to give a briefing for the head of the Toyota auto company and other enterprises. It was just after the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat and during the height of the Iran-Iraq war, so regional instability was much on the mind of everyone.

After I finished my talk, Mr. Toyota asked a question in Japanese which was quickly translated. “This is all very interesting,” he responded, “but what we really want to know is the date on which the Saudi monarchy will fall.”

Before I could answer, the head of the delegation said, “We know the date and are willing to tell you but first we would like to renegotiate our fees.” I think he was joking, though it was not the most tactful thing to say.

When I did answer, I explained that the Saudi monarchy was very strong and likely to survive for a long time to come. Almost 30 years later, I see no reason to change that assessment.

If you had told experts in the mid-1960s that a half-century later every king and emir then ruling in the Persian Gulf would still be there, most would have been astonished. After all, these regimes seemed representative of a bygone, even medieval, era. Surely, modernity would sweep them away. Certainly, militant Arab nationalists—backed up generally by the regimes in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq—were eager to do so. After 1979, the radical Islamists in Iran and their local sympathizers worked hard to foment revolution.

Yet all these regimes are still in power, in Bahrain and Kuwait, Oman and Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Indeed, in broad terms, these regimes are flourishing and none of them faces the threat of imminent overthrow. They have joined together in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) so it is possible to refer to these six countries collectively as the GCC states.

It would be easy to say, of course, that this political stability is due to wealth from petroleum and natural gas, a treasure even more precious when one compares the large amount of income to the relatively small population of these states. But that is misleading.

First, this very wealth has made these countries the target for blackmail, direct assault, and internal subversion. After all, they have weathered the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, Iranian attacks on tanker traffic, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the U.S.-led overthrow of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, the challenge from al-Qaida, and much more. No region of the world has been through more upheavals than this one.

Second, wealth does not merely promote stability; it also undermines tradition and the status quo. This is especially true when vast amounts of money, material goods, as well as modern ideas and methods pour into these countries. Nothing could be more destabilizing to such conservative, religious, and traditionalist societies than an extremely intense dose of modernization, probably stronger and more intensive than that faced by any other countries in history.

Third, at times oil prices dipped far lower thus turning the GCC states’ surpluses into deficits when their high internal spending is taken into account. Not all has been rosy economically for them by any means.

Thus, these regimes deserve high marks for managing their situations well and, of course, these rulers know their societies far better than foreign observers who would advise them to do things differently. The price, certainly, has been an absence of democracy, a failure to expand rights, and the continuation of women’s status as second-class citizens generally. In exchange, the citizens of the GCC states have gained much higher living standards, though that doesn’t mean that poverty has been altogether banished, especially in Saudi Arabia.

In addition to all this, the GCC states have to handle a difficult diversity in their populations. This is of two types. On the one hand, each of these countries has a very large proportion of non-citizen foreigners living on their territory as “guest workers.” This sector is kept docile by rotation, sending out longer-term residents and bringing in new ones; of course by the rich financial rewards in comparison to what they’d be earning at home, and repression.

There has never been a single instance in which this large population has threatened the host country’s political stability. Perhaps the closest was when the large Palestinian minority in Kuwait was accused of collaborating with the Iraqi occupation army and was almost totally deported with little trouble. Palestinians have never been allowed into Saudi Arabia in very large numbers, presumably to forestall trouble from radicals among them.

On the other hand, and more problematic, has been the different groups among the local citizen population. Bahrain has a Sunni ruling group and a much larger Shia majority, which has led to friction in the past. Kuwait boasts both Sunni and Shia communities which have gotten along in relative peace.

The Saudis, whose Wahabi faith is austerely Sunni and explicitly hostile to Shiism, have a Shia minority of about 15 percent, concentrated in the strategic Eastern Province. There have been attempts to appeal to this group by Tehran-connected Islamist radicals, featuring the fact that Iran is a country where Shias rule.

While the other GCC states have seen only sporadic terrorism—Oman defeated a Marxist revolutionary war back in the 1970s—Saudi Arabia defeated a serious threat from al-Qaida. That group, it should be remembered, was created by Usama bin Ladin for the purpose of overthrowing the monarchy. At times, Saudi counterterrorist forces have evidenced considerable incompetence but overall they performed effectively and stamped out the attempted insurgency.

Since 2003, the GCC states have had to deal with a new set of problems. The overthrow of the Iraqi regime removed the old Iraqi threat but also augmented the Iranian one, made even worse by Iran’s drive for nuclear weapons. In addition, the sight of another Shia-led state next door worried the Sunni-dominated states lest revolt spread or Iraq would become an Iranian client.

How did the monarchies deal with this situation? Most immediately, they exported some of their own extremism to Iraq, encouraging young men to go there to fight against the Shias. This got rid of potentially troublesome Islamist-oriented youth while also undermining the Shia power which seemed to them to be so dangerous. Ironically, of course, this put the GCC states on the same side as Iran’s ally, Syria, providing funds and fighters to kill American soldiers in Iraq, not to mention Iraqi Shia civilians. From their own standpoint, however, it worked rather well.

Another way of exporting terrorism, albeit less deliberate, was the decision of Saudi terrorists to attack Western targets, most symbolically demonstrated by the fact that almost all the September 11, 2001, terrorists were Saudis. Al-Qaida, as mentioned above, was originally an organization designed to foment revolution within Saudi Arabia but which has directed almost all its energy elsewhere.

Finally, Saudi doctrine has encouraged the idea that terrorism against Muslims is bad but terrorism against non-Muslims is quite acceptable, almost recommended. These stratagems may have done a bit of damage to the kingdom’s international image but have not had any significant costs.

Regarding their own security, GCC states have pursued a balanced approach. Here, it is useful to recall the history of how the kingdoms have maintained their security. Gulf regional politics functioned as a triangle in which two powerful states—Iraq and Iran—confronted the half-dozen weak ones.

Before the Iranian revolution, when the Shah was in power and a radical Arab nationalist Iraq wanted to overthrow the Arab kingdoms, Iran was their protector. Once the Islamist revolution happened in Iran in 1979, Iraq became their protector against that country and doctrine, most obviously during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war. Increasingly, since the 1970s, the United States increasingly entered the picture as an external protector.

Once Saddam decided to attack Kuwait in 1990, it was clear that neither Tehran nor Baghdad could be counted on and the United States became even more important. True, there were negatives to dependence on a non-Muslim state whose policies often made it unpopular, but the GCC states did not hesitate when their survival was in question, as seen in the 1990-1991 Kuwait crisis.

In theory, during the post-Saddam era, the United States, with European help, should have been a satisfactory pillar whose power could balance off the continued Iranian threat. The GCC states also opposed Iranian ambitions to a degree which, given their usual caution, was relatively high. The willingness of Saudi Arabia to confront Iran’s ally Syria, over Lebanon, was notable. It might be noted that Syrian and Iranian backing for Hizballah was seen in Riyadh as another example of Shia expansionism.

The strategic problem for the GCC states, however, is that the United States has shown itself to be weak, both in general and in confronting Iranian-Syrian influence, especially under the administration of President Barack Obama. The president spent his first year seeking engagement with Tehran which, whatever its other implications signaled to the GCC states that they were partly on their own. They adjusted their strategy to include a larger measure of getting along with Iran and appeasing it. After all, Iran was much closer to America and much more willing to use violence. If Iran was going to emerge as the leading—and nuclear—power in the Persian Gulf they would have to adjust to that situation to ensure their own survival.

Thus, on one hand, the GCC states would be delighted to see the United States block Iran from getting nuclear weapons or even to see Israel attack and destroy such facilities, but they will keep a low profile publicly to avoid trouble. If Iran gets nuclear weapons, the Saudis might try to get some of their own though the likelihood of a serious Saudi effort to buy such weapons is often exaggerated.

Consequently, given all these problems, the question of how these regimes have survived with such apparent ease a modern world and regional atmosphere that is so hostile to them should be one of the most-studied issue in contemporary political analysis. The foundation of this success is their considerable traditional legitimacy and their massive financial assets. But that’s not all.

Internationally, as has been noted above, the use of a balance of power has been central. They have sought a protector against the most threatening force while also employing appeasement of the most dangerous local power in order to reduce the size of the threat. What is most notable about the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in this regard is that it came in the face of strenuous GCC, especially Kuwaiti but also Saudi Arabia, efforts to keep Baghdad happy. This factor made the attack all the more enraging for the GCC countries, and most of all the Saudis.

What is the secret of the kings and emirs in terms of domestic survival? The use of money to satisfy and co-opt people plus the calculated use of repression have been mentioned. In addition, however, a very important choice has been to slow rather than accelerate reform. A conventional analysis by Western observers would be to urge more rights, change, and democracy in the belief that these would be stabilizing forces.

But the contrary is true. To go too fast—to go even at a moderate speed—would antagonize the powerful conservative forces in these societies, most notably Islamic clerics who mostly support the regimes but who would switch to the revolutionary Islamist side if they thought their rulers to be impious.

Going too fast would have been the main domestic danger to these regimes and even though their rejection of reform entails more oppression, from a regime interests’ standpoint they have been clever to do so. (One might have an interesting discussion on whether they learned from the Iranian shah’s eagerness to bring social change to his country as a cause of the revolution there.)

Hand in hand with that approach was the continuation of the traditional foundation of the regimes’ power. Of course the Saudi and other royal families have often provided an example of corruption and dissolution that runs quite contrary to their desired image of piety and traditional tribal virtue, yet enough family members have behaved properly—or at least have kept their vices fairly secret—to avoid undermining their prestige irreparably.

It should also be emphasized that none of these are “one-man” dictatorships, in contrast to many nominally left-oriented dictatorships in the Third World. The royal families are large, members are distributed as watchdogs to many key posts (including in the military), and enough commoners are brought into the power elite (albeit in subordinate roles) to provide a lot of safeguards against a coup or revolution.

Some of these royals are very capable people and so while it certainly happens that incompetents are put in place due to their lineage, this problem is kept limited. Similarly, the family has some autonomy in choosing the monarch, allowing for the most feeble or incompetent to be discarded despite their seniority.

The regimes have also made good use of both repression and corruption. As Machiavelli taught, these tools can be well or badly used.

Repression, to be most effective, must focus on real threats rather than a generalized intimidation which increases social resentment to the point of revolt. (This is another mistake made by the shah.) Moreover, oppositionists must be given an escape valve that allows them to change sides, an action which is a most profitable one in the GCC states. At the same time, though, punishment must be severe enough to intimidate any but the most determined revolutionaries prepared to sacrifice their lives. The GCC states have been very effective in adjusting their blend of repressive and cooptive policies.

A similar point can be made regarding corruption. If corruption is used to the benefit of too narrow a group, it provokes tremendous resentment. But if it is spread widely, then it will be a positive force for stability, not only buying off key elements yet also giving many others the hope that if they support the regime and behave such riches could come to them also. It should also be noted that business is largely tied to the ruling family while intellectuals and professionals are largely tied to the state bureaucracy, limiting the growth of a completely independent class which sees its interest in conflict with that of the rulers.

The bottom line, then, has been that the GCC rulers have shown a strong sense of survival and

Maneuverability which has allowed them to survive well into the twenty-first century. There is no strong reason to believe that they will not continue to do so in decades to come.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest books are The Israel-Arab Reader (seventh edition), The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Wiley), and The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center is at Gloria Center and of his blog, Rubin Reports, at Rubinreports.

Related posts:

1. Saudi Arabia and the Rise of the Wahhabi Threat
2. The Obama Administration’s Middle East Disaster
3. Who will stop Iran’s Ahmadinejad?

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Mon, July 19, 2010 | Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center

Egyptian forces confront the Lifeline 3 activists in El Arish (ihh.org.tr, January 2010)

A comparison of the IHH violence directed against the IDF during the Mavi Marmara flotilla (June 2010) and the violence employed by the Lifeline 3 activists against the Egyptian security forces (January 2010) shows many similarities, especially the central role of Turkey and the violent behavior of IHH

Overview

1. In December 2009-January 2010 an international aid convoy called Lifeline 3 was dispatched overland to the Gaza Strip. It was organized by an organization called Viva Palestina, headed by the pro-Palestinian former British MP George Galloway. Two hundred and fifty Turks participated in the convoy, approximately half of the total number, and prominent among them were IHH activists led by Bülent Yildirim.

2. A retrospective analysis of the convoy’s conduct, using information from the Turkish media and the IHH website, indicates similarities between Lifeline 3 and the violent confrontation aboard the Mavi Marmara:

A. In both instances the group was heterogeneous, and included Islamist extremists (especially Turks), activists and organizations affiliated with the European radical left and authentic human rights volunteers who had answered the call to aid the Gazans.

B. In both instances Turkish support was central. The Turkish government played an important role in Lifeline 3, even though the convoy was dispatched by Viva Palestina. The Turkish government was involved in arranging for the convoy, and its organizers were guest of the Turkish Parliament. The heads of the government even intervened with the Egyptian authorities on behalf of the convoy. When the violent confrontation ended, the Turkish and Egyptian foreign ministers held talks for the release of the members of the convoy. As a result of those efforts the Egyptians even authorized some of the participants (Bülent Yildirim among them) to enter the Gaza Strip with part of the equipment they had brought.

C. In both instances the participants refused to obey the instructions of the Egyptian and Israeli authorities. The directors of Lifeline 3 defied the Egyptians, and their approach was confrontational and challenging (as during the Mavi Marmara incident).

D. The Lifeline 3 participants, especially the IHH operatives and their leader, Bülent Yildirim, behaved violently toward the Egyptian authorities, similar to their violent resistance to the IDF soldiers aboard the Mavi Marmara. Fifty operatives were wounded during the confrontation with the Egyptian security forces, five of them seriously. In an interview posted on the IHH website, Bülent Yildirim said that during the confrontation “we took seven Egyptian soldiers prisoner; we released three who were wounded…” (similar to the way three IDF soldiers were held for a short time by Turks during the fighting aboard the Mavi Marmara).

E. In both cases there were protest demonstrations in Istanbul. Following the confrontation with the Egyptian security forces protest demonstrations were held in Istanbul at which Egyptian President Mubarak was called a traitor and Hamas and Hezbollah flags were waved. The Mavi Marmara incident also led to anti-Israeli demonstrations throughout Istanbul, initiated by IHH and Islamist groups.

3. In the opinion of its organizers, the Lifeline 3 affair was a failure, it ruined relations with Egypt and drew attention away from Israel. The convoy raised little interest in both the Israeli and international media. The lessons of Lifeline 3 were studied and the conclusions were applied, five months later, in the Mavi Marmara flotilla.

The Lifeline 3 Convoy

4. The Lifeline 3 convoy was organized by Viva Palestina, an organization headed by George Galloway.^[1] Five hundred activists participated in the convoy, 250 of them from Turkey. There were 220 vehicles of various types, including ambulances. Forty seven vehicles came from the United States, 80 from Britain, and 73 from Turkey. All the Turkish vehicles were painted in the colors of “Palestine.” The convoy set out from Britain on December 6, 2009 and arrived in Turkey on December 15.

5. Before the convoy left Turkey the Egyptian authorities opposed the route the convoy was planning to take to reach the Gaza Strip, which was through the port of Nuweiba (on the eastern coast of the Sinai peninsula, on the Gulf of Aqaba) and from there north through Sinai to the Gaza Strip. Hussam Zaki, a spokesman for the Egyptian foreign ministry, said that in his opinion choosing a route through Turkey had political objectives, because most of the participants and a significant part of the aid came from there. He said Egypt had no problem with Turkish aid and the Viva Palestina delegation, but requested they respect the rules of the Egyptian government. He said that the convoy had to pass through El Arish because that was the port authorized by the Egyptian security forces, and that was where all the aid for the Gaza Strip had to be examined. He also said that the convoy’s organizers had been informed of the ruling but had not bothered to respond (Ma’an News Agency, December 29, 2009).

6. On December 16, 2009, the convoy’s organizers held a press conference in Istanbul, during which IHH head Bülent Yildirim called on the Turkish prime minister to ask the Egyptian president, who had visited Turkey the day before, to open the border to the convoy (todayzaman.com, December 17, 2009). The organizers were also received by the Turkish Parliament, where they spoke with the Parliament chairman and leaders of the SP Party (an Islamist party whose activists were also aboard the Mavi Marmara) and the AKP Party (Erdogan’s ruling party) (ihh.org.tr, January 2010). The convoy left Istanbul, where it was joined by IHH members (including seven women), to tour Turkish cities, among them Ankara, Konya and Adana. On December 19 they reached Syria.

Flotilla organizers received as guests of the Turkish Parliament (ihh.org.tr, December 2009)

7. After a short stay in Syria, on December 21 the convoy reached Jordan. The Egyptian government, with which difficulties had surfaced even before the convoy left Turkey, announced it would close the Rafah crossing on the day the convoy arrived (worldbulletin.net, December 2009). Following the difficulties with the Egyptian authorities, the convoy remained in the port of Aqaba to resolve the problems. On December 27 it left Aqaba and returned to Syria because the Egyptian authorities would not permit it to enter the port of Nuweiba.

8. In Syria Bülent Yildirim, after considerable efforts, managed to hire a boat to transport the vehicles from the port of Latakia to the port of El Arish. Some activists arrived apparently by light planes rented from Syrian Airlines. The Syrian planes flew one flight and the organizers were then forced to rent planes from a Greek company for the remainder of the 500 activists.

9. On January 4, 2010, the convoy’s activists reached El Arish. They were joined by five senior members of the Turkish government, including the head to the Parliament’s foreign relations committee and the deputy head of the SP Party. The members of the Turkish government promised the convoy’s organizers they would do what they could to resolve the issues with the Egyptian government. They held a press conference near the port where they insisted they would only enter the Gaza Strip with the convoy (ihh.org.tr, January 2010).

Confrontations with the Egyptian Security Forces

10. The Egyptian authorities announced that their security forces would allow only some of the trucks into the Gaza Strip through the Rafah crossing and demanded that the others enter via Israel. The Turkish prime minister intervened and tried unsuccessfully to alter the Egyptian decision.

11. The Egyptian restrictions led to confrontations between the security forces and the members of the convoy, prominent among whom were IHH activists led by Bülent Yildirim. According to a statement by Yildirim (See below) during the confrontation IHH activists took seven Egyptian soldiers captive. A short time thereafter three wounded soldiers were released and the remaining four were held as bargaining chips. During the confrontations 50 activists were wounded, five of them seriously.

12. Following the incident IHH issued a statement claiming that the members of the delegation had met with violence from the Egyptians. Plainclothes Egyptian police, it claimed, threw stones at them and riot-control police attacked them with pepper spray.^[2] Similar to the announcement issued after the Mavi Marmara incident, the statement claimed that the individuals involved were all innocent volunteers whose only objectives were humanitarian, and the organization, said the announcement, deplored the violence employed by the Egyptians.^[3]

Left: Wounded IHH operative (wearing a vest similar to those worn by IHH operatives on the Mavi Marmara. Right: Confrontation with the Egyptian security forces (ihh.org.tr)

13. The following is a free translation from the Turkish of Bülent Yildirim’s description of the events in Egypt: “…Egypt wanted to divide the delegation entering the Gaza Strip into two parts. They refused to allow the first group which arrived in El Arish to enter, but we objected to that. The Egyptian response was to confiscate 59 vehicles which we were bringing as a donation [to the Gaza Strip]. We resisted and they immediately surrounded us. When we began negotiating with them they attacked us. They threw stones at us. Thirty of our members were wounded, five of them seriously. They arrested seven of us. We responded to their attack. We captured seven Egyptian soldiers, and released three who had been wounded. That left four with us. We were willing to release them if our men were get go. After the first attack the Egyptian soldiers surrounded us on land and at sea. We were besieged. They could attack us again” [ITIC emphasis].^[4]

14. In the end, following the intervention of the Turkish prime minister and foreign minister, on January 5 some of the convoy’s activists, including Bülent Yildirim, were allowed to enter the Gaza Strip with part of the equipment they had brought, and were received by Hamas.

Left: Bülent Yildirim and de facto Hamas administration head Ismail Haniya. Right: Reception for the delegation in the Gaza Strip (ihh.org.tr)

15. In reaction to the confrontation between the (predominantly Turkish) members of the convoy and the Egyptian security forces, thousands of Turkish protestors took to the streets to denounce Egypt and its actions against the convoy. Some of the demonstrations took place in front of the Egyptian consulate in Istanbul. The demonstrators carried Palestinian flags and signs condemning the Egyptians’ use of force. They waved Hezbollah and Hamas flags, and held up pictures of Imad Moughnieh and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak shaking hands with Tzipi Livni.

Pictures from the Demonstrations in Istanbul

Anti-Egyptian demonstrations. Right: The sign reads "We are all Palestinians— We will resist (muqawamah)" (Hürriyet, January 2010)

Palestinian, Hamas and Hezbollah flags at a demonstration in Istanbul (ihh.org.tr)

Flag of the SP Party, whose activists participated in the Mavi Marmara flotilla, and the Palestinian flag bearing the inscription "We are all Palestinians—We will resist" (ihh.org.tr)

Tzipi Livni and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on a sign during a demonstration in Istanbul

Egyptian Response

16. In response to the violent confrontation in El Arish, which the Egyptian leadership called “contempt from visitors in the country,” the spokesman for the Egyptian foreign ministry said that Egypt had been surprised by the convoy which “lacked any humanitarian semblance and did not bring any aid, and which did not report its arrival to the authorities.” Egypt also declared George Galloway persona non grata because he had fanned the flames during the riots in El Arish, and he was forced to leave Egypt (Ynet and Haaretz, January 8, 2010). Abu al-Gheit, the Egyptian foreign minister, said that Egypt would not allow similar convoys to enter its territory and that it would formulate a new arrangement through the Red Cross or Egyptian aid organizations to transport humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip (Egyptian TV, January 8, 2010).

Learning the Lessons of Lifeline 3

17. IHH and Hamas learned the lessons of the Lifeline 3 convoy and the harsh Egyptian reaction. The main lesson was the need to avoid confrontations with Egypt in the future and to shift the focus of attention, practically and for the media, to Israel.

18. The lesson was applied in an interview with Muhammad Sawalha, a Hamas operative in Judea and Samaria who found asylum in Britain and became a senior figure in the Muslim Brotherhood, which participates in anti-Israeli activity, including the organization of convoys to the Gaza Strip. He said that Lifeline 3 found itself involved in an “unwanted confrontation” with the Egyptian authorities and “the next time the confrontation will be directly with the Zionist enemy itself on the high seas” (Hezbollah’s alintiqad website, January 17, 2010)

1 George Galloway is a pro-Palestinian anti-Israeli former British MP, who played a key role in organizing the Lifeline aid convoy to the Gaza Strip. Following the confrontation with the Egyptian authorities he was declared persona non grata in Egypt.

2 Several containers of pepper spray were found aboard the Mavi Marmara and had been prepared in advance for the confrontation with the IDF forces.

3 Ihh.org.tr.

4 Ihh.org.tr, January 6, 2010.

Related posts:

1. IDF Forces Met With Pre-Planned Violence When Attempting to Board Flotilla
2. Most of the Activists Involved in the Violence On Board the Mavi Marmara are Radical Islamists and Anti-Western
3. Portrait of Bulent Yildirim: a Radical Islamic Fundamentalist

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Mon, July 12, 2010 | Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center

The logo of Gulfsat Communications

Hamas’ Al-Aqsa TV has circumvented the French media regulator’s ban by signing an agreement with Kuwaiti satellite operator Gulfsat. However, that company also uses satellites owned by Eutelsat, which was instructed by the French government to take Al-Aqsa TV off the air for spreading incitement.^[1]

Hamas circumvents France’s ban on Al-Aqsa TV

1. On June 7, 2010, the French government instructed its broadcasting authority to terminate the transmissions of Al-Aqsa TV, a channel operated by Hamas and broadcast on satellites owned by Eutelsat, a French telecommunications company based in Paris. The instruction was given after France received a warning from the European Commission that the channel repeatedly violated European laws by showing programs full of incitement for hatred or violence mostly against Israel and Judaism (AFP, June 7).

2. Hamas activists took immediate action in an attempt to lift the ban. Al-Aqsa TV directors approached legal professionals and lawyers for legal assistance on that issue. However, the efforts mounted by Hamas reached a dead end, since the channel had to introduce considerable changes in its programming for the ban to be lifted. Accordingly, on June 24, Noorsat, a company which leases satellite-broadcast capacity for channels targeting audiences in Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East, announced the termination of Al-Aqsa TV transmissions (Al-Aqsa TV, June 25, 2010).

3. According to Al-Aqsa TV deputy director Muhammad Thuraya, immediately after the termination was announced, Al-Aqsa TV officials managed to reach an agreement with a new intermediary telecommunications company, Kuwait’s Gulfsat. Thuraya further added that the channel is interested in expanding its coverage to include South American countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Columbia, and Cuba. In addition, he promised that the channel will become available in such countries as Kurdistan, Turkestan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, eastern China, and Russia (Al-Aqsa TV, June 25, 2010).

Details on Gulfsat Communications

4. Gulfsat Communications is a company established in 1995 with cooperation from Kuwait’s Ministry of Telecommunications and the US-based Hughes Network Systems. It is a subsidiary of United Networks, which is part of KIPCO Group, a leading investment company in the region. The company provides planning, integration, and installation of advanced solutions in satellite technologies to various sectors in the Middle East. One of the services offered by the company is satellite transmission of TV broadcasts. According to the company, the satellites it uses cover two thirds of the globe. The company’s business is not limited to the Middle East—it also works with countries in Africa, the Far East, Europe, US, and South America.

5. Gulfsat broadcasts Al-Aqsa TV on the Atlantic Bird satellite. It covers North Africa, the Middle East, south and central Europe, the southern part of Russia and Central Asian republics, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and parts of India. The Atlantic Bird satellite is also owned by Eutelsat, the same company which, having received the French government’s instruction, forced Noorsat not to provide services to Al-Aqsa TV.

6. We believe that the implication is that Al-Aqsa TV, despite changing its intermediary company due to pressure from the French government, has found a creative solution allowing it to use the services of the French company that announced it would terminate its transmissions. What is more, it appears that, with the new satellite, the channel will be able to expand its inciting and hateful programming to cover areas in Asia it could not reach before, such as the Islamic republics in East Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India. However, the channel broadcasts are still full of vicious anti-Israeli, anti-Semitic and anti-Western propaganda.

1 Follow-up to the July 15, 2010 post: “France banning al-Aqsa TV for inciting hatred and encouraging terrorism”.

Related posts:

1. France Banning Al-Aqsa TV for Inciting Hatred and Encouraging Terrorism
2. Flotilla Activists Linked to Al-Qaeda, Hamas and Other Terror Organizations
3. Hamas uses cement for military needs

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Mon, July 05, 2010 | Turkey Analyst, vol. 3 no. 13 | the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Joint Center | By Gareth H. Jenkins

The Devil in the Detail: Turkey’s Ergenekon Investigation Enters a Fourth Year

“This article was first published in the Turkey Analyst (turkeyanalyst.org), a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center.”

July 10, 2010 marks the second anniversary of the publication of the first indictment in what has become known as the Ergenekon case. A total of over 600 suspects have been detained, of whom more than 400 have been formally charged in indictments running to thousands of pages and backed by more than a million pages of supporting evidence. Yet the prosecutors have yet to extract a single confession, much less produce any convincing proof that the clandestine network they described even exists. Indeed, far from strengthening the prosecutors’ case, the increasing volume of “evidence” has steadily undermined it. Most disturbingly, not only is much of the material self-contradictory or manifestly absurd but – particularly in what has become known as the Sledgehammer investigation – some appears to have been manufactured.

Prof. dr. mehmet haberal, the rector of Başkent University, was among a number of people detained across Turkey as part of an ongoing investigation into the Ergenekon Case. (zaman/ali ünal)

Background

The indictments claim that the “ Ergenekon terrorist organization” had its roots in the Turkish military and had not only plotted to overthrow the AKP government by instigating a military coup in 2003-2004 but had been responsible for virtually every act of terrorism and racist killing in Turkey over the last 25 years.

In a country already rife with conspiracy theories, there were many prepared to believe the claims; not least given that the military had staged full-blooded coups in 1960 and 1980 and manipulated elected governments out of power in 1971 and 1997. For some there was also an element of revenge. Tens of thousands of Turkish leftists had been imprisoned and tortured after the 1980 coup, while conservative Muslims had never forgiven the military for toppling an Islamist-led government in 1997. Significantly, much of the momentum for the Ergenekon case came from media organs associated either with followers of the Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen, or with former leftists, such as the fiercely anti-military daily Taraf, which is run by former leftists but has become closely affiliated with the Gülen movement. Given the length of the indictments, the claims published in such pro-AKP publications about what the Ergenekon prosecutors had “proved” or “discovered” became the main source about the investigation for the vast majority of Turkish and foreign observers.

However, the reality is very different. The indictments are littered with contradictions and absurdities. More critically, although the thousands of pages of wiretaps do occasionally turn up apparent indications of wrongdoing (such as violations of privacy or corruption) and distasteful political views, there is no convincing evidence that the Ergenekon organization exists, much less how it was financed and organized.

The concerns intensified when the case finally went to trial in October 2008. Defense lawyers were quickly able to disprove many of the claims in the indictments. More worryingly, some of the evidence presented to court suggested something more sinister. To give just one of many examples, an evidence file allegedly recovered from the office of one of the accused in early summer 2008 included documents from the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs which were not written until the last two months of 2008.

Although the Ergenekon trial is still continuing, it is nearly one year since the most recent indictment was published on July 19, 2009. Unlike when it was first launched in October 2008, the trial now receives little coverage in the Turkish media. At its current pace, the trial appears likely to last for at least another decade.

Any hopes that the numerous absurdities and abuses in the Ergenekon case would persuade pro-government prosecutors and journalists to become more circumspect have proved to be misplaced. Indeed, the more the case has become discredited, the more blatant and febrile has become the partisanship of pro-AKP elements in the judicial system and the media. Since late 2009, both have shifted their attention away from the Ergenekon case itself to a series of parallel investigations, which have been more explicitly targeted at the military. Most have followed a similar pattern, in which anonymous informants are reported to have sent letters or documents to pro-AKP prosecutors or journalists, claiming to contain evidence of coup plots or assassination plans by members of the military. Details of the alleged plots and plans have then been published in the pro-AKP media, after which those named have been seized from their homes, interrogated and, in many cases, charged. In no case has the anonymous informant subsequently made his/her identity known.

The most striking example has been the so-called Sledgehammer Plan, which was first published in Taraf newspaper in January 2010. Taraf claimed that, on 6-7 March 2003, 162 serving members of the Turkish military gathered at a seminar in Istanbul to discuss detailed plans for a coup which had been drawn up at the beginning of December 2002. In the indictment sent to the court on July 6, prosecutors charged 196 suspects with involvement in Sledgehammer. However, as with the Ergenekon indictment, the evidence raises more questions than it answers. The alleged plans include what is described as a justification for a coup on the grounds that the AKP had filled the bureaucracy with its supporters and was trying to silence criticism in the media by imposing tax fines. But the AKP did not form its first government until mid-November 2002 and made no attempt to appoint any of its supporters to the bureaucracy during its first two weeks in power; while the tax fines on the media – namely on the Doğan Group after it published details of corruption allegations against close associates of Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan – were not imposed until 2009. Similarly, the documents published in Taraf describe the key role that was to be played in the impending coup by a secularist NGO; although the NGO in question was not even founded until 2006. There are many other similar examples. As with the Ergenekon case, all of those interrogated as part of the Sledgehammer investigation have rigorously denied any knowledge of the crimes with which they are charged.

Ilhan Selcuk

Implications

One of the most striking consequences of the investigation has been the creation of a climate of fear which, even if it has eased in recent months, remains widespread. Critics of the investigation have been subjected to smear campaigns in the pro-AKP media and, in several cases, themselves been arrested and charged with membership of Ergenekon. Lawyers acting for the accused claim that their clients are routinely offered a choice between being released and promising to refrain from any public criticism of the government and remaining in custody for the duration of the trial. The frequency with which outspoken opponents of the AKP had details of their private telephone conversations leaked into the public domain, means that many ordinary Turks are now wary of talking openly on the telephone. The intimidation has been exacerbated by the failure of the AKP-controlled Justice Ministry to initiate investigations into who has leaked the wiretaps into the public domain, even though it is a crime under Turkish law.

İlhan Cihaner

Even more disturbing has been the case of İlhan Cihaner, the public prosecutor in the eastern province of Erzincan. When Cihaner resisted pressure from the Justice Minister to abandon an investigation into illegal activities involving religious communities supportive of the AKP – including the Gülen Movement – he was not only removed from his post but charged with membership of Ergenekon. Cihaner was held in prison for several months before being released pending trial. Needless to say, the indictment against him contains no evidence of membership of Ergenekon or any other illegal activity.

But the most devastating impact of the Ergenekon case and the affiliated investigations, such as Sledgehammer, has been on the military. It is possible to argue that, by forcing it onto the defensive, the Ergenekon investigation has accelerated the military’s already declining ability to influence politics. But the cost has been high: both on a personal level, through the imprisonment and trial of many serving and retired officers who are manifestly innocent of the crimes with which they have been charged, and on an institutional level.

The officers who attended the seminar named in the Sledgehammer Plan did so not because they were members of a conspiratorial cabal but because they were ordered to attend by their commanding officers. As a result, many serving officers are now understandably hesitant when instructed by their commanders to attend a seminar or training course for fear that, in the future, they may face criminal charges for allegedly plotting to overthrow the government. Perhaps more seriously, General Saldıray Berk, the commander of the Erzincan-based Third Army, has been charged with membership of Ergenekon mainly because he is based in the same province as İlhan Cihaner; with the implication that officers serving under Berk could also be vulnerable to similar charges if they obey his orders. It is unclear what impact such concerns have had on military efficiency but it is unlikely to be positive; and the Third Army is currently heavily involved in attempting to suppress a resurgent Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). There are also questions about the impact the spending of tens of millions of dollars on, and the allocation of a significant proportion of the intelligence-gathering capabilities of the police to, the Ergenekon case has had on struggle against the PKK in the urban areas which fall within the jurisdiction of the police.

Conclusions

The politicization of the Turkish judicial system is nothing new. In the past, the system was frequently abused to suppress what were perceived as ideological threats to the Turkish state; such as leftists, Islamists and Kurdish nationalists. Similarly, for most of the last 50 years, a system of military tutelage has served as a constraint on the development of a fully functioning pluralistic democracy. However, the Ergenekon case and its affiliated investigations suggest that, under the AKP, Turkey has been swapping one form of authoritarianism for another; and that the judicial system continues to operate not according to proof, due process or even the truth, but political and ideological affiliation.

There are increasing signs that the AKP’s public popularity is beginning to flag and there is now a genuine possibility that it may be ousted from power at the next general election. The prospect has reinvigorated the AKP’s opponents, not only in the political sphere but also in the judicial system. In recent months, hard-line secularists in the upper echelons of the judicial system have become more assertive and intervened to curb some of the abuses of the pro-AKP prosecutors in the Ergenekon investigation. If the AKP is ousted, it appears likely that Ergenekon and the affiliated investigations will finally be allowed to collapse under the weight of their own contradictions and absurdities. But there is also a real fear that, just as the current cases are largely motivated by a desire for revenge for past injustices, if the AKP does lose power then it will merely be the turn of the prosecuted of today to become the prosecutors of tomorrow.

Gareth Jenkins is a Nonresident Senior Fellow with the CACI & SRSP Joint Center, is an Istanbul-based writer and specialist of Turkish Affairs.

Related posts:

1. How a Leftist-Islamist Alliance is Subverting Democracy in Turkey
2. How Turkey Manufactured a Coup Plot
3. Erdogan’s Turkey, Islamism and the Ottoman Empire

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Sun, July 11, 2010 | Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center

Khaled Mashaal

Senior Hamas figures, especially Khaled Mashaal, reveal their intention to exploit the flotilla as part of their campaign to delegitimize Israel, continuing their commitment to jihad. They reject the Israeli easing of restrictions and make it clear that their priority is not humanitarian assistance for the Gaza Strip.

1. Senior Hamas figures have represented the affair of the last flotilla as an important political-propaganda victory which not only damaged Israeli-Turkish relations but made a genuine change in the way the international community regarded Israel. However, Hamas is apprehensive lest Israel’s easing of restrictions strengthens international understanding for its motives and increase pressure on the Hamas movement.

2. Statements made by Khaled Mashaal, head of the Hamas political bureau in Damascus, and of other senior Hamas figures, present two objectives, one practical and the other political-strategic:

A. Practically speaking, Hamas wants the complete lifting of the so-called siege, meaning goods would enter and exit the Gaza Strip according to Hamas’s conditions and rules: opening the crossings to the uninterrupted passage of all types of merchandise, including those with military use, banned by Israel; Hamas supervision of the goods entering the Gaza Strip; marginalizing the role of the Palestinian Authority making it easier to smuggle weapons in the future; opening the sea lanes to the Gaza Strip; and opening a route between Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip, which would facilitate smuggling weapons. As far as Hamas is concerned, imposing its own rules would strengthen its control over the Gaza Strip at the expense of the Palestinian Authority and promote the continuation of its military buildup.

B. Ideologically and strategically speaking, Hamas wants to exploit the recent events and enlist Arab-Muslim and international support for the flotilla as an expression of what Khaled Mashaal calls “the beginning of the end of Israel.” As far as Hamas is concerned, the world has begun to understand that Israel is a “heavy weight on the interests of both East and West.” Therefore, preference should be given to the campaign to delegitimize Israel and to enlisting the Arab-Muslim world and all the other “lovers of freedom all over the world.” For Hamas, important means to promote the campaign are organizing more flotillas (with much larger numbers of passengers), suing Israel in courts of law, boycotting Israel and holding protest demonstrations and marches (“The flotilla did more for the Gaza Strip than 10,000 rockets.”). Khaled Mashaal, speaking in Arabic on June 28 and in total contrast to his attempts to represent himself as a moderate in interviews in English and before Western audiences, stressed Hamas’ commitment to jihad and the destruction of Israel. He did not mention the need for the humanitarian assistance of the flotillas.

3. While the Palestinian Authority also does not consider the Israel announcement about easing the restrictions on goods allowed into the Gaza Strip as the end of the affair, it wants to prevent Hamas from exploiting the flotilla to become stronger at the expense of the PA. Therefore, senior PA figures demanded additional concessions from Israel (including that the “blockade” be completely lifted and an arrangement instituted for goods to be transported from the Gaza Strip to Judea and Samaria). However on the other, they also demanded a PA presence at the crossings in accordance with the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access.

4. The Egyptian foreign minister said that the Agreement was “the most logical means” for lifting the so-called siege of the Gaza Strip, but that he doubted whether it could be implemented, in view of the difficulty of achieving a Fatah-Hamas reconciliation. Khaled Mashaal blamed the Palestinian Authority for its attitude toward “breaking the siege,” which he called “not serious,” saying that the Palestinian Authority wanted the siege to continue as a way of exerting pressure on Hamas.

Appendix I

Khaled Mashaal calls for the destruction and delegitimization of the State of Israel (“the Zionist entity”), through various “popular activities,” such as flotillas

1. On June 28, 2010, Khaled Mashaal, head of the Hamas political bureau in Damascus, gave a speech in which he discussed several topics at length, including the issue of the flotillas and their place in the campaign to delegitimize Israel.^[1] He did not mention one word about the “humanitarian” need for the flotillas, on the basis of which human rights activists around the world have been recruited.

2. He made the following remarks (Al-Aqsa TV, June 28, 2010).

A. The campaign to delegitimize Israel: “Today we have to focus on a way to remove the spurious legitimacy the world gave to the Zionist entity. Israel is illegitimate because it was founded on the illegal occupation of our Palestinian and Arab land. Today the conscience of the world has awakened.”

B. Giving priority to delegitimizing Israel: “Today we—the Palestinians, Arabs Muslims and freedom-loving peoples of the world—have to focus on the following priorities: delegitimizing Israel and maximizing the exploitation of the rage of the world against Israel so that Israel knows the region and the world will vomit it out [sic]…”

C. The nature of the struggle against Israel and objection to negotiations with it: “…Negotiations with Israel only improve its image without the Palestinians’ getting anything in return. The clash with Israel [is carried out] through war, the resistance [i.e., terrorist campaign] and battle or mass action such as flotillas. [It is also carried out by] those who demonstrate solidarity against the fence and the settlements [i.e., "popular resistance" of the sort exhibited at Ni’lin and Bila’in] and the way the confrontation is conducted in Jerusalem – within the clash Israel is the one which exposes the extent of its crimes…”

D. The end of relations between the Arab countries and Israel: “…It is illogical that the world is furious with Israel and that some of us continue to be Israel’s friends and continue to maintain relations with it and trust it…”

E. Recent events signify the beginning of Israel’s end: “…We challenge Israel in the region and the world has begin to be angry with it, and therefore I say that Israel has begun the countdown to its end, with the help of Allah. However there is still a need for struggle, jihad, deeds and sacrifice.”

F. All Jerusalem must be under Arab rule: “As for Jerusalem, we want it to be unified by not under the [Israeli] occupation but under the Arab-Islamic flag, with the help of Allah. Jerusalem will be exclusively Arab…”

G. “Breaking the siege of the Gaza Strip” with more flotillas: “…Breaking the siege is a priority and we must compel it by all means, including new flotillas which will be organized in the coming weeks and months, with the help of Allah…I call on the Arab and Muslim people and other lovers of freedom in the world to multiply the number of participants…Together with us, all freedom-loving people around the world have begun to understand how much of a curse Israel is to the world, to its security and interests, and to what extent it is a heavy burden on the interests of both West and East.”

H. Preferring the path of resistance [i.e., violence and terrorism] to negotiations in the confrontation with Israel and in other battle zones: “…A day or two ago we heard that the British insist on urgent negotiations with the Taliban. What a surprise. The fighting and struggle on the ground are what determine the balance of power at the [negotiating] table. That is the message for the political negotiator [i.e., Mahmoud Abbas] and the Arab leaders who support him in direct and indirect negotiations…This is a historic moment, today, after the success of the resistance, which made achievements in Lebanon and Gaza and embarrassed the invading forces in Iraq and now in Afghanistan. Today the path we can rely on is the path of resistance…When we decide our priorities we must insist on the resistance, liberation, our rights, our land, Jerusalem, the right of return, breaking the siege of the Gaza Strip and on renewing the resistance in the West Bank…”

3. In his speech in Damascus before an Arab target audience, Khaled Mashaal dropped the “smile campaign” Hamas has recently used to win over target audiences in Western countries, and reclarified his known basic principles: the aspiration to destroy Israel, opposition to negotiations and employing the weapon of terrorism [the "resistance"]. As far as Hamas in concerned, the concept of worldwide “popular resistance” with the support of human rights organizations does not replace the path of terrorism. However, as far as Hamas is concerned, it has proved itself for the time being and therefore Hamas is willing to use it to undermine the State of Israel’s legitimacy.

Appendix II

Hamas reactions to the Israeli government’s decision to ease the restrictions on the Gazans and statements concerning future flotillas

1. Senior Hamas figure Mahmoud al-Zahar related to the flotillas in an interview with the British Independent (June 28, 2010):

A. He said Israel should expect many more flotillas in the coming months (including some from the Gulf States). He expected, he said, that other ships would sail for the Gaza Strip after the last World Cup game on July 11 and during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan (which begins on August 11).

B. He was strongly critical of the boycott the Arab states had imposed on the Gaza Strip for the past four and a half years since Hamas won the elections. However, he expressed satisfaction with the pressure exerted on Israel by the International Quartet to ease the “siege” of the Gaza Strip, calling it “a big change.” The change, he said, resulted from the “popular discontent” of the Arab countries, which was manifested by the flotillas.

2. Hamas activists interviewed by the Wall Street Journal on July 2 said that one of the lessons of the flotilla was the importance of using the tactic of civil disobedience, protest marches, legal suits and boycotting Israel. Aziz Dweik, a member of the Hamas faction of the Palestinian Legislative Council in Judea and Samaria said that “The Gaza flotilla has done more for Gaza than 10,000 rockets.” Salah Bardawil from the Gaza Strip, a Hamas delegate in the Palestinian Legislative Council , said that Hamas had begun to value the importance of international support to gain legitimacy as the representative of the Palestinian people. He said “”Hamas used to believe [international support] was just empty words…Today it is very interested in international delegations…and in bringing Israeli officials to justice through legal proceedings” [ITIC emphasis].

3. Senior Hamas figures were critical of the Israeli government’s announcement that restrictions would be eased:

A. Ismail Haniya, head of the de facto Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip, said that Hamas rejected Israel’s attempts to “prettify the blockade and strengthen it in a new form.” He said that Hamas strived for a total removal of the siege. He added that Gaza was not alone by virtue of the expressions of solidarity and public opinion, which have led to Israel’s position regarding the siege to be almost at the breaking point (Hamas’ Palestine-info website, June 18, 2010).

B. Ismail Haniya, interviewed by Al-Islam Al-Yawm on June 26, was asked to comment on Israel’s agreeing to allow into the Gaza Strip the humanitarian assistance of the last flotilla. He said that “the basic problem is not the assistance itself, despite its importance and the Palestinians’ need for it, but the issue of the blockade, which we demand to end in its entirety. We refuse to turn the problem into a solely humanitarian issue…” He added that “Israel wants to end the crisis with as little damage [to itself] as possible, and the way it has chosen to do so is by easing the conditions of the blockade.”

C. Taher al-Nunu, spokesman for the de facto Hamas administration, said that Israel was trying to fool the world, and called the decision to ease the restrictions “throwing sand in the eyes [of the world].” He repeated Hamas’ demand for a complete end to the blockade, including the restrictions on the entrance of building materials, and not for easing restrictions (Safa News Agency, June 17, 2010).

4. Jamal al-Khudari, head of Hamas’ Popular Committee to Break the Siege (and who is in contact with Hamas-supporting organizations and activists around the world), also criticized Israel’s decision. He claimed that the Gaza Strip needed 800 truckloads a day, not the 100 Israel has been sending in. He said that lifting the siege had four stages: opening the crossings into the Gaza Strip, allowing all types of merchandise in (including raw and building materials), opening a route for Palestinians between the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria, and opening sea lanes under international inspection (Popular Committee to Break the Siege website, June 20, 2010). On another occasion he called for an Islamic conference in Damascus to decide on an “intifada of ships” to the Gaza Strip as a means of breaking the “siege” (Qudsnet website, June 29, 2010).

Appendix III

The Essence of the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access

1. The Agreement on Movement and Access, known as the crossings agreement, was signed by Israel and the Palestinians on November 15, 2005, after Israel’s unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip and with the prodding of International Quartet representative James Wolfensohn and the American administration. At the same time an Agreed Principles for the Rafah Crossing agreement was signed, which dealt in detail with that crossing. According to the agreement the Rafah crossing would be operated by Egypt and the Palestinian Authority under European Union supervision. It stated that a joint Israeli-Palestinian coordination room would receive video images and other data in real time to make it possible to monitor the implementation of the agreement. It also determined contacts between the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria, and called on Israel not to interfere with the operation of the port. It mentioned that the importance of building an airfield had been agreed on, and that talks would continue concerning its security arrangements.

2. Implementing the agreement was abandoned after Hamas’ violent takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, which involved the suppression of the security services which supported Mahmoud Abbas, including those which were supposed to oversee the Rafah and Gaza Strip-Israel crossings. Hamas’ military buildup and the massive rocket attack which preceded Operation Cast Lead also contributed to making the Agreement on Movement and Access redundant.

1 The speech was given in Damascus to an audience of senior Hamas figures as part of a conference entitled “The student movement among prisoners in occupation jails and its role in defending Jerusalem and national Palestinian project.”

Related posts:

1. The Gaza Flotilla is a Step Towards the Destruction of Israel
2. Hamas Promises to Continue Terrorism until Israel Is Destroyed
3. Hamas continues its policy of terrorism against Israel

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Sun, July 11, 2010 | RubinReports | By Barry Rubin

Egypt-Gaza border

Egypt Versus Gaza

There is a bit of silver lining, even in the Gaza cloud. It’s this: the Egyptian government, aware that the West won’t help it get rid of the revolutionary Islamist regime there, that Israel cannot do it, and that Hamas won’t voluntarily accept subordination to the Palestinian Authority, now understands it has to protect itself from that threat.

For Egypt, the threat is multiple. Most directly, Hamas is a close ally to Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, a group that wants to overturn the nationalist regime and give Egypt an Islamist state that would enjoy all the blessings of Iran and Taliban Afghanistan. In or after their revolution, the Egyptian elite would be murdered and all of its property confiscated.

A second threat to Egypt comes from the fact that Hamas is an Iranian client. The days are long gone when Egypt could credibly present itself as the leader of the Arab world and the trend-setter for the region, but it still has a real national interest in what happens elsewhere in the area.

Iran is a threat to Egypt in four ways: Persian versus Arab; Shia versus Sunni; Islamist versus nationalist; and Iran versus Egypt on a state-to-state level of competition. One might well think of a hostile Gaza Strip in relation to Egypt as parallel to what a Communist Cuba has been to the United States.

On a third level, Gaza could easily become a safe haven for terrorists operating against Egypt. Any weapon smuggled into Gaza, for example, could reappear some day in an attack on tourists in Cairo.

With Egypt approaching its first “normal” transition of leadership in forty years the government seems to be all the more nervous about such things.

(President Gamal Abdel Nasser died in 1970 and there was a short-lived but potentially dangerous factional battle, but when President Anwar Sadat was assassinated in 1981 the elite united and Husni Mubarak had no trouble gaining full power.)

So what can Egypt do? It doesn’t want to rule Gaza, as it did between 1948 and 1967. Why ingest such a headache, to mix metaphors. And Egypt’s obvious though not explicit support for Israel’s 2008-2009 retaliation against Hamas’s war brought it criticism. Egypt has also tried and failed to play mediator between Hamas and the PA. Cairo also knows it cannot depend on the United States (who can do so nowadays?)

Thus, the best Egyptian option is to isolate the contagion. An entire new Egyptian security system, with more troops and several zones of control, has been established. A wall has been constructed to prevent Gazans from breaking through and houses have been demolished near the border line. Stepped-up efforts try to control smuggling.

The government has made it clear that nothing crosses the border without its permission, though it isn’t able to enforce that completely of course. I haven’t seen figures on successful smuggling and—truth be told—a lot of Egyptian officials like bribes. So I cannot say how much they have cut down on the cross-border commerce. But they are trying harder.

Remember, the Hamas regime is not just a threat to Israel but to Egypt. Egypt’s government doesn’t forget that for a moment.

Related posts:

1. Egypt Constructing a Wall along the Egypt-Gaza Border
2. Islamism versus Nationalism
3. Egypt President Hosni Mubarak Attacks Hamas

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Sun, July 11, 2010 | Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center

The French government is banning Hamas’ Al-Aqsa TV for inciting hatred and encouraging terrorism. Hamas denounced the French government’s decision, saying that the shutdown of its channel was an assault on the freedom of speech.

Overview

Al-Aqsa TV’s campaign against France’s ban of its broadcasts (Al-Aqsa TV website, July 5, 2010)

1. On July 7, 2010, the French government instructed its broadcasting authority to take Hamas’ Al-Aqsa TV off the air. The satellite channel was broadcast on Eutelsat, a French satellite company headquartered in Paris. French Foreign Ministry spokesman Bernard Valero said that the instruction was given when France received a warning from the European Commission that the channel repeatedly violated European laws by showing programs which incited hatred or violence for reasons of religion or nationality, mostly against Israel and Judaism (AFP, June 7).

2. In the past, the French government took similar measures against Hamas’ Al-Aqsa TV and Hezbollah’s Al-Manar TV, motivated by the anti-Israeli (and anti-Jewish) incitement and support of terrorism on those channels. The French government believes that the hatred and incitement to terrorism trickle down to local Muslim populations in France and in other European countries. It is, therefore, our assessment that the current ban as well as the previous measures taken by the French government must also be considered within the context of France’s internal considerations.

3. France’s Eutelsat said it would comply with the European Commission’s request, “but that it had to go through several technical and contractual steps before it could turn off the Al-Aqsa TV stream” (Wall Street Journal, June 10). Eutelsat also informed Al-Aqsa TV that it would stop broadcasting the channel via its satellites within several days. Hamas denounced the decision, saying it would lose most of its target audience as a result. Hamas has launched a propaganda campaign calling on ministers of telecommunications and information in Arab countries to take action. The management of Al-Aqsa TV released an announcement saying that it holds the government of France responsible for the decision and its consequences, and calling on it to reconsider.

4. On March 18, 2010, the US Treasury Department designated Al-Aqsa TV as a terrorism-financing organization. It also appears on the European Union’s list of terrorist organization. However, despite the restrictions imposed on the channel’s broadcasts, Al-Aqsa TV is still broadcast by other (Arab) satellite operators and is available online, diminishing the effectiveness of the French resolution.

Satellite operators’ responses to the French government’s order

5. Al-Aqsa TV is broadcast via Noorsat, a company which uses the satellites of the French Eutelsat to broadcast to European countries. The French company has no direct contract with Al-Aqsa TV, but rather with Noorsat, which leases satellite-broadcast capacity for channels targeting audiences in Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East.

6. Following the request from the French government, Eutelsat said it would comply with the European Commission, “but that it had to go through several technical and contractual steps before it could turn off the Al-Aqsa TV stream” (Wall Street Journal, June 10, 2010). On June 14, Noorsat informed the managers of Al-Aqsa TV that it would stop broadcasting the channel via its satellite within 48 hours (Al-Aqsa TV, June 14). This may cause considerable decrease in the availability of the channel in European countries and will make it more difficult for Al-Aqsa TV to broadcast to Arab countries.

7. This is not the first time that France’s satellite provider Eutelsat has been warned by the European Commission. In 2008-2009, the European Commission warned Eutelsat that providing satellite services to Al-Aqsa TV was a violation of French law, prohibiting programs which promote incitement and hatred. It now appears, however, that at the time, the warning did not have any effect on the contents of the programs broadcast on the company’s satellites (AFP, June 7, 2010).^[1] It remains to be seen, therefore, whether the recent order given by the European Commission and the French government will be upheld with any consistency. It can be assumed that Hamas is going to look for ways to circumvent the restrictions imposed on it.

8. Commenting on the announcement of the French government, Eutelsat said that it always complies with the demands of the European Commission. According to Eutelsat, in 2008 and 2009, when it received the European Commission’s report on Al-Aqsa TV, the company contacted its client (Noorsat), the satellite provider responsible for Al-Aqsa TV’s broadcasts, and demanded that the channel conform to the requirements of the EU (AFP, June 7). Obviously, there has been no significant change in the programs broadcast on Al-Aqsa TV, fed by the radical worldview of Hamas.

Hamas’ reaction

9. Al-Aqsa TV deputy director Muhammad Thuraya reported that the Noorsat company was going to terminate the channel’s broadcasts on June 17. He further added that the decision was motivated by programs inciting hatred. The channel asked for a one-day extension to contact lawyers and international legal professionals in an attempt to reverse the decision. He noted that the decision would cause the channel, which employs 400 people, to lose about 70 percent of its viewers, since Al-Aqsa TV broadcasts on the Arabsat satellite only reach about 30 percent of the viewers (AFP, June 15).

10. The management of Al-Aqsa TV released an announcement saying it is holding the government of France accountable for the decision and its consequences, calling on it to reconsider. An official announcement released by the management of the channel says that the only explanation for the decision is pressure exerted by Israel and the US to suppress public freedom and the freedom of expression. According to the announcement, the decision is not consistent with international broadcast and press laws (Ma’an, June 15, 2010).

11. At the same time, Hamas launched a media campaign against the decision. Al-Aqsa TV broadcast a series of special programs dedicated to the issue of the ban, including interviews with various personalities who condemned the French government’s decision. The Al-Aqsa media network organized a demonstration of journalists in front of the French culture center in Gaza City. The demonstration was attended by senior Hamas figure Isma’il Radwan, a member of the Al-Aqsa board, and Khaled al-Batash from the PIJ.

12. The Hamas administration’s information bureau released an announcement saying it considered the decision to be yet another attempt to silence “the channels of resistance which expose Israel’s crimes”, wondering at the fact that the decision was made by France, a country which prides itself on being the birthplace of democracy and liberty. The information bureau calls on the council of Arab information ministers to take measures to secure the rights of Arab satellite channels, saying it will send France’s Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel (CSA) a letter demanding that the decision be reversed.

13. Hamas activists strongly condemned the decision (Al-Aqsa TV, Radio al-Aqsa, Safa, June 15, 2010):

a. Al-Aqsa TV director Hazem al-Sharawi called on France to reconsider the decision, promising that numerous actions will be taken to exert pressure on France for that purpose. He submitted a letter of protest to a representative of the French consulate in Gaza, who promised to deliver it to the French consulate in Jerusalem.

b. Al-Aqsa TV board member Isma’il Radwan said that the decision exposed France’s false claims on the freedom of press, and that its purpose was to tighten the so-called blockade on the Gaza Strip. According to Radwan, the decision proves that the campaign has become one of propaganda, with Israel attempting to discredit the Al-Aqsa channel by accusing it of inciting anti-Semitism and terrorism.

c. Top Hamas figure Salah al-Bardawil said that France’s decision was “oppressive and racist”, and that its purpose was to cover up “the crimes of the occupation” against the Palestinians and to silence the voice of the free media of the “resistance” which exposes said “crimes”. According to Al-Bardawil, France’s talk of democracy is just a façade. He called on Arab ministers of information to translate their previous resolution against the French decision into practical measures.

d. Youssef al-Manasi, the minister of telecommunications in Hamas’ de-facto administration, said that the decision had no legal or moral justification, and that France bowed to pressure from the US and Israel. He called on Arab ministers of telecommunications and information to take a firm stand on that issue and take measures to ensure freedom of action for Arab media and information institutions.

Appendix

Details on Al-Aqsa TV and satellites broadcasting the channel

14. Al-Aqsa TV is Hamas’ most important TV channel. It started broadcasting in the Gaza Strip on January 9, 2006, after Hamas had won the legislative council elections. Since it was first launched, it has been an instrument for disseminating messages of hatred and incitement against Israel. The channel often airs children’s programs packed with severe incitement against Israel, the Jewish people, and even the West.^[2]

Al-Aqsa TV’s logo

15. Following are examples of messages of hatred broadcast by Al-Aqsa TV, which may influence Arab/Muslim communities in France and elsewhere in Europe:

Anti-Semitic incitement rooted in the Protocols of the Elders of Zion

Ziyad Abu al-Hajj, Hamas-affiliated preacher who had taken part in an international convention in Spain for religious dialogue, repeating myths taken from The Protocols of the Elders of Zion and calling for the genocide of the Jews (Al-Aqsa TV, April 3, courtesy of Palestinian Media Watch)3

Children’s programs full of incitement and hatred

From the Al-Aqsa TV children’s program called “Pioneers of Tomorrow”: Nassur the bear: “We want to slaughter (the Jews) so that they leave our land, right?” (September 22, 2009, courtesy of Palestinian Media Watch)

16. The channel’s broadcasts in Europe are made possible thanks to Noorsat Global Satellite Communication Company, a provider of satellite communications services to the Arab world. It was established in December 2004 as a private enterprise for developing and operating satellite telecommunications networks for the Arab world. The company is headquartered in Bahrain and has offices in Amman. In October 2009, it announced that it had signed a multi-year agreement for leasing telecommunications satellites with Eutelsat, considerably expanding the company’s coverage.

The company’s logo

17. In order to broadcast Al-Aqsa TV in Europe, Noorsat makes use of telecommunications satellites owned by Eutelsat, a French-owned corporation headquartered in Paris. Using those satellites, the channel is broadcast to central and western Europe, home to sizeable Arab and Muslim communities exposed to Hamas’ blatant incitement against Israel and the Jewish people and encouragement of terrorism rooted in Hamas’ radical Islamic ideology.

The corporation’s logo

18. The channel also uses Arabsat and Nilesat, Arab and Egyptian satellites. In addition to the Gaza Strip, the channel can be watched in Judea and Samaria, in the entire territory of Europe, northern Africa, and the Middle East. It is broadcast to Europe via Atlantic Bird 4A, a satellite operated by Eutelsat, a leading satellite provider in Europe and one of the three leading providers in the world. If the latest decision of the French government is put into practice, the channel’s availability in Europe is likely to decline.

1 See our January 11, 2009 Information Bulletin: “Terrorism and the media: Hamas’s Al-Aqsa TV no longer broadcasts via the European Eurobird satellite.”

2 See our October 8, 2009 Information Bulletin: “Hamas recently broadcast a children’s TV show which specifically called for the slaughter of the Jews. Hamas thus continues brainwashing the children of the Gaza Strip with hatred and the use of violence against Israel and the Jewish people, contradicting the moderate image it tries to market to the West.”

3 See our April 21, 2009 Information Bulletin: “The hate industry: Hamas’s Al-Aqsa TV continues its crude anti-Semitic incitement, using The Protocols of the Elders of Zion and calling for the genocide of the Jews. In addition, a book was seized during Operation Cast Lead, rife with anti-Semitism.”

Related posts:

1. Hamas Circumvents France’s Ban on Al-Aqsa TV
2. The World’s Latest Anti-Israel Lies, Injustice, Bias, Prejudice, Hatred and Hypocrisy
3. Hamas Promises to Continue Terrorism until Israel Is Destroyed