By Rob Harris

The latest Middle Eastern PEW study focuses to a large extent on the perception of Barak Obama and his prospective role in the Israeli-Arab conflict.

The PEW study also revealed some notable findings about those involved in the conflict. One of the more expected but still sobering findings was the confirmation that, unlike Israeli’s, a large majority of Arab-Palestinians do not favour peaceful methods to achieve independent statehood. From the report:

Israelis, on balance, believe a way can be found for an independent Palestinian state to coexist peacefully with their country. Palestinians, on the other hand, overwhelmingly do not think this is possible, and a plurality believes armed struggle rather than negotiations or nonviolent resistance is the best way to achieve statehood.

“Armed struggle” in this instance is a more politically correct terminology for terrorism. Arab- Palestinian terrorists traditionally assault the Jewish civilian populace rather than the military.

For example, during the Second Intifada, which constitutes the last great united Palestinian “armed struggle”, 80% of those killed on the Israeli side by Arab-Palestinians were in fact civilian. Afghanistani/Iraqi insurgents killed civilians in similar proportions.

Palestinians are more likely to say armed struggle is the best way for their people to achieve statehood (45%) than they are to say negotiations or nonviolent resistance offer the best prospect for the creation of a Palestinian state (15% each). Another 22% volunteer that a combination of these three approaches would be most effective.

In effect 67% of all Palestinians support armed struggle because 45% support terrorism, whilst another 22% support terrorism combined with political actions. This does not bode well for any peace process!

Seeking pan-Arab military assistance?

The PEW study also found that a broadly similar percentage (three quarters) of Arab-Palestinians believe that the Arab world is not doing enough to assist them in achieving independent statehood:

When asked whether Arab countries are doing too much, too little or enough to help the Palestinian people achieve statehood, three-quarters in the Palestinian territories say they are doing too little; 16% say other Arab nations are doing enough and 5% believe they are doing too much to help Palestinians achieve statehood.

Assistance to achieve statehood can of course be given in various non-violent ways. However, when viewed with regard to a sizeable majority of Arab-Palestinians supporting violence to achieve the same goal of nationhood, it can clearly be inferred that that a majority of Palestinians likely support some form of pan-Arab military aid, which already occurs with Iran’s assistance to Hizbullah and Hamas.

The finding has a degree of ambiguity but it may even reflect some desire for outright pan-Arab inter-state war with Israel. This was a common populist expectation in the Middle East some decades ago.

The popularity of Palestinian factions amongst the populace

Perhaps surprisingly, Arab-Palestinians, both in the West Bank and Gaza, have a largely positive view of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. This popularity may have been bolstered by his successful move for “Palestine” to controversially gain observer status at the United Nations General Assembly last year, a unilateral move which breached the spirit of the Oslo Accords/Resolution 242.

Palestinians express mostly positive opinions of Abbas; 61% have a favorable view and 34% have an unfavorable view of the Palestinian president. Abbas is viewed favorably by majorities in both the West Bank (57%) and Gaza (68%). His party also receives positive ratings among Palestinians; 69% have a favorable view of Fatah, while 27% express unfavorable opinions.

PEW also found that leading terrorist groups Islamic Jihad and Hamas are less popular than Abbas’ Fatah/PLO faction. However, this finding may not be seen as a positive. 11% fewer Arab-Palestinians now hold negative opinions of Hamas since the last poll was taken by PEW. It is a sizeable change:

…a majority of Palestinians (56%) holds favorable opinions of Islamic Jihad, while about a third (35%) gives the militant organization negative ratings.

Opinions of Hamas are more mixed, with 48% of Palestinians viewing the extremist group favorably and 45% saying they have an unfavorable view of Hamas. In 2011, when Pew Research last asked Palestinians about Hamas, more held negative views (56%) than expressed positive opinions (42%)…

Despite changing views, such a show of support for Fatah may nonetheless encourage Abbas to hold long-delayed elections later this year.

Perceptions of Israeli’s and Arab-Palestinians in the West

The PEW survey also focused on the contrasting international support for Arab-Palestinians and Israel.

As has long been the case, the vast majority of Arab nations are extremely hostile to Israel, whilst the United States of America still holds a firm support for the state, despite the intensive efforts of Arab-Palestinian supporters to chip away at what is an essential block of support for Israel’s very existence.

Elsewhere in the Western World opinion of the two sides of the conflict varies quite considerably:

Views are more mixed in France, Germany and Russia. For example, 40% of French respondents sympathize more with Israel, while 44% say their sympathies lie with the Palestinians. Similarly, in Germany and Russia, about as many side with Israel as side with the Palestinians, but substantial numbers in these countries do not sympathize with either side in this conflict (31% and 42%, respectively).

The image PEW presents is one that may give a small ray of hope to those that support Israel because broad public stances on the conflict have not dramatically changed since 2007, despite the high-intensity campaigning by Western pro-Palestinian supporters:

For the most part, there has been little change in perceptions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in recent years. In France, however, opinions are more balanced than they were in 2007, when 43% sympathized with the Palestinians and 32% sympathized with Israel.

In mainland Europe, the image is mixed. Germany has seen a notable increase in support for the Palestinian cause, whilst in France support for Israel has surprisingly increased in recent years. Russia has a sizeable pro-Israel support base despite decades of hostility from officialdom within the USSR.

The report finds that almost twice as many British people support the Palestinians over that of Israel. The finding reinforces the view that the British stand out as perhaps the most anti-Israel collective in the Western world, where many British academics, journalists and politicians have taken a leading and longstanding role in Israel’s delegitimisation.

Rob Harris contributes articles to several websites on contentious political issues (not to be confused with the popular English novelist (1957-) of the same name). He blogs at eirael.blogspot.com. He lives in Ireland. For all the exclusive blog entries by Rob Harris, go here.

By Rob Harris

Horrific scene of the first explosion that went off near the finish line of the Boston Marathon. (Photo by John Tlumacki/The Boston Globe via Getty Images)

With news that the April 15^th terrorist assault on the Boston Marathon killed three, including an eight year old boy, and caused over one hundred and eighty to be injured (some critically), those touched by the tragedy and horror of this bloodthirsty indiscriminate attack on innocent civilians will of course be speculating a great deal on the source of the terrorism.

Definitive assertions would of course be unjustified at this stage but it is reasonably certain that the terrorist attack came from one of arguably three politically distinctive categories of terrorism.

An ethical conundrum!

Jeffrey Goldberg, a popular American journalist of genuine repute, wrote three hours after the Boston attack that it was improper for journalists to speculate on the source of the attack. Goldberg explained thus:

Shortly after the 2011 shootings in Norway, I asked publicly whether a Mumbai-type attack had visited Europe, the implication being that Muslim terrorists were behind the atrocity. It was perfectly plausible to suggest that Muslim terrorists were to blame — except that they weren’t. I learned my lesson.

Goldberg, like many others within the media, suggested prematurely that the 2011 Norway massacre by Anders Behring Breivik was likely an Islamic terrorist attack. The irony that an individual opposing Islamism actually committed the Norwegian slaughter generated a particularly smug form of the left-wing carping, and widespread use of the Islamophobia charge, despite the mainstream media’s traditional reluctance to refer to religion, particularly when it comes to Islamist terrorism.

One can easily envisage a scenario where idle speculation can incite violence against a specific religious group within a highly emotivised society after such a traumatic event. However, there is an opposing ethical credo within journalism, namely providing the truth. Speculation based on well-informed guesswork may not qualify as absolute truth on what occurred. However, it is still innately truthful, and an essential element within everyday journalism.

There is also a slightly patronising quality to the “no speculation” argument because it suggests an educated public does not have sufficient maturity to conduct itself with an appropriate sense of rectitude. Although it is wise at this stage to avoid making any firm judgement on the origins of the attack, speculation still has a place for a public that relies on the media for basic information on all manner of events. It can be done responsibly by stressing the provisional nature of such assertions, and especially by presenting the matter in a non-sensationalistic fashion.

The fact that the massacre has been welcomed by individual Muslims and various Islamic factions ought to be deemed a greater source of concern, if reprisals against the Islamic community are truly a possibility.

Domestic terrorism

Numerous journalists have speculated that American right-wing extremists are responsible because the assault occurred on Tax Day, tax being an issue politicised in American politics perhaps to a greater extent than that of most other nations, partly due to being a traditionally low-tax economy that focused on a philosophy of small governance. A more European scale of governance, funded by the taxpayer is seen as impacting on liberty on a number of levels.

The attack also coincides with Patriots’ Day in Massachusetts, which commemorates the anniversary of the earliest battles for the American War of Independence, giving further credence to the right-wing extremists claim. However, prima facie, it seems that such a historic date would be more likely the cause of celebration for patriot groups, rather than a time to generate such widespread infamy in America.

On the other hand, some individuals or groups may of course see the date as a symbolic starting-point for further conflict with what they deem to be a State that has turned tyrannical, and in breach of the values espoused in the US Constitution. However, such groups tend to favour very symbolic targets, such as government institutions as well as certain organisations (e.g. abortion clinics) and related events that have a distinctive political character that they deem to be objectionable.

The prospect of an Islamist attack

There is some reason to tentatively suspect that the attack is originated from an Islamic source, be it a group, or an American citizen/convert:

A Middle East counter-terrorism official based in Jordan said the blasts “carry the hallmark of an organised terrorist group, like al-Qaeda”. He did not give actual evidence linking al-Qaeda to the bombing.

“From the little information available, one can say it was a well-coordinated, well-targeted and near-simultaneous attack,” he said.

The counter-terrorism official highlighted the fact that the massacre featured the dual-assault hallmarks of an Islamist attack. This strategy of maximising casualties has become near ubiquitous for such groups. However, it should be noted that this same technique has also been used by other terrorist groups in the past, including the IRA.

It has been reported that the authorities investigating the case may suspect al Qaeda or an affiliated group although evidence is lacking at this early stage, and the search for a specific motivation remains open. Richard DesLauriers, the FBI agent in command of the investigation, stated that fragments recovered from the bombsite suggest the bombs were a specific pressure cooker based design that was recommended in al Qaeda’s magazine Inspire because they are easy to construct, can make use of widely available materials, and avoid detection from sniffer dogs. Such bombs have been used in India, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

It has also been noted that Abdallah Dhu-al-Bajadin, a senior al Qaeda weapons specialist, made threats against the US last month. This coincided with a rash of threats from other al Qaeda affiliated sources.

The Inspire connection also rears its head with an article attributed to Abu Musab al-Suri, a well known Syrian terrorist, which described sports events as being one of “the most important enemy targets” in the US.

Islamists have shown a tendency to target the city of New York since the 1993 World Trade Centre attack. It took on a symbolic dimension, being the most successful Islamic attack on non-ambassadorial US soil until 9/11. This fact would make Boston a less likely target for Islamists, although it could perhaps become more attractive from a terrorist perspective since the city clearly possessed a lower rank of security, and numerous plots to attack New York since 9/11 were prevented.

The prospect of state-sanctioned terrorism

It tends to be the case that terrorist groups rapidly claim responsibility after an attack takes place. The objective for any terrorist group is to maximise gain in terms of political capital, and to bolster a fearsome reputation. Making the claim soon after a horrified public response, to what is typically a most callous act of murder, will inevitably burn the identity of the terrorist group into the collective consciousness of a society. The fact that no group or individual has claimed responsibility is puzzling, and leaves open the possibility that the attack might involve a foreign nation.

Iran has not been mentioned to a significant extent in the media as a possible source for the assault. This is peculiar since it is a fact that their attacks on foreign soil, involving their elite Quds Force (part of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard), and closely allied Hizbullah, have greatly increased in the last number of years. Indeed an attack in 2011 on the Saudi Ambassador to the United States is likely to have had Iranian/Quds origins.

It is thought the United States has been involved in extensive efforts to prevent Iran developing nuclear weaponry. In parallel, it has introduced increasing rounds of sanctions against the Islamic State, which have been taking an ever-increasing toll on its economy since 2012.

One would speculate that such an attack would have a degree of sophistication but the terrorists having used relatively crude technology, suggesting that an inexperienced individual or individuals constructed the bombs, works against the theory. However, some security experts have speculated in the media that the use of inexperienced bomb makers could be intentional, with the aim of enhancing the possibility of escaping detection by Homeland Security.

Coda

Regardless of the source of this attack, the Boston Massacre is a tragic reminder of what terrorism truly constitutes.

Terrorism is the act of assaulting what are so often purely civilian events. In this instance it was a marathon in Boston, where competitors and bystanders were the sole target. It cannot even be said by apologists that this is an attack simply on Americans, over some sort of domestic or foreign policy, for the event attracts many international visitors. It is terrorism designed to maximise the carnage of innocents, be they men, women, children or infants.

The harm visited on the city will no doubt scar the victims, their families, and the greater community of Boston for years to come, giving rise to fear where there was once implicit trust. Yet it’s a community that has long possessed a strong individual identity, one that will surely survive the malign purpose of the instigators, whosoever they may be.

Update (19/4)

A dramatic sequence of events in the search for the Boston Marathon bombers has claimed the life of one police officer, and led to areas of Boston being placed in lockdown. The older of the suspects has been killed in a shootout with police. The younger second suspect continues to evade police despite a vast manhunt, which some speculate is due in part to the impact of social media.

The suspects were identified as brothers Tamerlan (26) and Dzhokhar (19) Tsarnaev, from Dagestan, a federal republic within the Russian Federation, which neighbours Chechnya. The brothers lived in the US for nearly a decade.

Dagestan is a principally Muslim region that has had substantive issues with Islamic insurgency and terrorism in recent decades, spilling over from chechnya, where there has been protracted conflict in an effort to gain independence. Whilst the conflict there has not threatened the US, regional Chechen fighters constitute part of the membership of certain groups fighting against the US presence in Afghanistan, with some believing Chechen rebels have links with al Qaeda.

The belief in an Islamist motive behind the attack has been strengthened, with an aunt of the brothers stating that Tamerlan Tsarnaev became a devout Muslim two years ago, while US government officials state that he travelled to Russia last year and returned to the US six months later. Similarly strong expressions of faith were made by the bothers on the Internet, with the suspects also expressing pride in their ethnic Chechen origins, and a desire to see independence from Russia.

Rob Harris contributes articles to several websites on contentious political issues (not to be confused with the popular English novelist (1957-) of the same name). He blogs at eirael.blogspot.com. He lives in Ireland. For all the exclusive blog entries by Rob Harris, go here.

By Rob Harris

(source: Scholars for Peace in the Middle East website, http://spme.net/)

In April 2013 the Teachers’ Union of Ireland (TUI) became the first European trade union involved with education and academia to adopt a resolution calling on its members to “cease all cultural and academic collaboration with Israel”. The boycott includes any co-operative research programs with Israeli institutions, and also proscribes the exchange of students between the nations.

The resolution also calls on the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU), an umbrella organisation representing some 55 Irish trade unions of which the TUI is affiliated, to “step up its campaign for boycott, divestment and sanctions against the apartheid State of Israel boycotting Israeli academia until it ends the embargo of Gaza, withdraws from the West Bank, and abides by all anti-Israel UN resolutions.” The ICTU has officially boycotted Israel since 2009, and has already gone out of its way to demonise the Jewish State with extremely one-sided pro-boycott conferences.

The TUI motion also instructs the Union’s executive to institute an information programme to justify the boycott. To use their own Orwellian language, it will be “an awareness campaign amongst TUI members on the need for a full boycott, divestment and sanctions against Israel”. It will likely invoke the dubious apartheid claims that led to the boycott in the first instance, in an attempt to reinforce the ideology behind the motion, and guarantee its continued support in the face of objections.

Assertions of the leading BDS advocates

According to the Jerusalem Post

The motion was raised by Jim Roche, a lecturer at the Dublin Institute of Technology and member of the fringe groups Ireland Palestine Solidarity Campaign (IPSC) and Gaza Action, and seconded by the vice-president of the TUI Gerry Quinn. […]

David Landy, a lecturer at Trinity College Dublin, member of the radical IPSC and founder of Academics for Palestine, called on other unions to follow suit. […]

He said it was “nonsense” that boycotts stifle academic principles.

“Undoubtedly apologists for Israeli apartheid will complain that such motions stifle academic freedom, but this is nonsense.”

So Mr. Landy haughtily deems it a “nonsense” that the boycott will discourage the free movement of academics and students, a valued principle within the academic world, and likewise it is a “nonsense” that it will discourage the free exchange of information and research? If his assertions are correct then why has he and his colleagues advocated a boycott that seeks to isolate Israeli academia and students?

“The Palestinian call for an academic boycott of Israel is an institutional boycott, not a boycott of individuals.”

Does Mr. Landy have no notion of the fact that academic institutions are composed of individuals both working and studying within them? When Israeli students attend schools from childhood, will they not almost inevitably be Israeli schools? What exactly does Mr. Landy and his IPSC colleagues foresee as happening when their motion proscribes the exchange of students with Israeli institutions? Clearly the real nonsense is the claim by boycott advocates that the process won’t harm individual Israeli students.

Israel and Arab-Palestinian education

Both Landy and Roche assert that Israel is somehow destroying the Palestinian education system, to the extent of even boycotting it:

“Ironically, those that will jump to complain about this motion will have no words of condemnation for the de facto boycott imposed on Palestinian education by Israel, nor for its continuing attacks on Palestinian education, students and educators,” Landy said.

Does such an assertion have any substantive basis in fact? Perhaps not, for literacy in the West Bank was at 88% before Israel administered the territory. It has now risen to 93%, comparing favourably with neighbouring Jordan.

Furthermore, university education was non-existent in the West Bank prior to Israel’s presence. Israel built six third level institutions to serve Arab-Palestinians. Several were temporarily closed during the Second Intifada as they were being used to advance the cause of conflict.

One example of third-level incitement is Al Najah University, which featured perhaps the most debased exhibit celebrating the death of Israeli civilians. It became a centre for Hamas’ al-Qassam brigade, and yielded numerous suicide bombers from amongst its student body.

Jim Roche and David Landy

Two chief advocates for the TUI boycott have become quite well known in Ireland for extremist views.

Jim Roche (right) with Dr. Ahmed Muhaisen, Head of the Department of Architecture (left) after Roche’s lecture at IUG. Jim Roche was invited to the Islamic University of Gaza (IUG) where he delivered a lecture on his work in architectural practice and his teaching at Dublin Institute of Technology. (source: www.dit.ie)

Jim Roche is a veteran of the flotillas that attempted to break the legal Israeli embargo on Gaza. He is a senior member of the jihadist-supporting Irish Anti-War Movement. His views echo that of the basest pro-Palestinian propaganda. He has openly perpetuated the long-disproven assertion that Arab-Palestinians in Gaza are starving, which was untrue even before Israel lifted all food import restrictions in June 2010.

Mr. Roche postulates fanciful notions, claiming Israel “has erased and continues to erase indigenous Palestinian architectural heritage from the physical landscape and collective consciousness….”, whilst ignoring the destruction to the holiest Jewish sites through the decades. He not only inverted the sequence of events leading to the Operation Pillar of Cloud conflict in 2012 but actually congratulated Hamas on showing ‘restraint’ while it was indiscriminately attacking Israeli civilians:

…what is remarkable about the current escalation, purely manufactured by Israel for internal electoral reasons, is the resilience and restraint shown by the Gazan people and its elected government.

Roche opposes all sanctions against Iran, and speaking after the successful TUI vote, he stated:

I am very pleased that this motion was passed with such support by TUI members, especially coming the day after Israeli occupation forces shot and killed two Palestinian teenagers in the West Bank.

Would this happen to be the same teenagers who threw petrol bombs at an armed Israeli checkpoint in the darkness of night? Haaretz reported that they were carrying seven incendiary devices, despite describing them as “unarmed”!

David Landy (source: www.tcd.ie/)

David Landy is a figurehead of the Irish pro-Palestinian movement. It has been suggested that he has a rather problematic stance toward his own Jewish identity. Indeed Landy wrote a book on the very issue, entitled “Jewish Identity and Palestinian Rights”, which taps into the increasingly vocal negation of Jewish identity in the Jewish quarter of the anti-Zionist movement. A review by Professor Philip Mendes, also featuring a similarly themed book, states that:

Both authors rightly suggest that their samples are involved in creating alternative communities of Jews who reject Israel. These communities give them a sense of belonging and mutual support that was denied to them in the mainstream Jewish community. This then begs the question of what if anything distinguishes their anti-Zionist beliefs from the views of anti-Zionists who aren’t Jewish…

Double standards, Irish style

Whether or not one thinks Israel is violating the rights of Arab-Palestinians, the singling out of this small nation above all others must surely seem an oddity to all but those who obsessively hate Israel.

Numerous Irish academic institutions have strong links with regimes that possess dubious human rights records. Moreover, one would think this issue would be a source of even mild concern to those supposedly interested in human rights because these links have grown ever stronger, such as with Russia, and particularly China, the developments of which have been well publicised. Consequently, the obsession over a few rather tenuous academic links with Israel is outlandish, to say the least.

As musician and academic Ciarán Ó Raghallaigh noted, perhaps with a hint of sarcasm in a letter to the Irish Times

Cover of Landy’s book “Jewish Identity and Palestinian Rights – Diaspora Jewish Opposition to Israel” (Zed Books 2011, www.zedbooks.co.uk/)

There seems to have been no discussion of the extensive academic ties that Trinity College, Dublin Institute of Technology and University College, Dublin all have with Russia and China, despite the former country’s illegal occupation of parts of the sovereign state of Georgia… This is all the more surprising given that it was the Dublin Colleges Branch of the TUI that sponsored the anti-Israel motion.

Neither were any corresponding demands placed by members of the TUI onto the opposing Arab-Palestinian side. It should be recalled that the Arab-Palestinian education system & academia has been used to incite extreme hatred and violence throughout the Palestinian populace for decades, thereby dealing a death-blow to any chance of a peace process, thanks to a permanently radicalised populace. It would seem that even an education system using children in endeavours to exterminate another state, going as far as to institute militaristic camps is not worthy of censure!

On prejudice and discrimination

The notion that the TUI boycott is an assault on Israel, rather than an attempt to weaken any sense of a perceived occupation, is well founded. The boycott extends to all Israeli institutions, rather than merely those involved with the West Bank or Samaria and Judea. The organisation Trade Unions Linking Israel and Palestine, which unites both Israeli and Palestinian workers and attempts to foster dialogue, noted the indiscriminate nature of the TUI boycott resolution:

The resolution does not specifically call for a boycott of Israeli academics or students who are, for example, based in the occupied territories. The boycott covers all Israelis, even those students and academics who oppose the occupation and who support self-determination for the Palestinians.

Similarly, one wonders what is to be achieved by including a cultural aspect to the boycott. Proponents argue that any manifestation of Israeli culture “whitewashes the occupation”. However, it can easily be inferred that behind such senseless words an uglier truth lies. These individuals are afraid that we will see Israeli people as human beings rather than as bloodthirsty monsters so often portrayed on the news.

Interestingly, British academic unions considering a similar boycott received legal advice that it might be in breach of European Union anti-discrimination laws. BDS was found to be illegal by the French Supreme Court, and the European Court of Human Rights upheld this ruling. However, it is unclear whether the TUI will be challenged on their boycott.

Some implications for Ireland

It should not be thought that the arguments of BDS advocates were overwhelmingly superior simply because the TUI vote was unanimously in favour of a boycott. Rather it is a somewhat unexpected conclusion that there would be little if any dissent to the boycott motion because pro-Palestinianism is by far the pre-dominant paradigm in Ireland when it comes to any discussion on this Middle Eastern conflict. Moreover, there appears to have been no speakers voicing opposing anti-boycott views at the TUI conference. Sadly the voices of a fanatical well-funded terrorist-applauding element have undue influence on the debate in Ireland in the absence of any substantive defence of Israel by opposing sides.

The boycott could have profoundly divisive implications. It may lead to TUI members singling out Israeli exchange students, and refuse to assist them as has occurred in other boycott scenarios. In 2009 a lecturer at NUI Maynooth mounted an unofficial boycott of Israel which was discovered when his refusal to assist an Israeli student was reported in the media. It may even cause industrial unrest if an employee of the TUI is disciplined for refusing to work with Israeli students or institutions since no Irish colleges appear to endorse a boycott.

The boycott also comes at a time when recession-hit Ireland has been increasingly looking to Israel due to its economic model, which is weathering the economic downturn.

Israel’s record when it comes to academic achievement can be justifiably described as outstanding. It ranks as the second best educated nation in the world according to the OECD, and one of the more remarkable aspects of those going along with the agitators of such a boycott is the inability to conceive of the way in which Israel substantively contributes to world academia, and scientific innovation, where it is known for its strides in health care.

Education is a key element in any nation’s economic recovery, and whilst Ireland can no doubt exploit opportunities with other nations, Israel still stands out in a number of key respects. It has the largest per capita number of third level and PhD graduates in the world. It is a world leader in science and high technology as evidenced by its remarkable showing on the NASDAQ which is almost comparable in scale to that of the entire EU, whilst it also gained substantive inward investment from multinationals. These are the very areas of industry in which Ireland seeks to advance, and to position itself.

The BDS movement seeks to isolate Israel economically, academically and culturally, in a quest to bring a remarkable nation to its knees. Whether or not such an action is deemed offensive from a moral perspective, simply from a position of self-interest, boycotting Israel’s education and academia is likely to make Ireland the worse off if it takes hold and spreads to other Irish academic unions in the long run.

Rob Harris contributes articles to several websites on contentious political issues (not to be confused with the popular English novelist (1957-) of the same name). He blogs at eirael.blogspot.com. He lives in Ireland. For all the exclusive blog entries by Rob Harris, go here.

Feb 27, 2013 | By Veysel Ayhan

This article was first published in the Turkey Analyst, vol. 6 no. 4 (www.turkeyanalyst.org), a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center. © Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center, 2013.

The battle over the Syrian town Ras al-Ain on the border to Turkey and the recent cease-fire agreement between the Syrian opposition and the Kurdish Democratic Union party (PYD) have major implications for Turkey, affecting its relations with the Kurds in Syria, and with parts of the opposition. The battle over Ras al-Ain has not only resulted in the Kurds seeing Turkey as their enemy, but has also led some Syrian opposition leaders to question the role that Turkey plays in their country. The standing of Turkey has been negatively affected as the notion that Turkey could be of assistance in ending the intensified ethnic, religious or sectarian strife that can be expected after the downfall of al-Assad has been dealt a blow at Ras al-Ain.

Background

On November 8, 2012, Syrian opposition forces of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and of the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front launched an attack against the Kurdish militia in Ras al-Ain, an ethnically mixed town of Kurds, Arabs and other ethnic groups on the border to Turkey. The control of Ras al-Ain, Serê Kaniyê in Kurdish, had been taken over by the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) following the withdrawal of the troops of the Syrian government in July 2012. The PYD had refused to join in the uprising against the regime of Bashar al-Assad, instead concentrating on strengthening the Kurdish hold over parts of northeastern Syria. With the attempt of the rebel troops to seize control over the town, the tension between the Kurds and Arabs flared up in heavy fighting.

The FSA and Islamic Liberation front units were repelled by the Popular Protection Units (YPG) of the PYD, but the attacks were resumed on January 16. The Kurdish militia was once again able to repel the attempt of the Islamic Liberation front and FSA units to gain control of Ras al-Ain, and on February 17 another cease fire, the fifth in a row, was declared.

The opposition troops that engaged the Kurds in the fighting over the control of Ras al-Ain were mainly drawn from the local jihadist group Ghorbaa al-Sham and the al-Nusra front alongside FSA units and fighters from Arab clans of the region. The cease-fire was brokered by the intervention of opposition leaders, chief among them Michel Kilo, who have become increasingly concerned that the Syrian popular uprising is going to degenerate into an ethnic strife between Arabs and Kurds, and who want to promote a dialogue with the Kurds. In order to bring about the cease-fire, the rebel representatives had to apply pressure on the groups that have assembled under the umbrella of the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front. The Islamic Liberation Front operates independently of FSA and the Syrian National Council, and it includes Salafist groups and jihadist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra. However, to speak of a front is somewhat misleading; even though the various Islamist groups in Syria want to demonstrate a determination to form a united a political front, they nonetheless lack a centralized military organization structure.

The cease-fire agreement stipulates that the armed forces withdraw from Ras al-Ain and that a council composed of civilians that represent the various ethnic groups in the town is formed; the control of the border to Turkey is supposed to be handed over to this council that is yet to be formed. The agreement furthermore stipulates that the FSA and YPG jointly assume control over the checkpoints at the entrance to the town. So far, however, the groups of the Islamic Liberation front that have seized the border posts have not turned over their control to the FSA or to the PYD. The border post to Turkey is currently controlled by Ghorbaa al-Sham while the al-Nusra front maintains a military office a short distance from the border to Turkey.

Implications

The battle over Ras al-Ain and the recent cease-fire agreement have major implications for Turkey, affecting its relations with the Kurds in Syria, and with parts of the opposition. Even though the Kurdish fighters were not solely drawn from the PYD, the result of the fighting at which the group has succeeded in demonstrating its military prowess, is that the PYD has gained in stature and legitimacy; the PYD has strengthened its position among the Syrian Kurds, which is an unwelcome development for Turkey that has made clear that it cannot tolerate that the PYD, which is seen as close to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), establishes control in the border area. On February 26, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared that “the integrity of Syria is very important for us. We cannot tolerate an entity of northern Syria. That would give us different rights. We will not tolerate any formation that damages this integrity, whether it is autonomy, or whether or not it is legal.” Statements such as these are being taken as proof by Kurdish groups that Turkey has lent support to the Arab forces.

As to why the fighting erupted in the first place, the explanations diverge. The Arab side has leveled the accusation that the PYD had been supported by the regime in Damascus, and had acted on its behalf in Ras al-Ain. The Kurdish side on the other hand, accuses Turkey of having declared war against them using Islamist forces. Whatever the cause, there can be no doubt that the battle over Ras al-Ain represents a watershed moment in the Syrian uprising; it has demonstrated that it has the potential to degenerate into an Arab-Kurdish war, and it has sown seeds of mistrust between the two ethnic groups. However, the cease fire agreement that has been brokered — although tenuous — reflects the new awareness that the Arab-Kurdish relationship needs to be mended. For the first time, an official relationship has been established between the PYD and the Free Syrian Army, and the two have committed to maintaining what amounts to a joint control of Ras al-Ain.

The agreement not only means that the PYD seeks to dispel the impression that it acts in concert with the regime of Bashar al-Assad; it also amounts to a joint attempt of the FSA and PYD to circumscribe the nefarious influence of jihadist and Salafist groups, even though the latter are yet to be dislodged from the checkpoints and the border post to Turkey that they continue to control.

Indeed, there is a rift between some of the Arab forces of the uprising and those of the Islamic Liberation Front; many of the fighters among the ranks of the latter are non-Syrians, and they are accused by some Syrian Arabs of not realizing that engaging in a fight with the Kurds risks igniting an ethnic conflagration that would not be in the interest of the revolution.

Conclusions

As for Turkey, the battle over Ras al-Ain and the subsequent cease-fire agreement has several negative ramifications. The PYD has emerged stronger than it was before the fighting started, having asserted its authority; the Kurdish group has also established a formal relationship with the main force of the Syrian revolution. And there is a growing realization within the FSA that attacking the Kurds is not to benefit of their cause, and that Turkey’s preoccupation with countering the influence of the PYD is deflecting attention and resources from the goal of unseating al-Assad from power.

There is a new perception in Syrian opposition circles that Turkey’s effort to undermine the PYD is only contributing to prolonging the life of the al-Assad regime and that it also contributes to sapping the international support for the revolution. The battle over Ras al-Ain has thus not only resulted in the Kurds seeing Turkey as their enemy, but has also led some Syrian opposition leaders to question the role that Turkey plays in their country.

At the very least, the standing of Turkey has been negatively affected as the notion that Turkey could be of assistance in ending the intensified ethnic, religious or sectarian strife that can be expected after the downfall of al-Assad has been dealt a blow at Ras al-Ain.

Dr. Veysel Ayhan is Associate Professor and President of International Middle East Peace Research Center.

Sun, March 24, 2013 | RubinReports | By Barry Rubin

U.S. President Barack Obama, seen here toasting with Israel’s President Shimon Peres, ended his three-day visit to Israel by paying his respects at the graves of Theodor Herzl, the founder of modern Zionism who died in 1904, and former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who was assassinated in 1995. Obama also visited the Yad Vashem Holocaust memorial before touring the Biblical birthplace of Jesus Christ. (Photo: Reuters)

Given the shape of Jewish history, verbal expressions of friendship that others would take as the norm are treated as overwhelming acts of wonderfulness. This tradition goes back to the days of monarchies, when Jews saw themselves as powerless people who were passive recipients of the king’s generosity.

One reason that idea continued was because expressing the idea that Jews might have some power, some ability to shape events, was a major theme of antisemitism. Indeed, claiming that there is an all-powerful Jewish lobby or even of a Jewish-controlled media (which is laughable) remain to this day one of the main earmarks of antisemitic thinking.

What is the purpose of hasbara, that is, the effort to explain Israel’s situation, experiences, perceptions, and goals? It is not to make everyone love Israel or Jews, though that would be nice, but to create conditions so that Jews are not attacked or materially hurt by hostile neighbors and so Israel can have the environment in which it can operate with enough international support to do what it needs to do.

Let’s discuss these themes in the context of President Barack Obama’s visit to Israel.

From an Israeli, though not necessarily from an American, viewpoint it is absurd to be “pro-Obama” or “anti-Obama.” The issue is what Obama does in regard to Israeli interests. This is not necessarily the same criteria that American Jews would take, given their additional involvement and interest in many other issues that have nothing to do with international affairs.

In Israeli terms, for example, Richard Nixon was a good president. So was Harry Truman, Bill Clinton, and Ronald Reagan. Note the wide differences in their domestic policies, reputations, and worldviews in an American context..

If Obama is now going to be considered friendly toward Israel then, to use his own words in a different context, he didn’t build it on his own. Indeed, if Obama had his own way, if he could do anything he wanted to do, he would have been terribly unfriendly, the most unfriendly American president in history. (Jimmy Carter’s hostility came almost completely after leaving office.) And in many ways, that is how he began his presidency.

But Obama is neither a free agent nor a fanatic out to hurt Israel at any price. As president he interacts with reality, at least on this issue. There were three categories of factors that changed the strong hostility of Obama’s original position into something else.

First, internal American factors:

• A tradition seen as the norm of strong support for Israel by the United States;
• Pro-Israel public opinion;
• A largely pro-Israel Congress.

Second, regional factors:

• The lack of cooperation by the Palestinians who gave Obama zero assistance in his attempts to help them. Imagine if the Palestinian Authority had said in 2009:

“We want negotiations right away and peace as fast as possible. But we expect Obama to get us what we demand, including big Israeli concessions in exchange for very little. President Obama, you can have peace if you only bash Israel!”

But they did the opposite, turning down ever Obama initiative.

• Lack of cooperation by the Arab states generally, which did not take advantage of Obama’s offer to help them get major Israeli concessions through U.S. pressure;
• Iran’s intransigence;
• The fact that Islamists proved Obama wrong and became more radical.

In short, Obana discovered that distancing himself from Israel bought no gain.

Third, actions by Israel and American Jews:

• The Israeli government’s strategy of cooperating with Obama as much as possible to avoid giving him a — you can call it a reason or an excuse — for a quarrel;
• The tireless work of American Jews, both supporters and opponents of Obama, to explain the issues and mobilize support. This includes those whose strong criticism stung the administration.

It is not that Obama was nice toward Israel all along; it is that there is a new policy based on his realizing there wasn’t going to be a breakthrough to a comprehensive peace agreement.

There are, however, still two problem areas. First, the president expresses sympathy but not agreement with Israel. His view is:

I understand why you act as you do but you are wrong. You can obtain lasting peace fast if only you aren’t stubborn and suspicious.

This, however, doesn’t matter very much. The second problem is critical. How can you be so nice to a country when you help its enemies? How can you help populate Israel’s borders and neighborhood with those who openly proclaim their goal of committing genocide on its people?

If one asks: Has Obama helped or hurt Israel’s strategic situation the answer is that he has quite definitely hurt it overall. If one asks: Has Obama helped or hurt Israel’s ability to deal with that strategic situation the answer is that he has been about as good — but certainly not better — as several predecessors by merely continuing past U.S. aid and other policies.

Again, though, it is not a matter of liking or disliking Obama as a person but analyzing his behavior as a president.

The day after Obama’s election in 2008, I organized a program in Tel Aviv on the result. I and everyone on the panel spoke of what a great person Obama was and how he was going to be a great friend of Israel. It was proper not to start a conflict with him.

During 2009, however, I was faced with an important question: Should I be flat-out honest as to what I thought regarding Obama’s policies or would that jeopardize the bilateral relationship. Would supporters of Obama react against Israel because of criticism of their beloved chief executive?

I decided to speak up, partly because the dangers were so great and also since the whole point of criticism is to persuade someone to change course. By 2011 it was already becoming clear that U.S.-Israel relations as such were not the problem, U.S. Middle East policy was.

Let me summarize in this way:

• Arab behavior was the main force showing Obama that he was wrong. That parallels what happened during the Cold War when anti-American actions by radical Arab regimes and their alliance with the USSR persuaded previously unfriendly U.S. policymakers that they benefited from an alignment with Israel;
• The fact that the American people recognized the rightness of Israel’s narrative could not be ignored by leaders, especially if bashing Israel brought no strategic advantage;
• What’s significant is not whether or not Obama loves Israel but that he sees support as being in U.S. interests. Reality forced him to move from a policy of distancing himself from Israel to one of embracing Israel;
• But Obama must learn now about the dangers of Islamism or his administration will continue to be a net minus for Israel. It would be better if Obama learned to love the Arabs, Iranians, and Turks fighting for moderation and real democracy in their countries, not the totalitarians in those places;
• By truly protecting U.S. interests, Obama would do more for Israel than by making any number of friendly speeches.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest book, “Israel: An Introduction“, has just been published by Yale University Press. Other recent books include “The Israel-Arab Reader” (seventh edition), “The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East” (Wiley), and “The Truth About Syria” (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center and of his blog, Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.

Sat, March 23, 2013 | RubinReports | By Barry Rubin

Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s prime minister, demanded an ­apology from Israel over the Mavi Marmara flotilla raid. (Photo: AP)

Israel apologizes to Turkey, reads every headline. That simply isn’t true in the sense it is taken to imply. To understand what happened one must examine the long negotiations on this issue.

The issue began when several ships were sent to break the Israeli sanctions on the Gaza Strip in May 2010. These sanctions were put on by Israel — Egypt, then under the government of President Husni Mubarak, had its own restrictions — against a radical Islamist regime in the Gaza Strip that openly rejected peace, used terrorism, and called for genocide against the Jews and the elimination of Israel.

This flotilla was not interested in helping the people of Gaza. It refused to land the cargoes in Israel and have them passed across the border after inspection. Rather, the goal was to help Hamas. A key role in the flotilla was played by the IHH, an Islamist group that has been involved in terrorism, backed by Turkey’s government.

These ships were intercepted by Israel’s navy and after warnings were seized. On all of the ships this happened without any injuries except on the Mavi Marmara, where radical jihadists with weapons had sworn to fight. They attacked the arriving soldiers, injured several, and took a couple of soldiers hostage. At that time the soldiers opened fire and several Turkish citizens were killed.

It is important to understand that the flotilla issue was not the cause of Israel-Turkish problems, which had begun long before. The real basis was the election of an Islamist government in Turkey. Discussions inside the Israeli government for years had known Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan’s hatred for Israel but did not want to be seen as responsible for any breakdown of relations.

During the talks, Erdogan made three demands:

1. Israel must apologize completely;
2. Such an apology implies a legal responsibility to pay reparations;
3. Erdogan insisted that Israel drop the embargo against the Gaza Strip.

Israel rejected these demands and instead offered:

1. To say it regretted the clash and the loss of life. This is like saying: If I offended anyone I’m sorry;
2. It offered to pay voluntarily, as a humanitarian gesture not as part of a guilty plea, the families of those killed;
3. Israel rejected any change on its policy toward the Gaza Strip.

Erdogan angrily rejected Israel’s offer.

Now, a compromise has been reached, apparently with some help from President Barack Obama. The agreement, which includes restoring normal bilateral relations, has been portrayed as some sort of Israeli surrender.

That is simply not true. The agreement is much closer to Israel’s position. There is no change on Israel’s strategic policy toward the Gaza Strip at all. While the word “apology” appears in Netanyahu’s statement, it is notably directed at the Turkish people, not the government and is of the sorry if your feelings were hurt variety.

Moreover, Israel denied that it killed the Turkish citizens intentionally, a situation quite different from what Erdogan wanted, and offered to pay humanitarian assistance to families.

Should Israel have expressed regret when it should instead receive an apology from the Turkish government for helping to send terrorists to create a confrontation? On purely moral grounds, no. Yet as I pointed out Israel did not abandon its long-standing position on the issue. It does not want an antagonism with the Turkish people nor one that will continue long after Erdogan and his regime are long out of office. Perhaps this was undertaken to make Obama happy and in exchange for U.S. benefits. But what has happened is far more complex than onlookers seem to be realizing.

Perhaps these seeming word games and niceties are beyond the interest or comprehension of many people, but everyone involved directly on this issue knows exactly what is happening. Erdogan knows very well that this was not a Turkish victory — except in public relations — though Israel won’t object to letting it be claimed as such.

Israel acted to try to reduce the tension with Turkey but without any illusions that the Erdogan regime would now be friendly. Indeed, there were implications that Erdogan was breaking his commitment on the deal. Immediately afterward, he said that a legal case against Israeli officers for alleged responsibility in the death of the Turks would continue and he was not yet sending back his ambassador to Israel. This might be posturing for a few hours or a real deal-breaker. We will see.

Obama’s role in this deal is not clear. (I have made clear to readers that I’m not just bashing Obama reflexively but I will also continue to analyze his actions as accurately as possible.) Did he put any pressure on Erdogan or Netanyahu? Did he promise either or both sides some benefits for making a deal? Not yet clear.

The danger is that this is the kind of arrangement that is all too common in the region. The media proclaim progress; the political leaders say what they want; but nothing changes in reality. One possibility is that Obama doesn’t understand (or doesn’t care) how deeply Erdogan’s anti-Israel feeling runs just as he doesn’t understand how deeply that is true for the Muslim Brotherhood.

Still, this deal is clearly in U.S. interests since it supposedly heals a rift between two countries that are close allies to itself in Washington’s eyes. As I said above, let’s see if this deal sticks or if there is any progress in fixing Israel-Turkey relations in the coming weeks.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest book, “Israel: An Introduction“, has just been published by Yale University Press. Other recent books include “The Israel-Arab Reader” (seventh edition), “The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East” (Wiley), and “The Truth About Syria” (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center and of his blog, Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.

Fri, March 22, 2013 | RubinReports | By Barry Rubin

After some years, marked by tensions between them, the baron decided to pay an unexpected visit to the village. The people were very excited and turned out to give him a warm welcome. The mayor and the baron spoke of the eternal friendship between the castle and the village.

Everyone cheered, especially when the baron promised his help in defending the village from dangers prowling around its borders. The baron urged the village to make peace with those forces but said he understood if it couldn’t do so and confirmed his support for the village’s right of self-defense.

The people were pleased but the mayor remarked to the town clerk: “Funny he didn’t mention his ongoing role in creating the problem.”

Still, the visit of Baron Viktor Frankenstein could be considered a big success.

Of course, President Barack Obama did not fully create the new monstrous threats facing Israel as much as Frankenstein did his monster. But the president did a lot to nurture these problems to life or made them much worse by coddling Iran for most of his first term, taking a soft stance toward Syria, praising the Turkish regime despite its anti-Israel and even antisemitic activities, and encouraging or even supporting Islamists who took over Egypt and are seeking to take over Syria.

Make no mistake. Obama’s visit to Israel and the Palestinian Authority did mark an important shift but only on part of his policy. He has given up on promoting the “peace process” as a high priority.

While publicly his administration blames Israel more, it also acknowledges that it cannot press Israel into taking high risks and making big concessions. The White House clearly knows that the PA is a large part of the problem, though it publicly remains silent on this point and doesn’t comprehend that the PA is almost all of the problem.

In practical terms, that means he understands that pushing on the peace process won’t work and trying to bully Israel will damage him in several ways. American public opinion and Congress, including most of the Democrats, are supportive of Israel. He has no interest in throwing away political capital that he needs for other things in order to pursue a goal that he knows cannot be attained.

The main international problem he needs to deal with is the Middle East itself, especially the two issues he focused on for his visit: Iran and Syria. Obama intends to spend 2013 negotiating — futilely — with Iran. While the strong sanctions against Tehran have damaged the economy they are unlikely to force it to stop the nuclear weapons’ drive.

As Iran gets closer to obtaining nuclear weapons, Israel’s government will increasingly consider an attack on Tehran’s facilities. Obama has spoken of all options being on the table and Israel’s right of self-defense. But assuming, which seems accurate, that Obama does not want to back an Israeli attack how is he going to restrain Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government? Obama needs Netanyahu’s cooperation in making a very tough decision and for that the president must have Israel feeling more secure and rewarded by the United States.

On the second issue, Syria, another country neighboring Israel is on the verge of a revolution that will bring the Muslim Brotherhood to power and even more extremist Salafists into having a powerful armed presence. While Obama still claims Syria will produce a democratic and moderate regime, that outcome seems increasingly unlikely.

What appears quite possible is that the weapons and training supplied with U.S. support will be turned against Israel. So how will Obama get Israel’s cooperation in trying to keep things quiet despite that new threat? This, too, requires him to be friendlier to Israel on bilateral issues.

There is also a third issue that parallels Syria and that is Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood is already in control and armed Salafist groups roam the Sinai Peninsula. If Egypt breaks the peace treaty, Israel will call on the United States to put pressure on Cairo, a demand that Obama wants to avoid. Here, too, he wants Israel to exercise restraint and once again this requires an Israel that feels the United States is defending its back.

This, then, is the paradox of Obama’s second-term policy toward the Middle East. He has abandoned his earlier effort to distance himself from Israel that he hoped would curry favor with Arabs and Muslims while, at the same time (he thought) advancing toward Israel-Palestinian peace. The strategy clearly didn’t work as Israel’s enemies showed themselves unready to compromise and not eager to pursue peace.

That step is a victory for Israel.

But Obama has not abandoned the pro-Islamist policy that has created a far more dangerous security situation for Israel and, in fact, made Arab-Israeli peace an even more distant dream.

In short, he is now offering to protect Israel more while, at the same time, he is the one who is doing just about the most to endanger Israel. Obama has strengthened the most extreme anti-Israel, anti-democratic, genocidal-oriented, and anti-American forces. His new foreign policy team includes the strongest advocates of this policy, men who are either blind or worse to the damage they are doing.

There will no doubt be a series of crises around this problem, especially regarding Egypt and Syria. During Obama’s second term, his bluffs will be called on Iran as well. And there is no shortage of other potential conflicts and ways in which U.S. interests will be seriously subverted.

Thus, Obama’s visit to Israel represents a real shift, a policy change. Yet Obama never talks about the ways in which his policy isn’t changing which are far more dangerous and important.

And thus one day, Obama might have to declaim, as did Mary Shelley’s main character, Dr. Frankenstein:

“At these moments I wept bitterly, and wished that peace would revisit my mind….But that could not be. Remorse extinguished every hope. I had been the author of unalterable evils; and I lived in daily fear, lest the monster whom I had created should perpetrate some new wickedness.”

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest book, “Israel: An Introduction“, has just been published by Yale University Press. Other recent books include “The Israel-Arab Reader” (seventh edition), “The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East” (Wiley), and “The Truth About Syria” (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center and of his blog, Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.

Thu, March 21, 2013 | RubinReports | By Barry Rubin

U.S. President Barack Obama holds a joint press conference with his Palestinian counterpart Mahmoud Abbas beneath a banner showing Abbas and the late Palestinian later Yasir Arafat in Ramallah on March 21, 2013. (Photo: AFP/Getty Images)

As President Barack Obama continued his visit to Israel the themes remained the same as the ones I covered here. The two main public events were a speech by Obama to Israeli university students and a joint press conference with Palestinian Authority (PA) leader Mahmoud Abbas.

In his speech, Obama spoke at great length about Israel’s history, concerns, and related matters to try to show that he “gets it” when it comes to Israel. The basic phrases were in many cases similar to those used by previous presidents. The intention was to show warm sympathy and support for Israel.

But there were three things strange about the point of the speech, showing that Obama was completely out of touch with contemporary sentiments and thus showing that in many ways he doesn’t get it. These points are:

First, Obama’s big theme is that, and I’m not being satirical here, peace is good. He tried to make the students understand that peace is better than continued conflict and has many advantages. Yet all the students in the audience probably knew everything he was saying. Of course they think peace is good. They are the ones who have to serve in the military and risk their lives, not to mention know that they and their loved ones are the targets of terrorism and war.

Can Obama possibly not comprehend all of this? No, I believe he doesn’t. He seriously thought that he was bringing new ideas to his audience that they had never thought about before nor heard about for years.

Second, he did not deal with a single one of what I call “the day after” issues. In other words, assume that there is a peace agreement between Israel and the PA. Well, how do we know Hamas won’t take over the PA or more radical forces will come to power that will not recognize the deal?

• What is a deal with the PA worth when it won’t include the Gaza Strip, where Hamas would redouble its efforts to attack Israel and work hard to undermine any such agreement?
• What reason is there to believe that there won’t be cross-border terrorism across the new international frontier and the government of Palestine doesn’t do anything about it?
• What about the likelihood of the Palestine government inviting in the armies of other countries or at least getting advanced weapons from them?
• How is Israel going to deal with the PA’s passionately held demand that millions of Palestinians be allowed to come and live in Israel?
• Why should Israel believe in any guarantees and assurances from the United States and Europe when such promises have been repeatedly broken, including ones made by Obama himself?

These are only some of the questions Israelis have about what a peace would look like and whether a formal agreement would really be better than the status quo. This is especially true with the 30-year-old peace Egypt-Israel peace treaty possibly under dire threat. For Obama, none of these problems exist. To his mind, you get a peace agreement on paper and that’s the end of the problem.

Third, Obama has not made one serious mention of the changed regional situation except to say that the United States wants democracy in the Arabic-speaking world and will try to work for that and Egypt’s continued adherence to its peace treaty with Israel. Yet he is still backing Islamists seeking or holding power.

To cite only one example, Obama has supported the new head of the Syrian opposition — apparently against real resistance in the opposition — despite the fact that this man, Ghassan Hitto, has close ties with the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and support for terrorism against Israel.

Other than wishful thinking, how does Obama think that Israel can make new big concessions and take risks in the face of radical Islamist regimes in Egypt, Tunisia, the Gaza Strip, Turkey, Lebanon, Iran, and Syria? This is especially true when none of these regimes — except for Iran and to some extent the Hamas regime in Gaza — is strongly opposed by the current U.S. government?

So there is a disconnect between Obama’s new policy on the peace process which fits with Israeli interest despite is criticism, and a regional policy that is a big headache for Israel.

The other development was Obama’s visit to Ramallah. There he gave a message to the PA leadership that also preached the benefits of a two-state solution. He even referred to Israel as a Jewish state, which was a significant phrase.

In response, however, Abbas made it clear that he would only negotiate with Israel if certain preconditions were met, Including a new freeze on construction within existing Jewish settlements on the West Bank and also Israel providing its final proposal for where the border should be. Presumably, if Israel seeks to change the pre-1967 borders Abbas will not come to the negotiating table.

I wonder if Obama and his advisors noticed two things about Abbas’ statement and I think they did.

First, the last time Obama got Israel to do a freeze, Abbas did not negotiate seriously, leaving Obama looking foolish. Netanyahu cooperated; Abbas and the Arabic-speaking regimes didn’t. So why should Obama fall for the same trick twice?

Second, the situation is similar to what happened early in Obama’s first term when Abbas arrived in Washington and gave an interview to Jackson Diehl of the Washington Post making it clear that he was not interested in negotiating with Israel. Abbas has given several interviews recently in which he explicitly stated that now that the UN General Assembly has declared Palestine a “non-member state” he doesn’t need to negotiate with Israel.

In other words, Obama’s trip to Ramallah reinforced his view that the “peace process” is going nowhere and he cannot expect the PA to cooperate with any big effort by him to try to get talks going. So why should Obama bother to pressure Israel in trying to push ahead?

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest book, “Israel: An Introduction“, has just been published by Yale University Press. Other recent books include “The Israel-Arab Reader” (seventh edition), “The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East” (Wiley), and “The Truth About Syria” (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center and of his blog, Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.

Thu, March 21, 2013 | RubinReports | By Barry Rubin

(source: foxnews)

The Obama visit to Israel has become an unlimited love fest with expressions of mutual admiration and total agreement. In his joint press conference with Obama, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the foremost issue they were discussing was “Iran’s relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons.”

Netanyahu put forward his position by praising Obama for saying he was determined to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons using “determined diplomacy and strong sanctions.”

But, Netanyahu continued, despite all the great things Obama had done Iran’s nuclear program continued and said,

“And as you know, my view is that in order to stop Iran’s nuclear programs peacefully, diplomacy and sanctions must be augmented by clear and credible threat of military action.”

Netanyahu thus tried to build on Obama’s previous statements to thank Obama “for always making clear that Israel must be able to defend itself by itself against any threat.” In other words, he suggested implicitly that supporting an Israeli preemptive strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities was a logical outgrowth of Obama’s policies, an idea that Obama does not share.

Whether right or not, Netanyahu suggested that there was only about a year before Iran got to the verge of the ability to have weapons. Thus, he is putting a time limit on how long diplomacy and sanctions can be tried.

He also subtly asserted Israel’s need for independent action:

“I know that you appreciate that Israel can never cede the right to defend ourselves to others, even to the greatest of our friends, and Israel has no better friend than the United States of America.”

Regarding Syria, Netanyahu noted that this, too, was discussed and that both countries want to see a stable and peaceful Syria. In addition, the weapons in Syria should not fall into the hands of terrorists.

The problem, of course, is that Obama is supporting a Syrian regime that would be Islamist and under the control of the Muslim Brotherhood, a sworn enemy of Israel. Moreover, since the United States is practically handing out weapons to terrorists it is hard to imagine that these arms have not already fallen into the wrong hands.

Netanyahu concluded:

“And I have no doubt that the best way to do that is to work closely with the United States and other countries in the region to address this challenge, and that is what we intend to do.”

In other words, Israel will try to get U.S. policy to be careful and await the day it will come to its senses when it sees the size of the problem Washington has helped create.

The third point of discussion was the “peace process.” Netanyahu assured Obama that he was fully committed to peace and to a two-state solution. He is ready to negotiate without preconditions and work toward a historic compromise.

Here, Netanyahu knows that the Palestinian leadership is neither ready to negotiate unconditionally or make any historic compromises beyond accepting the pre-1967 boundaries, though even then on demand that hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs be settled inside Israel’s borders.

In his response, Obama praised Israel’s “thriving democracy,” Israel’s unique security needs, his appreciation about the threat from Hamas, and his commitment to Israel’s security. He noted such things as military and intelligence cooperation, joint exercises and training, and security assistance and advanced technology.

Almost openly making an appeal for domestic support, Obama stated:

“In short — and I don’t think is just my opinion; I think, Bibi, you would share this — America’s support for Israel’s security is unprecedented, and the alliance between our nations has never been stronger.”

In other words, so Mr. Prime Minister don’t you think that I’m the greatest friend Israel has ever had in the White House? Netanyahu wasn’t going to say “no.” His answer later in the press conference, though, was on his own terms:

“I appreciate the fact that the president has reaffirmed, more than any other president, Israel’s right and duty to defend itself, by itself, against any threat. We just heard those important words now. And I think that sums up our — I would say, our common view.”

In other words, yes, Obama has laid the basis for Israel saying that he is willing to support it in defending itself even if that requires an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. I don’t think Netanyahu believes that but he has to try that gambit.

Then Obama made an extraordinary statement:

“I think that what Bibi alluded to, which is absolutely correct, is each country has to make its own decisions when it comes to the awesome decision to engage in any kind of military action. And Israel is differently situated than the United States, and I would not expect that the prime minister would make a decision about his country’s security and defer that to any other country, any more than the United States would defer our decisions about what was important for our national security.”

What Obama just said publicly is that if Netanyahu decided that Israel’s defense required an attack on Iran, the president would not expect the prime minister to be deterred by U.S. opposition. Did Obama mean that? It is hard to believe that he did, yet what no Israeli leader is going to miss that seeming “green light.”

Obama announced continued military assistance to Israel, continued funding for the Iron Dome anti-rocket system, and other unspecified help.

Naturally, Obama continued, any two-state solution must leave Israel secure alongside a sovereign and independent Palestinian state.

One statement that probably left Israeli officials amused was when Obama said:

“I’d note that last year was a milestone, the first year in four decades when not a single Israeli citizen lost their life because of terrorism emanating from the West Bank. It’s a reminder that Israel has a profound interest in a strong and effective Palestinian Authority.”

They know how much the Palestinian Authority has done to promote violence, how weak and ineffective it is, and how much its survival is due to Israel’s protection.

Turning to regional issues, Obama said:

“As the United States supports the Egyptian people in their historic transition to democracy, we continue to underscore the necessity of Egypt contributing to regional security, preventing Hamas from rearming and upholding its peace treaty with Israel.”

It’s surprising that Obama didn’t mention getting Egypt to maintain its peace treaty with Israel though that might have been an oversight. Pushing Egypt to prevent Hamas from getting more weapons — a commitment under the last ceasefire between Israel and Hamas — has been an achievement for Obama. But much of the success is due to the recklessness of Hamas in going too far in supporting radical Egyptian Salafist groups that are attacking the Brotherhood regime.

He also mentioned support for Israel’s concern regarding Syria’s transfer of advanced weapons to Hizballah “that might be used against Israel” and efforts regarding Iran. Obama said what has been the standard U.S. position:

“We do not have a policy of containment when it comes to a nuclear Iran. Our policy is to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon,” adding again that “all options are on the table. We will do what is necessary to prevent Iran from getting the world’s worst weapons.”

But what does this mean? If negotiations fail and sanctions do not intimidate Iran, that leaves either an attack or accepting that Iran gets nuclear weapons, that is, containment. There are no other options, unless Tehran decides to give up or just to have the ability to build nuclear weapons but don’t actually do so. That wishful thinking — it could happen but it is less likely — is the only thing that could get Obama out of his dilemma.

Obama spoke at length about how it isn’t yet clear what the Syrian regime has done regarding chemical weapons. He defended his administration as having been actively involved in trying to get rid of Assad.

He did not address the likelihood that U.S. policy is helping to produce a new Syrian regime that will be a radical Islamist government extremely hostile to Israel.

Another interesting point raised by Obama is his acknowledgement that “what was already a pretty tough neighborhood has gotten tougher” and Israel could expect U.S. support not only because of Israel but due to U.S. interests. Obviously, if the neighborhood has gotten tougher it is due to U.S. policies toward Islamists coming to power.

Yet, again, Obama does not link this situation to his own behavior. So does he really understand the implications of what he’s saying or does he still feel it is the time for Israel to make risky concessions toward the Arabs? Perhaps Obama now does understand that, another factor in making the “peace process” a mere rhetorical flourish rather than a serious policy option.

Obama then spoke at length about why the “peace process” wasn’t advancing. And Obama added accurately — obviously reflecting internal discussions that have been going on in the U.S. government:

“And I purposely did not want to come here and make some big announcement that might not match up with what the realities and possibilities on the ground are.”

Obama had thus gone to a point where an American reporter could ask, very politely, whether the president might not have worked very effectively on the issue in his first term. He then rewrote history to say that he merely promised to work on a solution during his first term. He even blamed the press for exaggerating his emphasis on the issue. It was that blatant.

Yet he added:

“But ultimately, this is a really hard problem. It’s been lingering for over six decades. And the parties involved have, you know, some profound interests that you can’t spin, you can’t smooth over. And it is a hard slog to work through all of these issues”

In other words, although he will never say so openly, he was wrong in thinking the problem could be solved easily and he now knows better. To listen to Obama you get the impression that he expects no progress in his second term either. In fact he reduced expectations pretty low:

“And — and — and my goal here is just to make sure that the United States is a positive force in trying to create those opportunities as frequently as possible….”

So this is Middle East policy in Obama’s second-term: downplaying Israel-Palestinian issues, pushing for a new regime in Syria while disregarding the real dangers of producing a monster there, and trying to convince Israel from not attacking Iran by insisting that all options are on the table although his bluff will be called at some point.

On bilateral relations, this represents a gain for Israel but it is still stuck in dealing with radical Arab regimes which U.S. policy is not going to confront and which it even sees as friendly. Moreover, for the next year Israel will enjoy firm American rhetoric on Iran but what if things come to a crunch? Obama’s hints and pledges could collapse like a house of cards once Tehran approaches a nuclear weapons’ arsenal.

Also, Obama now faces the situation of previous American presidents, a dilemma that he has long ridiculed. The Saudis and Jordanians, along with some other countries, don’t care but the Iranian, Turkish, and a number of Arab regimes (including the Palestinian Authority) are going to be outraged by what Obama did and said. The Islamists will see this as a declaration of war, though of course they already viewed themselves as in a state of war with America. The Cairo speech will be spit upon; all the efforts to distance himself from Israel and create a new orientation for U.S. policy have failed.

Obama is now — on matters directly regarding Israel — a typical American president. The idea that Obama made policy out of raw hatred against Israel should be put to rest.

Nevertheless, the incompetence and the deluded strategy toward Islamists still remain, as does the dangerous situation for U.S. interests that Obama has helped create. Fireworks will no doubt take place during Obama’s second term.

PS: Palestinian anti-Obama demonstrations showed the “gratitude” amassed for Obama’s previous support by branding him as a Zionist, imperialist running dog. But one detail drew my close attention. The demonstrators sang a song called “America is the head of the snake.” That’s the song that then PLO leader Yasir Arafat led in singing at the Palestine National Council meeting almost 45 years ago. In other words, after 45 years of effort and especially the last 23 years in which America tried to help create a Palestinian Arab state, it has made zero progress toward winning Palestinian support or recognition of America’s aid and efforts. The same story, of course, will be reproduced regarding Obama’s efforts to show his respect for Islam and his empathy for Islamism.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest book, “Israel: An Introduction“, has just been published by Yale University Press. Other recent books include “The Israel-Arab Reader” (seventh edition), “The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East” (Wiley), and “The Truth About Syria” (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center and of his blog, Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.

Wed, March 20, 2013 | RubinReports | By Barry Rubin

Cartoon by Gary Clement (National Post cartoonist / nationalpost.com)

When President Barack Obama arrived in Israel, March 20, for his visit he said it was “no accident” that he went there as his second term’s’ first overseas trip.

Question: Who was the first foreign leader Obama called when his first term began? Answer: Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas.

So is this juxtaposition also “no accident.” I have written that this trip symbolizes Obama giving up the idea of pressuring Israel on the “peace process” issue and explained in detail why that is true. Everyone else seems to be predicting that Obama is being nice right now to lower the boom on Israel either during this trip or afterward. I haven’t seen a single other article that agrees with my assessment. I stand by my assessment.

It is all the more amusing how one establishment writer portrayed my analysis. She made me into the spokesman for a large bloc and distorted the whole point. And that tells us a lot about how the Middle East and Obama’s policies are distorted by the ruling establishment and misunderstood by the opposition.

Here’s what Slate has to say about me:

“The anti-Obama peace-process skeptics can’t help but gloat. As Barry Rubin, a conservative, pro-Israel American pundit put it on his Facebook page: ‘I think we have just won a huge victory … Obama has admitted defeat on trying to bully, manipulate, or pressure Israel.’”

This is a very revealing sentence in several respects:

• First of all, the article was not on my Facebook page. On my Facebook page was a link to my article in PJMedia. Zacharia is not a friend on my Facebook page so she could not have seen the material quoted there. Consequently, she wrote it that way to avoid having to admit the existence of PJ Media and linking to that publication. By saying something was on my Facebook page — rather than on one of the biggest news/analysis sites on the Internet — I am to be made to sound like a basement-dwelling blogger.
• As I have said repeatedly and everyone knows me knows, I am not a “conservative.” I have repeatedly said that I am a traditional liberal and explain this in detail in many articles as well as regularly in conversation. Zacharia’s point here is to deny that anyone except conservatives can criticize Obama. This is to signal Slate readers that they should ignore what I say. It is ironic since one of my main points is the hijacking of liberalism by the left which then redefines liberalism in its own image. By the way, one reason it is necessary to appear in conservative publications is because the mass media has closed out — except in very limited ways — dissenting opinions about the Middle East.
• It is not true to say “skeptics can’t help but gloat.” I have seen about 15 articles written by real live conservatives that all took a totally different tack. They read what was important in the Obama statement as an anti-Israel theme, blaming Israel for the lack of peace. Others have predicted dire consequences for Israel from Obama’s visit. As far as I know I’m the only person who has written up the event as a victory for Israel.

But you see the problem is stereotyped approaches. Zacharia and company are looking at things in terms of Obama always doing good. Conservatives tend to look at things as Obama always doing bad. What’s rejected by Zacharia and her type is trying to figure out what’s actually happening.

I think the typical analysis among both Obama’s supporters and critics is to say what Jeffrey Goldberg, one of the best writers on the region, told Haaretz:

“The Obama of the first term did not come to Israel and demanded a settlement freeze. The Obama of the second term is coming to Israel so he could be in the position to demand a settlement freeze in the future.”

Some who say that like it; some who say that don’t like it. But it seems to be what everyone but me is saying. Yet I believe Obama has learned something and I also believe that the Palestinian Authority and Arab states — many of which are now ruled by Islamists — will never give Obama an incentive to press Israel.

• The word “gloat” is intended to make the “liberal” readers of Slate angry and ignore what I said. Gloating is a nasty behavior, bragging, taking pleasure in others failures, etc. Change the words to read: gloating about the poor state of the U.S. economy, gloating about the mess in Egypt. The use of the word gloating cancels out the fact that someone was correct and that the writer was wrong. An attempt to understand an important issue has been turned into a ping-pong game. Rather than “gloating,” I explained why Israel should talk about what a great president Obama is even though I retained freedom of action as an individual. I think that also accurately predicted what is happening on this trip.
• The word “American.” Yes, I’m proud to be an America and to think the United States is a great and wonderful country, unlike many (most?) of those on the left. But I write largely from an Israeli perspective. By leaving that out the author then is saying: Not a perspective from Israel but just another domestic opponent of the president. Maybe she’s a bit sensitive because she’s in California, thousands of miles away from the scene and I am actually here. From what she writes I might as well be in California, too, getting my information from the New York Times or Los Angeles Times and not an hour away by car from the Gaza Strip (five minutes away by rocket, see below).
• By not mentioning my being Israeli, Zacharia redefines the “we” who has won a victory. I meant the “we” as Israeli interests. But by the way she wrote it (Zacharia teaches communications, remember) it would appear that the “we” are American conservative opponents of Obama! So suppose you like Israel but also like Obama. That turns my analysis from something you would regard as a good thing — good for Israel and Obama since he would avoid making a policy mistake — into a bad thing — some nasty, smirking person attacking your favorite political leader.
• And, of course, all the reasons I give for my analysis are left out. The statement must be made to seem like an argument of a bitter critic, not an analysis based on facts and long study.
• As for Zacharia, here’s what I wrote about her here six months ago:

“The elite currently in power in the Western mass media will never comprehend the Middle East. There is a problem with bias, for sure, but the big issue is the impenetrable ignorance of the very people entrusted with explaining the region to others. They insist on imposing their own misconceptions on the situation while ignoring the evidence.”

Yep, same thing as now.

“Consider Janine Zacharia. What a distinguished resume: Jerusalem bureau chief and Middle East correspondent for the Washington Post (2009-2011), chief diplomatic correspondent for Bloomberg News (2005-2009), and before that five years working for the Jerusalem Post in Washington, D.C., and another five years working for Reuters and other publications from Jerusalem. Right now she’s a visiting lecturer at Stanford University in communications.

“Surely, such a person must understand the region’s issues, and if anyone isn’t going to have an anti-Israel bias in the mass media it would be her. And she isn’t anti-Israel in a conscious, political sense. Indeed, she obviously views herself as sympathetic. Rather, her assumptions make her type of views inevitably anti-Israel and, more broadly, inevitably destructive of U.S. interests on other issues.”

I think I tried to characterize her fairly rather than using a stereotype. But here’s the best part:

“Here’s her article in Slate. The title is “Why Israel’s Gaza Campaign is Doomed.” Not why this response is the best of a set of difficult options; not why the world should support Israel; not why Hamas should be removed from power with international support but why Israel is wrong and stupid to fight. “Doomed” is a strong word.”

You see! Again, no sense of context or what’s really going on, just two teams playing a game and she knows which team she is on.

“The subhead — adapted from Zacharia’s text — is “Benjamin Netanyahu’s decision to bomb Hamas militants will leave Israel more isolated, insecure, and alone.” Not the decision of Israel’s unanimous leadership including first and foremost its military and defense experts but that of a prime minister who now plays a role for the American media most closely approximated to that held by former President George W. Bush.”

Now think about it. Six months ago she wrote an article saying that Israel was being defeated and was badly isolated. I wrote the opposite. I was right. Obama is in Israel saying nice things and not pressuring Israel. Nobody is pressuring Israel. And Israel isn’t insecure, or at least to the extent that is true it is largely due to White House policies.

Oh, and this is rich. She concludes that the American media hate Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as much as Bush. True, but that’s through the work of people like her.

So I was right; Zacharia and Obama were wrong (you can see all the quotes about how he was going to solve the conflict) but this point must either be concealed from the American readers or explained away so as to make them more firmly believe all the wrong ideas they have believed up to now.

It’s a great teachable moment but another example about how the left-wing media refuses to teach.

Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. His latest book, “Israel: An Introduction“, has just been published by Yale University Press. Other recent books include “The Israel-Arab Reader” (seventh edition), “The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East” (Wiley), and “The Truth About Syria” (Palgrave-Macmillan). The website of the GLORIA Center and of his blog, Rubin Reports. His original articles are published at PJMedia.