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Zondag, 5 December 2010 | The Guardian: Document 1, Document 2, Document 3, Document 4, Document 5, Document 6, Document 7, Document 8, Document 9 | Bewerkt door Crethi Plethi

De moslimextremist Ajmal Amir Kasab loopt door de hal van het Chatrapathi Sivaji treinstation in Mumbai tijdens de aanslag in 2008. Lashkar-e-Taiba, die verantwoordelijk was voor deze terroristische aanslag, is één van de groepen die fondsen werven in Saudi Arabia. (Foto: Sebastian D'souza/AP)

WikiLeaks: Golfstaten Fungeren Als Financieringsbron Voor Terrorisme

Counterterrorisme maatregelen van de Perzische Golfstaten tegen fondsenwerving door radicale Islamitische groeperingen als Al Qaida, Taliban en Lashkar-e-Taiba [LeT] hebben onvoldoende resultaat gehad. Dit lezen we in de geheime Amerikaanse memo’s die via WikiLeaks gelekt zijn.

Saoedi-Arabië is ‘s werelds grootste bron van inkomsten voor islamitische militante groepen zoals Al Qaida, de Afghaanse Taliban en de Pakistaanse Lashkar-e-Taiba, maar de Saoedische overheid is terughoudend in het stoppen van de stromen van geld richting de terroristen, volgens een memo.

“Er moet meer gedaan worden aangezien Saoedi-Arabië financiële draagvlak blijft bieden voor Al Qaida, de Taliban, en andere terroristische groeperingen,” zegt een geheime memo uit december 2009 ondertekend door de Amerikaanse minister van Buitenlandse Zaken Hillary Clinton. Haar memo drong er bij Amerikaanse diplomaten op aan om hun inspanningen te verdubbelen zodat deze fondsen niet in handen van moslimextremisten in Pakistan en Afghanistan zouden vallen.

“Donoren in Saoedi-Arabië vormen de belangrijkste bron van financiering voor soennitische terreurgroepen wereldwijd,” zei Clinton volgens het memo.

Er worden nog drie andere Arabische landen vermeld als bron van militant geld: Qatar, Koeweit en de Verenigde Arabische Emiraten.

De Amerikaanse memo’s wijzen op een vaak onderbelichte factor in de strijd tegen moslimextremisme en de oorlog tegen deze militanten in Pakistan en Afghanistan: het geweld wordt deels gefinancierd door rijke fundamentalistische donoren in de Golfstaten waarvan de regeringen weinig doen om hen te stoppen.

Het is vooral een acuut probleem in Saoedi-Arabië waar fondsenwervende militanten het land, vermomd als pelgrims, binnenkomen en bedrijven oprichten voor het witwassen van geld en donaties krijgen van door de overheid goedgekeurde liefdadigheidsinstellingen. Zie ook onze downloadpagina waar u studies en analyses kunt downloaden voor meer achtergrond informatie over de financiering van terrorisme.

In een memo wordt beschreven hoe de Pakistaanse militante groepering Lashkar-e-Taiba, die de Mumbai-aanslagen in 2008 uitvoerde, gebruik maakte van een Saoedisch bedrijf om haar activiteiten in 2005 te financieren. Leden van de liefdadigheidsvleugel van de LeT, Jama’at-Ud-Da’wa [JuD], reisden bijvoorbeeld naar Saoedi-Arabië om donaties te vragen voor nieuwe scholen waarbij de kosten overdreven werden en het overtollige geld weggesluisd werd om terroristische activiteiten te financieren. Jama’at-Ud-Da’wa ontkent banden te hebben met Lashkar-e-Taiba, maar wordt door de VS, Pakistan en de VN als een terroristische organisatie gezien. De JuD werd in 1985 in Lahore [Pakistan] opgericht als Markaz Daw’a wal Irshad, maar de organisatie veranderde haar naam in Jama’at-Ud-Da’wa nadat de VS Lashkar-e-Taiba als een terroristische organisatie had aangemerkt.

Militanten die fondsen moeten werven komen vaak tijdens de bedevaart naar Saoedi-Arabië. Dit is “een grote lacune in de beveiliging, aangezien pelgrims vaak reizen met grote hoeveelheden contant geld en de Saoedi’s hun de toegang niet kunnen weigeren tot Saoedi-Arabië.” Zelfs een kleine donatie kan terroristische groeperingen al veel helpen: Lashkar-e-Taiba opereert, volgens Amerikaanse schattingen, op een budget van slechts $ 5,25 miljoen dollar per jaar.

Ambtenaren van Saoedi-Arabië worden vaak als onwillige partners afgeschilderd. Clinton klaagde over de “voortdurende uitdaging om Saoedische ambtenaren ervan te overtuigen om terroristische fondsen die afkomstig zijn uit Saudi-Arabië als een strategische prioriteit te behandelen.”

Uit de documenten blijkt ook dat Saoedi-Arabië een Amerikaans verzoek om drie goede doelen te verbieden, die in de VS als terroristische entiteiten zijn geclassificeerd, heeft geweigerd. Uit informatie blijkt “dat deze groepen nog steeds geld sturen naar het buitenland en soms het extremisme in het buitenland met geld steunen.”

Volgens de documenten is er wel enige vooruitgang geboekt. Dit jaar meldden Amerikaanse functionarissen dat Al Qaida’s mogelijkheden om fondsen te werven in Saoedi-Arabië “aanzienlijk verslechterd” is aangezien de overheid hardhandig optreedt tegen Al Qaida. Als gevolg hiervan is de groep van Osama Bin Laden “op z’n zwakst sinds 9/11” in Saoedi-Arabië.

Overigens wordt elke vorm van kritiek over de Saoedische tegenwerking in het bestrijden van fondsenwerving voor terrorisme over het algemeen achter gesloten deuren geuit. De documenten laten zien dat als het gaat om olie-rijke bondgenoten de Amerikaanse diplomaten hun bezorgdheid in privégesprekken uiten wat in schril contrast staat met de vaak directe kritiek tegen bondgenoten als Pakistan en Afghanistan. En de ambtenaren op de Amerikaanse ambassade in Riyaad lijken meer zorgen te hebben over de beveiliging van Saoedische olievelden tegen aanvallen van Al Qaida.

Een andere grote zorg voor de VS in de Golfregio is de Verenigde Arabische Emiraten. De Afghaanse Taliban en de militante Haqqani verdienen “aanzienlijke bedragen” door middel van in de VAE gevestigde bedrijven. De Taliban persen geld af van de grote Pathaanse gemeenschap in de VAE waar ongeveer 1 miljoen Pakistanen en 150.000 Afghanen wonen. Ze verkrijgen ook grote bedragen door Pathaanse zakenmensen te ontvoeren die gevestigd zijn in Dubai of hun familieleden en dan grote losgelden te vragen. Hamid Karzai, de huidige president van Afghanistan is ook Pathaan en komt van de Popalzai-clan. De Pathanen zijn de grootste bevolkingsgroep in Afghanistan en worden als de oorspronkelijke Afghanen gezien. De aan de Taliban gelieerde Haqqani zijn een onafhankelijke terroristische groepering in Afghanistan en Pakistan en worden geleidt door Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani samen met zijn zoon Sirajuddin Haqqani. Deze groep wordt als één van de grootste bedreigingen gezien voor de ISAF-troepen in Afghanistan.

“Sommige Afghaanse zakenlieden in de VAE kopen hun tickets pas op de dag van vertrek om de kans te verkleinen zelf te worden ontvoerd bij aankomst in Afghanistan of Pakistan,” aldus een memo.

Volgens bronnen van de Amerikaanse inlichtingendiensten zouden in januari vorig jaar twee belangrijke Taliban fondsenwervers regelmatig naar de Verenigde Arabische Emiraten zijn gereisd, waar de Taliban en de Haqqani geld witwassen via lokale bedrijven.

In een memo wordt expliciet de vanuit Kabul werkende Haji Khalil Zadran genoemd als een sleutelfiguur binnen het Haqqani netwerk. Maar in de memo beklaagd Clinton zich erover dat het moeilijk was om zekerheid te hebben: de gebrekkige regelgeving omtrent financiële transacties in de VAE en de poreuze grenzen zorgen ervoor dat de Amerikaanse onderzoekers slechts “beperkte informatie” over de identiteit van sleutelfiguren van de Taliban- en Lashkar-e-Taiba heeft bemachtigd.

Het ontbreken van grenscontroles werd “uitgebuit door koeriers van de Taliban en Afghaanse drugsbaronnen die zich mengen onder handelaren, ondernemers en migrerende werknemers,” zei Clinton.

Amerikaanse en VAE ambtenaren werken steeds meer samen in een poging om de stroom van financiële middelen tegen te gaan en de geldkoeriers (smokkelaars die gigantische sommen met geld Pakistan en Afghanistan binnensmokkelen) aan te pakken.

Koeweit wordt net als de buurlanden omschreven als een “bron voor fondsenwerving en een belangrijk doorsluis haven” voor al-Qaeda en andere militante groepen. Terwijl de regering krachtig gehandeld heeft tegen terroristische aanvallen op eigen bodem, is het veel “minder geneigd om actie te ondernemen tegen financiers en fondsenwervers in Koeweit die aanvallen buiten Koeweit financieren of plannen.”

Zo heeft Koeweit geweigerd om de ‘Revival of Islamic Heritage Society’, een liefdadigheidsinstelling die door de VS aangewezen is als een terroristische entiteit in juni 2008 voor het verlenen van steun aan Al-Qaeda en andere groepen zoals de LeT, te verbieden.

Er is weinig informatie over de fondsenwerving in Qatar [de vierde Golfstaat die in deze documenten besproken wordt], maar: “de VS beschouwen het algemene niveau van de samenwerking op het terrein van counter-terrorisme als de ergste in de regio.” Hierin komt ook weer terug wat we in een eerder artikel besproken hebben over de WikiLeaks documenten dat Israël de VS al in een eerder stadium gewezen hebben op de dubbele rol die Qatar speelt in het Midden Oosten wat betreft Iran en islamitisch terrorisme. De Israëliërs vinden dat Qatar iedereen te vriend probeert te houden om zelf buiten schot te blijven en hadden de Amerikanen geadviseerd om zijn militaire basis in Qatar te sluiten.

De financiering van islamitisch terrorisme is een groot probleem voor de Westerse wereld. Als de financiële middelen van de terroristische groeperingen niet opdrogen kunnen ze tot in lengte van jaren doorgaan met het voeren van oorlog en zelfs steeds betere militaire middelen ter beschikking krijgen. De documenten laten dan ook scherpe kritiek zien richting Pakistan, waar volgens de VS de regering te laconiek omgaat met het aanpakken van de financiering van militante groepen die zelfs heimelijke militaire steun van het Pakistaanse leger genieten.

In de geheime documenten zien we hoe vóór de aanslagen in Mumbai in 2008, Pakistaanse en Chinese diplomaten hun uiterste best deden om VN-sancties tegen de liefdadigheidsvleugel van LeT, Jama’at-ud-Da’wa, te blokkeren.

En in augustus 2009, negen maanden nadat de sancties uiteindelijk werden opgelegd, schreven Amerikaanse diplomaten dat “we blijven berichten ontvangen waaruit blijkt dat de Jama’at-ud-Da’wa nog steeds op meerdere locaties in Pakistan actief is en dat de groep nog steeds openlijk geld aan het inzamelen is.”

Zolang de regeringen van Arabische- of islamitische staten en totalitaire regimes zoals China niet serieus meewerken met de ‘vrije wereld’ om een einde te maken aan de geldstromen richting terroristische organisaties is het een utopie om te denken dat dit kwaad uitgeroeid kan worden met militaire middelen alleen.


Bron: WikiLeaks

Wednesday, 30 December 2009, 13:28

S E C R E T STATE 131801
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR TFCO
EO 12958 DECL: 12/28/2019
TAGS EFIN, KTFN, PTER, PINR, PREL, PK, KU, AE, QA, SA
SUBJECT: TERRORIST FINANCE: ACTION REQUEST FOR SENIOR
LEVEL ENGAGEMENT ON TERRORISM FINANCE
REF: A. (A) STATE 112368 B. (B) RIYADH 1499 C. (C) KUWAIT 1061 D. (D) KUWAIT 1021 E. (E) ABU DHABI 1057 F. (F) DOHA 650 G. (G) ISLAMABAD 2799
Classified By: EEB/ESC Deputy Assistant Secretary Douglas C. Hengel for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

——-

Summary

——-

1. (U) This is an action request cable. Please see para 3.

2. (S/NF) Summary: In August 2009, Special Representative to the President for Afghanistan and Pakistan (S/SRAP) Ambassador Richard Holbrooke in coordination with the Department of Treasury established the interagency Illicit Finance Task Force (IFTF). The IFTF is chaired by Treasury A/S David Cohen. It focuses on disrupting illicit finance activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the external financial/logistical support networks of terrorist groups that operate there, such as al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, and Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT). The IFTF’s activities are a vital component of the USG’s Afghanistan and Pakistan (Af/Pak) strategy dedicated to disrupting illicit finance flows between the Gulf countries and Afghanistan and Pakistan. The IFTF has created a diplomatic engagement strategy to assist in the accomplishment of this objective. The strategy focuses on senior-level USG engagement with Gulf countries and Pakistan to communicate USG counterterrorism priorities and to generate the political will necessary to address the problem. The IFTF has drafted talking points for use by all USG officials in their interactions with Gulf and Pakistani interlocutors. These points focus on funding for terrorist groups threatening stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan and targeting coalition soldiers. These points have been cleared through the relevant Washington agencies.

3. (SBU) Action request: Drawing on the background materials for respective countries, and in preparation for the upcoming visits by Ambassador Holbrooke and Treasury U/S Levey in January, the Department requests all action posts deliver the general talking points in paras 5-6 and country specific talking points contained in the following paras: (1) Saudi Arabia ) para 8, (2) Kuwait ) para 10, (3) UAE ) para 12, and (4) Pakistan ) para 13. The talking points should be delivered by Ambassadors/Charge D’Affaires.

4. (C) In response to State 112368, the Department has received responses from Embassies Riyadh, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Doha, and Islamabad regarding the resource capabilities devoted towards these efforts. The Department also received each Mission’s evaluation of the effectiveness of host country institutions working on combating terrorism financing along with post’s recommendations on ways forward.

—————————————-

General talking points for all Embassies

—————————————-

5. (SBU) Threat financing:

Cutting off the flow of funds to terrorist organizations and achieving stability in Af/Pak are top U.S. priorities.

These objectives require effective actions against terrorist fundraising in the Gulf by al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, LeT, and other Af/Pak-based violent extremist groups, all of which undermine the security of the entire international community. We will not succeed without your cooperation.

Long term success in combating terrorist financing requires a comprehensive, strategic approach that includes the following elements:

(1) aggressive action to identify, disrupt and deter terrorist donors, fundraisers and facilitators;

(2) appropriate legal measures, including effective prosecution, to hold terrorist financiers and facilitators publicly accountable and to send a strong message of deterrence to current and would-be donors that their actions face significant legal and social repercussions.

(3) strong oversight of charities, including their overseas branches, to ensure that these organizations are not supporting terrorist and extremist elements;

(4) strict enforcement of UN 1267 sanctions; and

(5) full compliance with international anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) standards, including vigorous enforcement.

6. (SBU) Charities:

The United States strongly supports legitimate charitable activities and is a strong proponent of private charitable giving.

We recognize and admire the emphasis placed on charity within Islam and we seek to work cooperatively with governments and organizations in the Islamic world to ensure that legitimate charitable activities thrive.

At the same time, we want to increase our cooperative efforts to ensure that extremists and terrorists do not exploit charitable giving.

——————————————— ———-

Country-specific background material and talking points

——————————————— ———-

7. (U) Saudi Arabia background

(S/NF) While the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) takes seriously the threat of terrorism within Saudi Arabia, it has been an ongoing challenge to persuade Saudi officials to treat terrorist financing emanating from Saudi Arabia as a strategic priority. Due in part to intense focus by the USG over the last several years, Saudi Arabia has begun to make important progress on this front and has responded to terrorist financing concerns raised by the United States through proactively investigating and detaining financial facilitators of concern. Still, donors in Saudi Arabia constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide. Continued senior-level USG engagement is needed to build on initial efforts and encourage the Saudi government to take more steps to stem the flow of funds from Saudi Arabia-based sources to terrorists and extremists worldwide.

(S/NF) The USG engages regularly with the Saudi Government on terrorist financing. The establishment in 2008 of a Treasury attache office presence in Riyadh contributes to robust interaction and information sharing on the issue. Despite this presence, however, more needs to be done since Saudi Arabia remains a critical financial support base for al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, LeT, and other terrorist groups, including Hamas, which probably raise millions of dollars annually from Saudi sources, often during Hajj and Ramadan. In contrast to its increasingly aggressive efforts to disrupt al-Qa’ida’s access to funding from Saudi sources, Riyadh has taken only limited action to disrupt fundraising for the UN 1267-listed Taliban and LeT-groups that are also aligned with al-Qa’ida and focused on undermining stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

(S/NF) Saudi Arabia has enacted important reforms to criminalize terrorist financing and restrict the overseas flow of funds from Saudi-based charities. However, these restrictions fail to include &multilateral organizations8 such as XXXXXXXXXXXX Intelligence suggests that these groups continue to send money overseas and, at times, fund extremism overseas. In 2002, the Saudi government promised to set up a &Charities Committee8 that would address this issue, but has yet to do so. The establishment of such a mechanism, however, is secondary to the primary U.S. goal of obtaining Saudi acknowledgement of the scope of this problem and a commitment to take decisive action.

(S/NF) Department note: The Department received post’s comments regarding embassy staffing at Riyadh and recommendations for enhancing bilateral cooperation (ref B). The Department agrees with post’s recommendation that the U.S. must reinforce, on a political level, the Saudi Arabia Government’s recent acknowledgement that terrorist groups other than al-Qa’ida are a threat both to it and to regional stability. The Department also supports post’s assessment that consistent engagement, including the exchange of actionable intelligence, by senior USG officials is paramount. We plan to discuss these issues with the SAG during upcoming senior-level USG visits.

8. (U) Saudi Arabia talking points

(S/REL USA, SAU) We recognize your government’s efforts to disrupt al-Qa’ida networks in the Kingdom and we reaffirm our commitment to support the Saudi government in its actions on terror finance. We encourage your government to continue efforts against al-Qa’ida and stress the importance of sharing and acting on information related to terrorist financing.

(S/REL USA, SAU) We note your concerns with fundraising in the Kingdom by al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups and urge decisive action to enforce the UN 1267-mandated asset freeze against Taliban and LeT fundraising similar to Saudi efforts to enforce UN 1267 sanctions and take other appropriate action to target al-Qa’ida.

(S/REL USA, SAU) We underscore that the Taliban and LeT are aligned with al-Qa’ida and that your government’s support for disrupting the financing of these groups is critical to the stability of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the broader Central and South Asian region. We emphasize the need to prevent the Taliban from using the cover of reconciliation talks to raise funds.

(S/REL USA, SAU) We urge your government to assume responsibility for the overseas operations of charities and NGOs headquartered in the Kingdom. We encourage you to prevent terrorists and their supporters from exploiting religious events (Hajj, Umrah, Ramadan) to raise funds. We acknowledge the recent adoption of stricter financial controls on charities, but urge greater regulation and oversight of the Saudi charitable sector.

(S/REL USA, SAU) We would like to stress our interest in broadening and deepening this dialogue and information exchange as we still lack detailed information on the ultimate sources of terrorist financing emanating from the Kingdom. We commend your government for recent efforts to put terrorists and terrorist financiers on trial, and we encourage you to publicize details of prosecutions to maximize the deterrent effects.

(S/REL USA, SAU) You have had success in detaining and deterring financial facilitators. However, we encourage your government also to focus on the long-term and more fundamental goal of dissuading donors from funding violent extremism.

(S/REL USA, SAU) We commend your government’s effort over the past several years to use the media, internet, and other forms of public outreach to discourage extremism. We emphasize that a critical component in this campaign is cutting off the flow of funds from Saudi Arabia to foreign religious, charitable, and educational organizations that propagate violent extremist ideologies to vulnerable populations.

9. (U) Kuwait background

(S/NF) The USG has consistently engaged the Government of Kuwait (GOK) about the specific activities of terrorist financiers in country, Kuwaiti charities financing terrorism abroad, and Kuwait’s lack of a comprehensive anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing regime. While the GOK has demonstrated a willingness to take action when attacks target Kuwait, it has been less inclined to take action against Kuwait-based financiers and facilitators plotting attacks outside of Kuwait. Al-Qa’ida and other groups continue to exploit Kuwait both as a source of funds and as a key transit point.

(S/NF) The GOK has undertaken a number of initiatives to curb terrorist financing in the charitable sector (ending direct cash donations, increasing monitoring and supervising mosques and charitable organizations, and enhancing enforcement of regulations by a Ministry of Social Affairs task force). It also recently arrested some Kuwait-based al-Qa’ida facilitators, but it is too early to assess whether this marks a change in Kuwaiti policy of co-opting terrorists as a means of deflecting potential attacks against Kuwaiti interests.

(S/NF) Kuwait’s law prohibits efforts to undermine or attack Arab neighbors, a basis for the prosecution of al-Qa’ida facilitators, Kuwait remains the sole Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) country that has not criminalized terrorist financing. The GOK faces an uphill battle to implement comprehensive terror finance legislation due to a lack of parliamentary support. However the government is also not currently prepared to push hard on this issue. The GOK at times has obstructed or been slow to enforce UN-mandated asset freezes of Kuwait-based entities.

(S/NF) A particular point of difference between the U.S. and Kuwait concerns Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS). In June 2008 the USG domestically designated all RIHS offices RIHS under Executive Order 13224 for providing financial and material support to al-Qa’ida and UN 1267-listed al-Qa’ida affiliates, including Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Jemaah Islamiyah, and Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya. The United States nominated RIHS for listing under UNSCR 1267 but Indonesia placed a technical hold on the RIHS listing due concerns regarding RIHS’s presence in Indonesia. Libya also placed a hold – probably at Kuwait’s behest – citing insufficient information on RIHS’s activities. Indonesia has rotated off the United Nation’s Security Council so only Libya’s hold on RIHS remains. (Department note: Libya’s hold will drop in 2010 unless one of the newly elected UNSC Members places a hold on our request to list RIHS.) In Kuwait, RIHS enjoys broad public support as a charitable entity. The GOK to date has not taken significant action to address or shut down RIHS’s headquarters or its branches, which is consistent with GOK tolerance of similar behavior by Kuwaiti citizens and organizations as long as the behavior occurs or is directed outside of Kuwait.

(S/NF) Department note: The Department appreciates postVs thorough description of the staffing situation at Mission Kuwait (ref B). The Department commends U.S. Embassy Kuwait for taking an active approach in proposing a strategy to build GOK capacity in combating financial crimes through training and seminars focused on legislation and law enforcement (ref C). The opportunity to engage the GOK on improving its capabilities to deal with financial crimes is enthusiastically welcomed by agencies in Washington. Washington agencies appreciate post’s assessment and identification of several focal areas that deal with financial crimes. These goals closely track the work of the IFTF Capacity Building Working Group. The Department commends Embassy Kuwait’s recent support of Kuwait’s National Anti Money Laundering Committee’s AML conference in early December 2009. In response to post’s request, the Department will work with relevant members of the Washington inter-agency to provide comments and feedback to the draft of Kuwait’s amended AML law.

10. (U) Kuwait talking points

(S/REL USA, KWT) We appreciate the breadth and depth of our strong bilateral relationship. We would like to see our cooperation on counter-terrorist financing improve to a level that matches our excellent cooperation in many other areas. In this respect, the recent Kuwait anti-money laundering conference held in Kuwait is a positive step forward.

(S/REL USA, KWT) Our information indicates that Kuwaiti donors serve as an important source of funds and other support for al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups. The arrest in August of six Kuwaiti men who were plotting terrorist attacks on U.S. and Kuwait interests marks an important step in enhanced counterterrorism cooperation. We encourage you to keep up the positive momentum.

(S//REL USA, KWT) We underscore that the Taliban and LeT are aligned with al-Qaida and that your government’s support for disrupting the financing of these groups is critical to the stability of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the broader Central and South Asian region. We emphasize the need to prevent the Taliban from using the cover of reconciliation talks to raise funds.

(S/REL USA, KWT) We appreciate your government’s generosity for a wide range of important causes and for the positive contributions made by Kuwaiti charities. We commend Kuwait for some of the initiatives taken to enhance oversight of charitable donations, but we need you to do more to prevent the financing of terrorism abroad from Kuwaiti soil.

(S/REL USA, KWT) Our goal is to work more closely with your government to separate and protect legitimate charitable activity from those that fund terror. We have particular concerns about their foreign activities.

(S/REL USA, KWT) We remain concerned that the continued absence of counterterrorism legislation criminalizing terrorist financing will continue to prevent effective counterterrorist efforts.

(S/REL USA, KWT) We urge your government to prioritize the passage of counterterror finance legislation. Robust and comprehensive anti-money laundering and counterterror financing laws will enhance your government’s ability to prosecute those seeking to undermine Kuwait’s security, but will also enhance the reputation of Kuwait’s financial sector as a whole.

(S/REL USA, KWT) If raised, Kuwait RIHS: We have shared our concerns with your government regarding RIHS on numerous occasions. We designated the organization in the United States as a specially designated terrorist entity based on information that RIHS funds have supported terrorist groups in various regions of the world. The USG is not alone in its concern; six other governments (Albania, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, and Russia) have taken enforcement action against RIHS branches in their countries.

(S//REL USA, KWT) We would welcome the opportunity to work more closely with you to ensure that RIHS and other charities cannot be used to support terrorists.

11. (U) United Arab Emirates background

(S/NF) UAE-based donors have provided financial support to a variety of terrorist groups, including al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, LeT and other terrorist groups, including Hamas. Washington agencies note, however, that they have limited information on the identity of Taliban and LeT donors and facilitators in the UAE. Hence there is limited information to be shared with local interlocutors. Nonetheless, the point can be emphasized that the UAE’s role as a growing global financial center, coupled with weak regulatory oversight, makes it vulnerable to abuse by terrorist financiers and facilitation networks.

(S/NF) Department Note: The Department has received post’s comments regarding personnel staffing at Mission UAE and the challenges post faces. The Department is supportive of the action plan laid out on engaging with the UAE on Taliban finance issues (ref E). The Department assesses that a bilateral commitment by the United States and the UAE to focus on weaknesses within its financial regulatory measures is an important step in making progress on strengthening UAE efforts to disrupt potential terrorist financing.

12. (U) United Arab Emirates talking points

(S/REL USA, ARE) We appreciate the depth and breadth of our bilateral relationship. Since 2001, we have developed a strong partnership with your government in countering financial support for al-Qa’ida, and more recently, in constricting Iran’s ability to use UAE financial institutions to support its nuclear program.

(S/REL USA, ARE) We would like to extend our cooperation and partnership to efforts to deal with the threat represented by Taliban and LeT fundraising in the UAE. We believe that the United States and UAE, which both have troops in the field in Afghanistan, share a common interest in curtailing any Taliban or LeT fundraising activities and fully implementing UN 1267 sanctions on such activities on behalf of these groups in the UAE.

(S/REL USA, ARE) However, we are pleased that concerns have been raised in the UAE regarding the Taliban and LeT fundraising. We also commend the calls for increased vigilance, information sharing, and enforcement actions to disrupt and deter this activity.

(S/REL USA, ARE) In our view, the alignment of the Taliban and LeT with al-Qa’ida means that our mutual efforts to disrupt the financing of these groups also is critical to the stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

(S/REL USA, ARE) We emphasize the need to prevent the Taliban from using the cover of reconciliation talks to travel and raise funds.

(S/REL USA, ARE) We appreciate your government’s willingness to work with the USG on cash courier interdiction and note that such efforts are crucial to undermine al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, and other groups’ ability to exploit the UAE as a fundraising and facilitation hub. We urge your government to strengthen its regulatory and enforcement regime to interdict cash couriers transiting major airports.

13. (U) Pakistan background

(S/NF) Pakistan’s intermittent support to terrorist groups and militant organizations threatens to undermine regional security and endanger U.S. national security objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although Pakistani senior officials have publicly disavowed support for these groups, some officials from the Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) continue to maintain ties with a wide array of extremist organizations, in particular the Taliban, LeT and other extremist organizations. These extremist organizations continue to find refuge in Pakistan and exploit Pakistan’s extensive network of charities, NGOs, and madrassas. This network of social service institutions readily provides extremist organizations with recruits, funding and infrastructure for planning new attacks. On the international stage, Pakistan has sought to block the UNSCR 1267 listings of Pakistan-based or affiliated terrorists by requesting that China place holds on the nominations. China recently placed a technical hold on the designation of three Pakistan-based or affiliated terrorists nominated by India, although China did not prevent the most recent Pakistan-related U.S. designation nomination in June.

(S/NF) The Department has received post’s comments regarding personnel staffing and the detailed description of the challenges faced by Embassy Islamabad in the area of terrorism finance (ref D). Department leaves it to post discretion to determine which departments within the host government should receive the points provided in para 16 so that Pakistan fully understands the priority the USG places on this issue.

14. (U) Pakistan talking points

(S/REL USA, PAK) Emphasize that Pakistan’s support for disrupting financing to the Taliban and LeT obligatory pursuant to their obligations under UNSCR 1267 and successor resolutions, and is critical to achieving stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

(S/REL USA, PAK) We are deeply concerned that Pakistan has failed to enact an AML/CTF law that meets APG/FATF standards. As you may realize the FATF is currently engaged in a &International Co-Operation Review Group8 exercise, that is likely to have very negative multilateral repercussions if the Parliament does not pass an adequate AML/CTF law.

(S/REL USA, PAK) We stress your government’s obligation, under UNSCR 1267, and successor resolutions to strictly enforce existing sanctions against the 142 Taliban, LeT leader Hafiz Saeed, LeT/JUD, al Rashid Trust, al Akhtar Trust and other individuals and entities on the UN 1267 Consolidated List.

(S/REL USA, PAK) We urge your government to support the international community’s efforts to combat terrorist financing. Your government’s views of UNSCR 1267 listing requests for LeT and other Pakistan-based terrorist groups should be made on the merits of the requests and not linked to politics, including what country made the nomination or which countries are referenced in the public statements of the cases.

(S/REL USA, PAK) We urge your government to comply with UN and domestic legal obligations to enforce sanctions on the Pakistan-based, UN-proscribed NGOs al Rashid Trust and al Akhtar Trust, and all successor organizations that continue to funnel money and provide other forms of support to the Taliban and LeT.

(S/REL USA, PAK) We emphasize that social services provided by NGO extremist organizations, such as Jamaat-ud Dawa (JUD) challenge the legitimacy of your government to provide for its people. This includes relief efforts in the Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camps of the Northwest Frontier Provinces by the new LeT/JUD charity Falah-e Insaniyat Foundation.

(S/REL USA, PAK) We stress that our governments must work together to ensure that there are moderate alternatives to terrorist-controlled social welfare networks upon which IDPs and other vulnerable populations currently rely. We must work together to develop and support NGOs not affiliated with terrorist groups, and establish a comprehensive oversight and enforcement mechanism for NGOs that is consistent with the Financial Action Task Force’s international standard.

(S//REL USA, PAK) We urge your Government in the strongest possible terms to take action against the Haqqani network, which is funneling weapons and fighters across the border to fight U.S. and Coalition Forces in Afghanistan. This network, led by Sirajuddin Haqqani who was listed by the UN under UNSCR 1267, funds its activities through illicit activities, including kidnapping, extortion, bank robbery, narcotics, smuggling, and fraud.

(S//REL USA, PAK) We urge your Government to replace the anti-money laundering decree recently promulgated by your Executive Branch with legislation fully consistent with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations and to ensure that the current decree can stand in court. The FATF Forty Plus Nine Recommendations are international standards, which Pakistan, by virtue of its membership in the Asia-Pacific Group, committed to.

15. (U) Qatar background

(S//NF) Department Note: Qatar is one of the four Gulf countries included in the IFTF, and accordingly, the IFTF developed the background information included in para 16 for inclusion in the diplomatic engagement strategy. However, given the current focus of U.S. engagement with the GOQ on terror finance related to Hamas, it would be counter-productive for Embassy Doha to engage the GOQ at this time on disrupting financial support of terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

(S/NF) Qatar has adopted a largely passive approach to cooperating with the U.S. against terrorist financing. Qatar’s overall level of CT cooperation with the U.S. is considered the worst in the region. Al-Qaida, the Taliban, UN-1267 listed LeT, and other terrorist groups exploit Qatar as a fundraising locale. Although Qatar’s security services have the capability to deal with direct threats and occasionally have put that capability to use, they have been hesitant to act against known terrorists out of concern for appearing to be aligned with the U.S. and provoking reprisals.

(S//NF) Department Note: The Department has received post’s comments regarding personnel staffing and the thorough description of the coordination process on terrorist finance issues at Embassy Doha (ref F). Department appreciates post’s assessment that GOQ definitions of what constitutes terrorism differs occasionally from those of the USG. Department agrees with post’s suggested approach on this issue of engaging with direct discussions with host government officials.

—————————————-

Points of contact and reporting deadline

—————————————-

16. (U) Please direct any questions or comments on this request to EEB/ESC/TFS (Jay J. Jallorina or Linda Recht). Posts are requested to report back on responses from other governments by January 19, 2010. CLINTON


Bron: WikiLeaks

Monday, 10 August 2009, 23:56

S E C R E T STATE 083026
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
RELEASABLE TO PAKISTAN
EO 12958 DECL: 08/07/2019
TAGS EFIN, KTFN, PREL, PTER, UNSC
SUBJECT: UN 1267 (AL-QAIDA/TALIBAN) SANCTIONS: USG
OPPOSITION TO FOCAL POINT DE-LISTING REQUEST FOR JUD AND HAFIZ SAEED
REF: STATE 65044
Classified By: IO”>IO”>IO Assistant Secretary Esther Brimmer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraphs 4-6.

———————-

SUMMARY AND OBJECTIVES

———————-

2. (SBU) In May 2009, legal representatives for 1267-listed entity Jamaat-ud-Dawah (identified by the UN 1267 Committee as an alias for Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, permanent reference number QE.L.118.05) and its leader, Muhammad Saeed (permanent reference number QI.S.263.08) petitioned on their clients behalf for delisting via the UN focal point. The focal point, which was established in the UN Secretariat pursuant to UNSCR 1730 to allow listed individuals/entities (or their representatives) to petition directly for de-listing, forwarded the de-listing request on behalf of JUD and Saeed for review to the USG (designating state) and to the Government of Pakistan (state of citizenship/residence/incorporation). The USG and GOP have had three months to review the de-listing petition. We have completed our review and plan to notify the UN focal point on August 25 of our opposition to de-listing. Before doing so, we would like to take this opportunity to: — share the results of our review of the de-listing petition for JUD and Muhammad Saeed with Pakistani officials; — seek GOP views on the request; — underscore our ongoing concern over the threat posed by LeT/JUD and Saeed; — ask Pakistani officials to update us on actions taken to impose UN 1267 sanctions on LeT/JUD and Saeed.

———-

BACKGROUND

———-

3. (S) On December 10, 2008, the UN 1267 Committee took several actions related to the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Tayibba (LeT), including its listing of Jamaat-ud-Dawah (JUD) as an alias for LeT, as well as the listing of JUD’s leader, Muhammad Saeed. The Committee in 2005 added LeT to its Consolidated List citing its affiliation with al-Qaida. The addition of the JUD alias, as well as the listing of Saeed, followed closely on the heels of the LeT-perpetrated attacks in Mumbai, India, in November 2008. Prior to the attacks, our request to list JUD and Saeed were placed on hold by China at the behest of Pakistan. In spite of Pakistani acquiescence to the listings in December 2008, we continue to see reporting indicating that JUD is still operating in multiple locations in Pakistan, and that the group continues to openly raise funds. It is unclear what, if any, steps the GOP has taken to freeze JUD’s assets or otherwise implement UN 1267 sanctions, which include an asset freeze, travel ban, and arms embargo.

————–

ACTION REQUEST

————–

4. (SBU) USUN is requested to inform the focal point on August 25, after both USUN and Islamabad have had a chance to inform Pakistani officials of our views, of our opposition to the de-listing request on behalf of JUD and Muhammad Saeed. In its communication to the focal point, USUN should refute the assertion in Saeed’s and his legal representatives claim in the focal point de-listing petition that “there are no grounds for placing Saeed and JUD on the Consolidated List and the material relied upon is incorrect and baseless” and note that we stand by the information included in the statements of case we submitted (co-sponsored by the UK and France) to the UN 1267 Committee to add JUD and Saeed to the Consolidated List. USUN should further state that we have seen no evidence of a change in circumstance warranting de-listing of JUD or Saeed.

5. (SBU) USUN and Embassy Islamabad should inform Pakistani officials in New York and Islamabad, respectively, of our opposition to the de-listing petition for JUD and Saeed. Action addressees may wish to draw upon the following points:

— We have reviewed the de-listing petition from attorneys on behalf of Jamaat-ud Dawa (JUD) and its leader Hafiz Saeed and will soon inform the UN 1267 Committee, via the UN focal point, of our opposition to de-listing.

— We first wanted to share our views with Pakistani officials, and to seek Pakistan’s view on the de-listing petition.

— As you are no doubt aware, we are deeply concerned about the threat posed by LeT/JUD, and reject Saeed’s and his legal representatives claim in the focal point de-listing petition that “there are no grounds for placing Saeed and JUD on the Consolidated List and the material relied upon is incorrect and baseless.”

— In fact, LeT and JUD stem from the same original organization, Markaz-ud-Dawawal-Irshad (MDI). When LeT was declared a terrorist organization in Pakistan in 2002, MDI publicly divested itself of LeT at that time and renamed itself JUD. LeT transferred most of its assets and personnel to the newly formed JUD, ensuring its survival.

— We believe that LeT uses JUD facilities as a public front for its activities and shares offices, phone numbers, personnel and bank accounts. LeT’s old offices merely changed the name on the door.

— JUD’s budget, using funds from both witting and unwitting donors, is dedicated to social services and/or humanitarian relief but some is used to finance LeT operations.

— We are also aware that LeT and JUD share many senior leaders, including Hafiz Saeed, who according to information available to the USG, as of 2009 continued to control LeT and issue guidance to LeT members.

— We would like here your views on the status of LeT/JUD and Saeed, and would particularly appreciate an update on steps Pakistan has taken or will take to implement UN 1267 sanctions on them.

6. (S/REL to Pakistan) Embassy Islamabad is also requested to share a non-paper, included below in paragraph 7, prepared by our intelligence community in February 2009 assessing JUD’s links to LeT. This non-paper, which was previously passed by former S/CT Coordinator Dell Daily to Pakistani Ambassador to the United States Husain Haqqani, provides more detailed information on our concerns about LeT/JUD and Saeed that underpin our view that their listing by the UN 1267 Committee was and remains appropriate.

7. (S/REL to Pakistan) BEGIN TEXT OF NON-PAPER

(U//FOUO) Assessing Jamaat-ud-Dawa’s Links to Lashkar-e-Tayyiba

SUMMARY

(S//REL) The Community assesses that LT, a Pakistan-based terrorist group, uses the JUD name as an alias. JUD is a religious, educational, and humanitarian organization that the Community assesses provides cover and protection for LT’s militant activities in Pakistan. LT and JUD share many senior leaders; LT falls under the authority of JUD leader Hafiz Muhammad Saeed; and JUD supports and facilitates LT’s violent activities. – LT and JUD stem from the same original organization*Markaz-ud-Dawawal-Irshad (MDI)*that was founded around 1986 and for which LT served as its armed, militant wing. MDI was renamed JUD in December 2001. – LT was declared a terrorist organization in January 2002, and MDI publicly divested itself of the LT at that time. LT transferred most of its assets and personnel under the newly formed JUD.

(S//REL) The Community assesses that JUD relies heavily on private donations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), madrassas, and businesses spread throughout South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Some of the money to finance LT operations is obtained by fraudulently redirecting donations intended for humanitarian work.

(S//REL) JUD and LT have branch offices with different names and have adopted a number of aliases as a denial and deception tactic.

END SUMMARY

(C//REL) Various Names and Aliases

(S//REL) The Intelligence Community assesses that Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) and Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD) are part of the same organization, originally called Markaz-ud-Dawawal-Irshad (MDI), that was founded by Hafiz Muhammed Saeed and other faculty at the University of Engineering and Technology in Lahore in 1986. MDI was established with funding from donors in the Middle East and set up camps to prepare its personnel to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan.

MDI reorganized after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, creating LT as its paramilitary wing to fight in the Indian-controlled districts of Jammu and Kashmir while MDI focused on religious and humanitarian activity. Saeed led both MDI and LT during the 1990s.

When the US declared LT a terrorist organization in December 2001, MDI reorganized*changing its name to JUD to draw a distinction between its charitable and educational work and LT’s militant activities*in an effort by MDI leaders to shield their fundraising and other activities from sanctions. Saeed publicly resigned from LT, telling the media that he had assumed the leadership of JUD. In mid-January 2002, LT was banned.

Islamabad “watchlisted” JUD in 2003, but the government has resisted pressure to take action against the group, particularly after JUD,s popular earthquake relief efforts in 2005 and 2006 in response to the October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan.

LT has used JUD facilities as a public front for its activities and, shared offices, phone numbers, leaders, and bank accounts. LT members identified themselves as JUD when in Pakistan and as LT when in Kashmir.

LT/JUD purportedly raises funds for the Palestinian people in response to Israel’s attacks on Gaza. The Community judges that as of January, JUD also may be operating under the alias Tehreek-e-Hurmat-e-Rasool. LT’s political affairs coordinator Khalid Waleed identified himself in late December as the chief organizer for a conference for Tehreek-e-Hurmat-e-Rasool, according to intelligence reporting. – On 6 February, the JUD held a Kashmir Solidarity Conference at which JUD renamed itself Tehreek-e-Azadi-e-Kashmir (TAK). At JUD,s first public protest since December, supporters used old JUD banners and chanted JUD slogans, but rallied under the name TAK to avoid arrest.

BEGIN TEXT BOX

(U//FOUO) UN Links Jamaat-ud-Dawa to Terrorism

(S//REL) The United Nations (UN) banned Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD), and on 10 December, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee (the 1267 Committee) approved the addition of JUD as a new LT alias for targeted sanctions. This UN designation required all UN member states to freeze any assets this entity may have under the member states’ jurisdiction, impose a travel ban, and implement an arms embargo against them as set out in paragraph 1 of UNSC Resolution 1822 of 2008.

(S//REL) The Community assesses that LT/JUD, in an attempt to evade restrictions, has established branch offices with different names and adopted a number of aliases. One branch, Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq, is a publicly acknowledged charitable arm of JUD and has its own web page with photos of hospitals and ambulances. Other aliases include Paasbaan-e-Ahle-Hadith, Paasban-e-Kashmir, Al-Mansoorian, and Al-Nasaryeen. We assess that LT and LT-associated militants will continue to use aliases in order to circumvent restrictions on their movement and operations.

END TEXT BOX

(U//FOUO) Financial Support

(S//REL) The Community assesses that JUD fundraising has relied heavily on private donations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), madrassas, and businesses spread throughout South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Some of JUD’s budget, using funds raised both from witting donors and by fraud, is dedicated to social services or humanitarian relief projects, while some is used to finance LT operations. – In December 2005, an official of Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq forwarded JUD donation receipts to a probable LT front company in Saudi Arabia where an LT finance official may have been closely associated with the general manager*possibly acting as a front for moving LT funds, according to intelligence reporting. – Makki in 2002 frequently visited the Middle East and viewed it as a main source of funding. To demonstrate results to donors, JUD would finance the cost of building a new school or upgrading facilities at a madrassa, but would inflate the cost to siphon money to LT.

(S//REL) The Community lacks sufficient intelligence to determine if or how the November Mumbai attacks have affected donations to JUD. Some donors may be dissuaded from supporting JUD if they become aware that their funds may be used for additional terrorist attacks, whereas other donors may support LT’s attacks. As public and government scrutiny increases in the wake of the attacks and subsequent designation of JUD as an alias of LT by the UN, we assess that JUD will rely more on covert fundraising efforts.

(U//FOUO) Leadership

(S//REL) The Community assesses that Saeed is the leader of LT and Lakvi is LT’s operations commander*and they continue to run the organization despite being detained for their role in the November Mumbai attacks. We also judge that they have planned, directed, and executed LT attacks throughout South Asia and likely have used some funds collected in the name of JUD’s charitable activities to support multiple LT terrorist operations, including the November Mumbai attacks. The Community assesses that Saeed continues to lead both organizations. However, the Community is unable to assess to what extent senior JUD leaders such as Saeed are involved in specific terrorist operations or the level of detail to which they are knowledgeable about specific past and pending attacks. – As of mid-July Lakvi was responsible for the LT’s military operations budget of PKR 365 million (approximately US $5.2 million) per year. He reportedly used the money to purchase all materials required for LT operations other than weapons and ammunition, according to a source claiming direct and ongoing access to LT leaders.

END TEXT OF NON-PAPER

—————————————

REPORTING DEADLINE AND POINT OF CONTACT

—————————————

8. (U) Action addressees should report as soon as possible but no later than August 19 results of their demarche to Pakistani officials .

9. (U) Questions may be directed to IO”>IO”>IO/PSC (Erin Crowe, 202-736-7847). CLINTON


Bron: WikiLeaks

Friday, 29 May 2009, 11:46

C O N F I D E N T I A L RIYADH 000716
EO 12958 DECL: 05/22/2019
TAGS PREL, PTER, EFIN, AF, PK, SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI INTERIOR MINISTRY BRIEFS SPECIAL ADVISOR
HOLBROOKE AND TREASURY DAS GLASER ON TERRORISM FINANCE
REF: RIYADH 702
Classified By: CDA DAVID RUNDELL, 1.4 (b),(d)

1. KEY POINTS:

— (SBU) Special Advisor Ambassador Richard Holbrooke and Treasury DAS Glaser were briefed on Saudi terror finance efforts at a May 16 meeting with Interior Ministry (MOI) officials at the Security Forces Officers Club in Riyadh. Holbrooke also received a briefing on Saudi counterterrorism strategies (reftel). — (SBU) Saudi Arabia will join the Egmont Group by the end of May 2009. — (C) Holbrooke pushed for stronger cooperation in pursuing sources of funding for the Taliban, particularly in the Gulf States. — (C) The Hajj is still a major security loophole for the Saudis, since pilgrims often travel with large amounts of cash and the Saudis cannot refuse them entry into Saudi Arabia. A new Saudi law requires arriving travelers to declare cash over certain amounts. — (C) The MOI is concerned about funds flowing to Hizballah from the Saudi Shi’a community. — (C) The political situation in Pakistan affects MOI’s intelligence cooperation with Pakistan’s ISI.

NEW SAUDI FIU PROMISES BETTER COOPERATION

2. (C) The briefing was delivered by officials from the MOI’s new Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). They said the Saudi FIU’s mission is to cooperate with all other authorities to combat money laundering and terrorism finance, and outlined the divisions of FIU and their responsibilities to receive, analyze, investigate, and act upon reports of terrorist finance activities in concert with other Saudi financial and law enforcement agencies. The FIU had a budget of $31 million in 2008.

3. (C) Holbrooke asked how the U.S. was working with the new FIU. DAS Glaser said FIU cooperation will enable Saudi Arabia to plug into the global terror finance context. The U.S. has tested the Saudi system with three requests and has received a good response. Glaser added that Saudi success in rolling up domestic terror cells has had a positive impact but the need now was to target financial donors and networks that channel the funds to AQ and the Taliban. The daily work of exchanging information with Saudi Arabia was going well.

4. (C) Holbrooke asked whether the relationship could be further improved. The Saudis replied that Saudi Arabia would join the Egmont Group by the end of May 2009. Holbrooke said terrorists exploit the seams between countries such as borders, free trade zones, and international networks such as Hawala systems, and that in this respect drug proceeds were not the primary source of funds for the Taliban; rather private donations from the Gulf were the chief source of Taliban financing. This indicated the need for a new level of cooperation, he said, to address funds flowing from the Gulf to the Taliban, AQ, and South Asian terrorist groups. In particular, the UAE, Pakistan, and the UK must be on board.

5. (C) MOI counterterrorism advisor Major General Khalid al-Humaydan said Saudi Arabia was working to create a “coherent plan” on terrorist finance that included establishing a legal basis for taking action against financiers. The MOI had no problem targeting organizations, he said, but preferred to go after financiers on an individual basis: “the bad apples, not the whole barrel,” he said. With the FIU in place, he said, the MOI would be better able to “turn leads into tangible evidence” and follow up with counterpart authorities in other countries. “We used to call Dubai the ‘Black Hole’,” of terrorist finance, he said. Glaser agreed with the need for a comprehensive strategy. He said he understood the Saudi approach to focus on individuals rather than organizations, but there was another more common model that focused on organizations as part of a broader terrorist network.

HAJJ, HIZBALLAH, AND PAKISTAN

6. (C) MOI Senior Advisor Major General Dr. Sa’ad al-Jabri said the Saudi approach was based on the fact that Saudi Arabia had been in a war and had to act. Saudi authorities had detained over 4,000 individuals, some of whom were suspected of terrorist financing offenses and would act if supplied with information. Hajj was still a big problem for the Saudis, since they could not refuse to let pilgrims enter the country. Some of the non-Saudi terrorism detainees in Saudi Arabia had entered as pilgrims. The Saudi government recently passed a law requiring arriving travelers to declare cash above a certain amount, but Hajj was still “a vacuum in our security,” he admitted. Another problem was money going to Hizballah from Saudi Shiites. The Saudis’ focus had been on funds from Sunni sources, but they needed to focus on the Shi’a too, Dr. Sa’ad said.

7. (C) Holbrooke noted that Pakistan was also a center for terrorist financing through Islamic charities and asked whether the Saudis were monitoring the large Pakistani community in Saudi Arabia, and whether the Saudis were consulting with the governments of Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh about the issue. Al-Humaydan said the Saudis had detained numerous individuals from these countries and were seeking cooperation to investigate their activities. He added that “we talk to ISI (Pakistan’s intelligence agency) and get a good response, but we think ten times before approaching them; things are changing there and we are advised to be careful.” Political unrest and new ISI leadership were the principal changes, he said. As a result, he concluded, “We only trust face-to-face transmission of information.” The MOI had shared information with ISI on Pakistanis in Saudi Arabia suspected of terror finance, but ISI had not responded.

DON’T FORGET IRAN

8. (C) Holbrooke asked whether the Taliban still found support in Saudi Arabia. Dr. Sa’ad answered that support from Saudi Arabia was less than it had been in earlier years, such as the 1980s, but was still present. Holbrooke asked about Iran, and Dr. Sa’ad replied that in the Saudi view, Iran was a “serious contributor” to terrorism activities in many places, including Yemen, North Africa, and Latin America.

9. (C) Holbrooke concluded by assuring his hosts of the U.S. commitment to cooperation on fighting terrorism and for better relations with the Muslim world.

10. (U) Meeting participants

U.S.

Special Advisor Ambassador Richard Holbrooke Barnett Rubin, Senior Advisor Dan Glaser, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury David Rundell, Charge d’Affaires Andrew Roth, Embassy Riyadh Edwin Brown, Embassy Riyadh (notetaker) Jeff Smith, Embassy Riyadh

Saudi Arabia

Major General Sa’ad al-Jabri, Senior Advisor, Ministry of the Interior

Major General Khalid al-Humaydan (“Abu Ali”), Counterterrorism Advisor, Ministry of the Interior

Brigadier General Ahmed al-Issa, U.S. Liaison, Ministry of the Interior

Captain Bandar al-Subaie, Assistant to MG Sa’ad al-Jabri

FIU briefers

11. (U) Amb. Holbrooke cleared this telegram.

RUNDELL


Bron: WikiLeaks

Wednesday, 29 October 2008, 10:12

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 001619
SIPDIS
WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP, CENTCOM FOR POLAD, NAVCENT AND J5, DOE
FOR KKOLEVAR AND WBRYAN, DEPARTMENT FOR P SMULL, NEA
GCRETZ, S/CT AND NEA/ARP
EO 12958 DECL: 10/28/2018
TAGS ECON, ENRG, EPET, MARR, MCAP, MOPS, OVP, PGOV, PREL,
PTER, SA
SUBJECT: SAG AGREES TO USG STEPS TO PROTECT OIL FACILITIES
REF: A. RIYADH 1579 B. RIYADH 1408 C. RIYADH 1298
RIYADH 00001619 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Charge’ d’Affaires David Rundell for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

1. (U) This is an Action Request, see paragraph 11.

2. (S) SUMMARY. The Joint Commssion on Critical Infrastructure Protection and Border Security (JCCIP) initiative in Saudi Arabia made significant progress this week. On October 27, a Department of Energy delegation led by DOE DAS Wm. Bryan, with AmEmbassy Riyadh Charge’ d’Affaires in attendance, presented a three-hour Vulnerability Assessment (VA) of the Abqaiq oil facility (Reftel A) to Saudi Ministry of Interior senior-level and working staff, which included a 40-minute briefing/discussion with Assistant Minister for National Security Affairs Prince Mohammed bin Naif (MBN). DOE’s recommendations were enthusiastically accepted by MBN, with further JCCIP work agreed to. Concurrent with the VA presentation, the deployed CENTCOM representative in Riyadh presented the draft Letter of Request (LOR) to MBN to establish the Office of the Program Manager – Facilities Security Force (OPM-FSF), which will be responsible to train and equip the Saudi security forces being formed to protect Saudi energy production facilities, desalination plants and future civil nuclear reactors. The Saudis remain highly concerned about the vulnerability of their energy production facilities and reaffirmed their strong desire for a long-term USG commitment to implement the JCCIP agreement. END SUMMARY.

——————————-

FULL SPEED AHEAD ON ASSESSMENTS

——————————-

3. (S) DOE presented a two-day, thorough, highly-technical evaluation of Abqaiq’s security capability to MOI, FSF and ARAMCO officials on Oct. 27 and 28, with the introductory briefing consisting of a three-hour presentation. The conclusion is that the Abqaiq facility’s safety standards are world-class and its current security measures would counter a repeat of the Feb. 2006 failed Al Qaeda VBIED attack, but Abqaiq remains highly vulnerable to other types of sophisticated terrorist attacks. DOE provided concrete steps for the Saudis to enhance and harden Abqaiq’s security architecture.

4. (S) MBN was impressed with DOE’s Abqaiq VA and expressed his appreciation for DOE’s work. He ordered his staff to immediately implement DOE’s recommendations to improve Abqaiq’s security and requested DOE to perform further VAs. The Ras Tannurah oil facility was named as the next site to be assessed, with its VA to be conducted as soon as possible. It was agreed DOE would establish three VA teams dedicated solely to evaluating Saudi Arabia’s critical infrastructure sites, which number approximately 100. These DOE teams would be joined by MOI members who would learn the necessary skill sets from DOE to then perform their own individual VAs of sites. The goal would be MOI to eventually take the lead in VAs of all remaining sites, with DOE supporting the MOI VA teams. This would maximize the number of sites able to be assessed in the shortest time period. DOE also invited MOI, ARAMCO and CENTCOM to join them at Sandia Labs to wrap up the Abqaiq assessment and demonstrate the models used in formulating their recommendations. This visit is expected to

RIYADH 00001619 002.2 OF 003

be conducted by the end of 2008.

5. (S) It was noted during the presentation that the ARAMCO officials were uneasy with MOI encroaching onto their territory. ARAMCO expressed concern that “Too much security will make it too hard for us (ARAMCO) to do our jobs in producing oil.” While it was telling to see firsthand some the interagency disputes within the SAG, an MOI official in a sidebar confided in us that ARAMCO’s concerns would be addressed, but that MBN, who reportedly has the final say in the protection of Saudi critical infrastructure, would not allow Saudi oil facilities to be left vulnerable, regardless of ARAMCO’s complaints.

6. (S) This same MOI official mentioned that the protection of Saudi critical infrastructure is expected to eventually be 25% of MOI’s budget. MOI’s current annual budget is approx. USD 1 billion. The protection of Saudi critical infrastructure will likely lead to a significant increase in MOI’s budget as the FSF alone will be 35,000 strong, minimum, with an additional 20 per cent more forces for port and border security. DOE’s security projects and future to-be-determined JCCIP programs with other USG agencies will add even more to MOI’s budget requirements.

————–

OPM-FSF STARTS

————–

7. (S) The draft LOR for OPM-FSF prepared by CENTCOM was presented to MBN. This draft explicitly lays out on one page the exact wording for the SAG’s formal request to the USG to establish OPM-FSF. MBN directed his staff to prepare such a letter for his signature. Once we receive this letter, CENTCOM will then respond with a Letter of Acceptance (LOA) which will allow CENTCOM to begin building up OPM-FSF’s personnel and equipment structure. MOI indicated they plan to present the formal Saudi LOR to GEN Petraeus when he visits the Kingdom, currently scheduled for Nov. 8.

——————–

JOINT WORKING GROUPS

——————–

8. (S) A related discussion item was the role of the Joint Working Groups (JWG). It was previously established there would be three JWG: FSF, Industrial Security and Internal Security (Reftel B). During our recent meetings, it was clarified and agreed to that “Joint” will refer to USG-SAG only, not inter-agency. When these working groups meet, it will be a single USG voice in dialogue with a single SAG voice. Inter-agency USG discussions will take place at the JCCIP Cell in Riyadh or in Washington.

9. (S) DAS Bryan, in discussions with MOI officials, requested clarification on MOI’s view and scope of the Industrial Security Joint Working Group. The “Industry” of focus is the oil industry and all other industries that support the oil sector. This also includes interdependencies on other utilities, in particular electricity and water. This will enable DOE to better perform the system level analysis as opposed to individual site assessments. Additionally, this insight enables DOE to staff the Industrial Security JWG with appropriate USG representation.

—————————–

RIYADH 00001619 003.2 OF 003

“WE MUST PROTECT IT TOGETHER”

—————————–

10. (S) In a private meeting between MBN and the Charge’, MBN conveyed the SAG’s, and his personal, sense of urgency to move forward as quickly as possible to enhance the protection of Saudi Arabia’s critical infrastructure with the priority being its energy production sites. MBN related how his grandfather, King Abdulaziz, had the vision of forming a lasting strategic partnership with the United States. MBN stressed he shared this vision, and wants the USG’s help to protect Saudi critical infrastructure. He commented that neither the Kingdom nor the U.S. would be comfortable with the “French or Russians” involved in protecting Saudi oil facilities. “We built ARAMCO together, we must protect it together.” MBN also confirmed his travel dates to Washington will be Nov. 5 to 7.

11. (S) MOI officials queried us on the exact date U/S Wm. Burns, P, would travel to the Kingdom for the meeting of the Joint Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection and Border Security. The SAG expects it to be in mid-December after the Eid al-Adha (set to end Dec. 12), and request confirmation as soon as possible of P’s exact travel date so they can prepare the appropriate agenda. Post requests the Department’s confirmation of P’s exact travel dates to Saudi Arabia for the next JCCIP.

——-

COMMENT

——-

12. (S) The Saudis now feel energized by DOE’s VA, DOE’s subsequent proposals and CENTCOM’s assistance in establishing OPM-FSF. Likewise, they recognize many of their energy facilities remain at risk from Al Qaeda and other terrorists who seek to disrupt the global economy, and vigorously urge we continue assisting them to counter this threat. RUNDELL


Bron: WikiLeaks

Thursday, 07 January 2010, 13:10

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000009
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/01/07 TAGS: ECON, PTER, KTFN, AE, AF, EFIN SUBJECT: (S) US-UAE Further Cooperation to Disrupt Taliban Finance
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Olson, Ambassador, State Department, U.S. Embassy Abu Dhabi; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

(S//NF) Summary

1. (S//NF) SUMMARY. On December 15-16, 2009, Treasury Department Acting Assistant Secretary of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis Howard Mendelsohn, along with GRPO officers and Treasury analysts, met with senior officials from the UAE’s State Security Department (SSD) and Dubai’s General Department of State Security (GDSS) to discuss suspected Taliban-related financial activity in the UAE. Prior to these meetings, GRPO and Treasury passed to SSD and GDSS detailed information on the financing of the Taliban and other terrorist and extremist groups based in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Mendelsohn praised the UAE for its contribution to building a stable and moderate Afghanistan. He thanked the SSD and GDSS for its commitment, per the directive of Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, to disrupt any Taliban-related financial activity that can be identified in the UAE. The UAE services pledged full cooperation toward the shared goal and asked for additional detailed and actionable lead information. In particular, they asked for additional passport information, telephone numbers, full names and aliases, and travel itineraries for Taliban figures suspected of traveling to the UAE. END SUMMARY.

2. (S//NF) During the course of the two multi-hour intelligence exchange sessions, GRPO and Treasury analysts walked through the previously shared information suggesting that Taliban-related finance officials have visited the UAE in order to raise or move funds. The UAE security officials believe that the Taliban may draw support from the sizeable Pashtun population resident in the UAE. They asked for lead information the U.S. could gather with names of individuals or entities in the UAE that may be supporting the Taliban.

3. (S//NF) Officials from SSD and GDSS pledged that their respective organizations would follow up on the information provided, and work through intelligence channels to share information and results and submit additional requests for information.

Taliban/Haqqani Network

4. (S//NF) Mendelsohn acknowledged the important steps the UAE has taken to combat al-Qaida and the Taliban-to include sending troops to Afghanistan-and highlighted the importance the USG places on combating Taliban financing. He stated that the Taliban receives significant money from narcotics trafficking and extortion, but noted that the U.S. believes that the group also receives significant funds from the Gulf, particularly from donors in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. He further stated that the Taliban and Haqqani Network are believed to earn money from UAE-based business interests. Security officials from both SSD and GDSS agreed that the Taliban and Haqqani Network are serious threats. Officials from SSD added that Iran supports the Taliban with money and weapons, helps the Taliban smuggle drugs, and facilitates the movement of Taliban and al-Qaida members. SSD officials stated that Iran’s IRGC and navy are involved with these activities. GDSS officials noted Iran’s support to Taliban in Pakistan, adding that GDSS believes that India also has supported Pakistani Taliban and Pashtun separatists.

5. (S//NF) Treasury analysts provided information on XXXXXXXXXXXX two senior Taliban officials who have made multiple fundraising visits to the UAE, according to U.S. intelligence. The UAE security services were not familiar with either individual and asked for additional identifying information, including current passport information used by the individuals to enter the UAE in order to track down their movements. (NOTE: Information available to the USG and shared for this exchange included telephone numbers, an e-mail address, and expired passport information for crosschecking against Emirati immigration databases on both individuals. END NOTE.) SSD confirmed it checked UAE immigration systems based on the passport information provided and found no matching records. GRPO and Treasury analysts also shared names and phone numbers of multiple Taliban and Haqqani associates known either to reside in or travel to the UAE. SSD officials stated that Taliban fundraisers may use fabricated travel documents, and that Pakistanis/Afghanis often carry multiple passports, but noted that individuals from Pakistan and Afghanistan who apply for a travel visa now require an eye scan. The officials said this system should help prevent a single individual from using different aliases or passports. The services pledged to continue their investigations and share further results.

6. (S//NF) GDSS officials noted its ongoing monitoring of the large Afghan and Pakistani immigrant communities in Dubai and they commented that the Taliban extorts money from UAE-based Afghan businessmen. The same officials said the Taliban is also involved in kidnapping for ransom, whereby Afghanistan and Pakistan-based family members of the UAE-based businessmen are kidnapped for Taliban profit. Some Afghan businessmen in the UAE have resorted to purchasing tickets on the day of travel to limit the chance of being kidnapped themselves upon arrival in either Afghanistan or Pakistan.

7. (S//NF) The GDSS officials stated that hawaladars are usually unwitting when they transfer money that ends up with the Taliban. They further noted that Taliban financial supporters are likely to transfer smaller amounts across multiple hawalas to minimize suspicion.

8. (S//NF) SSD officials discussed the Taliban and Haqqani Network’s suspected use of front companies to raise and move money. They were familiar with Haji Khalil Zadran, a Kabul-based Haqqani Network financial facilitator who has visited the UAE, but were not able to provide any details on him.

9. (S//NF) GDSS officials were familiar with XXXXXXXXXXXX who reportedly provides funding to the Taliban/Haqqani Network, according to U.S. intelligence. The GDSS officials stated that they do not believe XXXXXXXXXXXX is loyal to the Taliban, and noted that he has cooperated with Pakistani authorities, as well as with Afghan President Karzai. They pointed out XXXXXXXXXXXX’s past visits from former Guantanamo Bay detainee Mullah Zaif, but noted that such visits-which may have resulted in financial support-have ceased. GDSS continues to monitor XXXXXXXXXXXX although at present they do not believe that he is a Taliban financial manager. Mendelsohn suggested that he may be a pragmatist who maintains relationships with legitimate authorities, but the USG has current information that suggests he is still involved with the Taliban.

10. (S//NF) GDSS discussed at length the history of the Haqqanis. They specifically highlighted Jalaluddin Haqqani’s success in exploiting images of civilian casualties in Afghanistan for fundraising purposes.

(S//NF) Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wa al-Sunna

11. (S//NF) Mendelsohn also raised Afghanistan and Pakistan-based extremist and terrorist groups, to include Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) and Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wa al-Sunna (JDQ). UAE security services were not familiar with the names of specific UAE-based LT members shared by GRPO and Treasury, but promised to follow up on the information. Mendelsohn raised the UAE-based NGO Dar al-Birr as an organization suspected of supporting JDQ. GDSS was familiar with the organization and pledged to investigate the matter.

OLSON


Bron: WikiLeaks

Wednesday, 02 September 2009, 11:56

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 000874
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, NEA/ARP (MCGOVERN) AND INR
EO 12958 DECL: 08/19/2019
TAGS EFIN, ECON, EINV, PGOV, AE
SUBJECT: C-SA9-01527: PAKISTANI AND AFGHAN EXPATRIATE TIES TO
EXTREMISTS
REF: STATE 71311
ABU DHABI 00000874 001.2 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RICHARD OLSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B AND D).

1. (S) The responses in para 3 are keyed to reftel request. Post notes that reftel was not addressed to Embassy Abu Dhabi, resulting in delayed response. Post requests that all cables requiring action/information on UAE issues be sent to Embassy Abu Dhabi.

OVERVIEW

——–

2. (S) Structurally, the UAE is a relatively open economy with the most vibrant financial sector in the Gulf; its federal structure also gives much economic autonomy to the various emirates, which impose varying levels of regulation and due diligence on economic activity. Characteristic of the region, the use of cash is common for legitimate financial transactions. High volumes of cash and electronic funds flow both to and from Afghanistan and Pakistan, the vast majority of which is derived from legitimate trade and remittances. The lack of effective border controls on cash is no doubt exploited by Taliban couriers and Afghan drug lords, camouflaged among traders, businessmen and migrant workers. Systemically approaching this issue both in the UAE and in the broader Gulf region to disrupt Taliban finances, while protecting commerce and economic activity, is an important, though challenging task. At the suggestion of the UAEG, we have established joint US/UAE task force (composed of interagency elements on both sides) to combat illicit financial flows to and from Afghanistan, specifically bulk cash smuggling.

3. (SBU) Begin reftel responses:

A. (C) HOW MUCH MONEY DO EXPATS SEND BACK TO THEIR HOME COUNTRY IN ANNUAL REMITTANCES?

As the UAEG does not break down remittance statistics by country, it is difficult to ascertain the total value of funds transferred. Anecdotal information suggests some expatriates transfer as much as 50 percent of their salary, although there is significant variance.

1) (C) BY WHAT CHANNELS? HOW OFTEN?

Most expatriate residents — of all nationalities — who remit funds to their home country do so through formal exchange houses (like Western Union and its local competitors) or informal hawala mechanisms. As most employees are paid monthly, workers generally transfer funds on a monthly basis.

2) (S) DOES THE HOST GOVERNMENT MONITOR THE MONEY FLOWS? IF SO, HOW?

The UAE Central Bank maintains records of all financial transactions facilitated by banks, exchange houses and registered hawalas. This information includes names, addresses, phone numbers, and visa details of the sending party as well as information on the receiving party abroad. Similar information is required by Police and Customs officials for physical cash imports exceeded 40,000 AED (approximately USD 10,900).

B. (C) WHAT ARE THE METHODS WHEREBY SOUTH ASIANS ARE RECRUITED AND/OR RADICALIZED BY GULF-BASED EXTREMISTS?

Post has limited evidence South Asian expatriates are being recruited or radicalized in the UAE. There are anecdotal reports that one Pashtun Afghan community in the UAE may have tribal or religious ties to the Taliban. UAE authorities are known to observe this group’s activities and occasionally disrupt gatherings.

C. (U) DESCRIBE AFGHAN AND PAKISTANI EXPATS AND LOCAL NATIONAL DONATIONS TO CHARITIES THAT MAY SEND MONEY TO AFGHANISTAN OR PAKISTAN.

Charitable giving (“zakat”) is one of the five pillars of Islam, and, as such, is pervasive in Muslim communities. Donation jars, boxes, ATMs and pledge cards for the major UAE charities (see 1C) are found throughout the country. The UAEG does not directly regulate donations, but rather oversees the establishment and registration of charitable organizations, disbursal of collected funds and goods donations. UAE charities primarily make donations abroad in the form of goods and development projects, not cash.

1) (C) WHICH CHARITIES MIGHT BE ASSOCIATED WITH EXTREMIST GROUPS, TERRORISTS, OR THE AFGHAN OR PAKISTANI GOVERNMENTS?

All legal charitable organizations in the UAE are associated with UAE government officials and entities. The largest of these groups, the

ABU DHABI 00000874 002.2 OF 003

Red Crescent Authority, the Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Charitable Foundation, and the Mohammed bin Rashid Charitable and Humanitarian Foundation, have ongoing charitable activities (including donations of clothing and food, as well as project developments) in Afghanistan and Pakistan in coordination with the UAEG and host governments. There is no evidence any of these groups have ties to extremist groups. In fact, the UAEG actively works to channel zakat from nationals and expatriates to the Red Crescent Authority, whose activities and employees it monitors closely.

2) (C) DESCRIBE EXPAT AND LOCAL NATIONAL DONATION LEVELS TO THOSE CHARITIES. WHICH ONES ARE MOST POPULAR? WHICH ONES ARE MOST SUSPECTED OF HAVING EXTREMIST, TERRORIST, OR GOVERNMENT TIES?

The major UAE charities receive significant cash and in-kind donations from senior ruling family members, wealthy Emirati nationals and small donations from other citizens and expatriates. Post does not have comprehensive statistics that reveal which charities are most popular, although the three largest are the only ones authorized to disburse funds overseas.

Ajman-based Human Appeal is suspected of ties to Hamas.

3) (U) PLEASE PROVIDE INFORMATION ON ANY CHARITIES RUN BY AFGHAN AND PAKISTANI EXPATS.

Not applicable. In order to be registered, charitable groups must be founded by 20 Emirati nationals.

D. (U) HOW LARGE IS THE POPULATION OF PAKISTANI AND AFGHAN EXPATRIATE WORKERS IN EACH GULF STATE?

There are approximately 1 million Pakistani expatriates and 150,000 Afghan nationals living in the UAE.

1) (U) HOW MANY IN THE SOUTH ASIAN COMMUNITY ARE PERMANENT RESIDENTS?

UAE immigration policies do not allow for permanent residence status.

2) (U) HOW MANY ARE GUEST WORKERS?

All expatriates are resident in the UAE on work visas or their dependents.

3) (SBU) WHAT IS THEIR ETHNIC AND, WHERE APPROPRIATE, TRIBAL/CLAN MAKE-UP?

Many Pakistanis are low-wage guest workers, predominantly Pashtun/Pathan. Baluchis have intermarried with Emiratis for generations, and many Punjabi and Sindhi elites (including President Zardari) maintain pieds-a-terres in Dubai.

Most Afghan residents are believed to be Pashtun.

E. (C) WHAT LINKS DO THEY HAVE WITH POLITICAL PARTIES, INSURGENTS, OR OTHER EXTREMISTS IN AFGHANISTAN OR PAKISTAN?

While it can be assumed that the Pakistani and Afghani populations in the UAE represent a wide range of political views, political activism among expatriates is discouraged by UAE authorities.

F. (SBU) WHO ARE THE KEY LEADERS WITHIN THESE COMMUNITIES?

Key leaders are prominent and successful businessmen. Given instability at home, many Afghan and Pakistani business leaders and political figures and their families use the UAE, and Dubai in particular, as a part-time residence and are active in their respective expatriate communities. Among uneducated and unskilled workers, leaders likely emerge along tribal and societal lines.

1) (SBU) WHAT PROMINENT MOSQUES OR COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS DO THESE EXPATRIATES BELONG TO? DESCRIBE THE MOSQUES’ ACTIVITIES AND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GOVERNMENT, PEOPLE, OR EXTREMIST GROUPS IN AFGHANISTAN OR PAKISTAN.

All mosques operate under the direct supervision of the UAEG. None have ties to Afghanistan or Pakistan, aside from the nationalities of congregants. All sermons and announcements in UAE mosques are tightly controlled by the UAE Government.

2) (U) DO EXPATS FOLLOW PROMINENT PAKISTANI, AFGHAN, OR GULF CLERICS? IF SO, WHICH ONES, AND WHY? WHICH PAKISTANI AND AFGHAN CLERICS HAVE THE LARGEST FOLLOWING AMONG EXPATRIATES IN GULF STATES?

Unknown.

ABU DHABI 00000874 003.2 OF 003

A) (SBU) WHERE DID PROMINENT CLERICAL LEADERS RECEIVE THEIR RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND WHAT SCHOOL OF THOUGHT DO THEY LOOK TO FOR RELIGIOUS GUIDANCE (DEOBANDI, BARELVI, AHL-E HADITH, SALAFI, ETC.)?

There are no known Pakistani or Afghani clerics in the UAE. The Imam who delivers the English language Friday sermon in Abu Dhabi (i.e., the language of many South Asians, is American).

B) (C) DESCRIBE CLERICS’ POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN GULF STATES, PAKISTAN, OR AFGHANISTAN.

All clerics/imams are supervised by the UAEG and are not involved in political activities.

3) (U) WHO ARE THE MOST INFLUENTIAL OR WEALTHY BUSINESSMEN IN THESE COMMUNITIES? WHAT TYPES OF BUSINESSES ARE THEY INVOLVED IN?

There are a number of successful Pakistani and Afghan businessmen resident in the UAE who are involved in a wide range of trading and services.

4) (C) WHAT LINKS DO THE BUSINESS LEADERS HAVE WITH CLERICS OR EXTREMISTS AT HOME? DESCRIBE ANY ROLE THEY MAY PLAY IN RAISING, HOLDING, OR DISPERSING FUNDS FROM THE EXPAT COMMUNITY?

Post has no evidence that business leaders are engaged in fundraising or other ties to extremists, although we would not be surprised if it is happening.

G. (U) HOW DO EXPATS VIEW THE TALIBAN AND OTHER EXTREMISTS IN THEIR HOME COUNTRY? WHAT ASPECTS OF THESE GROUPS’ PLATFORMS AND ACTIVITIES DO PAKISTANI AND AFGHAN EXPATRIATES ADMIRE OR REJECT?

Unknown.

H. (U) HOW DO EXPATS VIEW THEIR GOVERNMENTS IN KABUL OR ISLAMABAD?

Many wealthy Afghans and Pakistanis tell EmbOffs that they choose to live in the UAE rather than their corrupt and/or failing countries. Others, particularly those with political ties, are committed to eventually returning home to help re-build their countries, but choose to temporarily live in Dubai out of concern for their families’ safety.

I. (S) PLEASE DESCRIBE ANY STEPS THE HOST GOVERNMENTS HAVE TAKEN OR PLANS THEY MIGHT HAVE TO MONITOR OR INFLUENCE THESE EXPAT POPULATIONS.

For national security reasons, the UAEG closely monitors all expatriates, particularly those from Pakistan (the largest expat community in the UAE) and Afghanistan (given concerns about extremism/terrorism). The specific plans are not known.

J. (S) TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THE U.S. EMBASSIES WORKING WITH OTHER THIRD-COUNTRY OFFICIAL PERSONNEL TO GATHER INFORMATION ON AND ATTEMPT TO ADDRESS THIS SUBJECT AREA (I.E. THE TRACKING AND STEMMING OF TERRORIST FINANCING FLOWS TO INSURGENT GROUPS IN AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN)?

Emboffs have regular exchanges with like-minded countries on financial crimes matters, although historically these efforts have focused on al-Qaida and Iran. There has been ongoing cooperation with like-minded embassies regarding efforts to disrupt drug trafficking and related money laundering through the UAE.

K. (SBU) PLEASE REPORT ON THE TYPES OF MEDIA FOLLOWED AND/OR PARTICIPATED IN BY AFGHAN AND PAKISTANI EXPATRIATES IN SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES.

Pakistani nationals are employed at some of the major English language newspapers and satellite television stations based in the UAE. OLSON


Bron: WikiLeaks

Thursday, 07 January 2010, 13:10

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 000009
NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/01/07 TAGS: ECON, PTER, KTFN, AE, AF, EFIN SUBJECT: (S) US-UAE Further Cooperation to Disrupt Taliban Finance
CLASSIFIED BY: Richard Olson, Ambassador, State Department, U.S. Embassy Abu Dhabi; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

(S//NF) Summary

1. (S//NF) SUMMARY. On December 15-16, 2009, Treasury Department Acting Assistant Secretary of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis Howard Mendelsohn, along with GRPO officers and Treasury analysts, met with senior officials from the UAE’s State Security Department (SSD) and Dubai’s General Department of State Security (GDSS) to discuss suspected Taliban-related financial activity in the UAE. Prior to these meetings, GRPO and Treasury passed to SSD and GDSS detailed information on the financing of the Taliban and other terrorist and extremist groups based in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Mendelsohn praised the UAE for its contribution to building a stable and moderate Afghanistan. He thanked the SSD and GDSS for its commitment, per the directive of Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, to disrupt any Taliban-related financial activity that can be identified in the UAE. The UAE services pledged full cooperation toward the shared goal and asked for additional detailed and actionable lead information. In particular, they asked for additional passport information, telephone numbers, full names and aliases, and travel itineraries for Taliban figures suspected of traveling to the UAE. END SUMMARY.

2. (S//NF) During the course of the two multi-hour intelligence exchange sessions, GRPO and Treasury analysts walked through the previously shared information suggesting that Taliban-related finance officials have visited the UAE in order to raise or move funds. The UAE security officials believe that the Taliban may draw support from the sizeable Pashtun population resident in the UAE. They asked for lead information the U.S. could gather with names of individuals or entities in the UAE that may be supporting the Taliban.

3. (S//NF) Officials from SSD and GDSS pledged that their respective organizations would follow up on the information provided, and work through intelligence channels to share information and results and submit additional requests for information.

Taliban/Haqqani Network

4. (S//NF) Mendelsohn acknowledged the important steps the UAE has taken to combat al-Qaida and the Taliban-to include sending troops to Afghanistan-and highlighted the importance the USG places on combating Taliban financing. He stated that the Taliban receives significant money from narcotics trafficking and extortion, but noted that the U.S. believes that the group also receives significant funds from the Gulf, particularly from donors in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. He further stated that the Taliban and Haqqani Network are believed to earn money from UAE-based business interests. Security officials from both SSD and GDSS agreed that the Taliban and Haqqani Network are serious threats. Officials from SSD added that Iran supports the Taliban with money and weapons, helps the Taliban smuggle drugs, and facilitates the movement of Taliban and al-Qaida members. SSD officials stated that Iran’s IRGC and navy are involved with these activities. GDSS officials noted Iran’s support to Taliban in Pakistan, adding that GDSS believes that India also has supported Pakistani Taliban and Pashtun separatists.

5. (S//NF) Treasury analysts provided information on XXXXXXXXXXXX two senior Taliban officials who have made multiple fundraising visits to the UAE, according to U.S. intelligence. The UAE security services were not familiar with either individual and asked for additional identifying information, including current passport information used by the individuals to enter the UAE in order to track down their movements. (NOTE: Information available to the USG and shared for this exchange included telephone numbers, an e-mail address, and expired passport information for crosschecking against Emirati immigration databases on both individuals. END NOTE.) SSD confirmed it checked UAE immigration systems based on the passport information provided and found no matching records. GRPO and Treasury analysts also shared names and phone numbers of multiple Taliban and Haqqani associates known either to reside in or travel to the UAE. SSD officials stated that Taliban fundraisers may use fabricated travel documents, and that Pakistanis/Afghanis often carry multiple passports, but noted that individuals from Pakistan and Afghanistan who apply for a travel visa now require an eye scan. The officials said this system should help prevent a single individual from using different aliases or passports. The services pledged to continue their investigations and share further results.

6. (S//NF) GDSS officials noted its ongoing monitoring of the large Afghan and Pakistani immigrant communities in Dubai and they commented that the Taliban extorts money from UAE-based Afghan businessmen. The same officials said the Taliban is also involved in kidnapping for ransom, whereby Afghanistan and Pakistan-based family members of the UAE-based businessmen are kidnapped for Taliban profit. Some Afghan businessmen in the UAE have resorted to purchasing tickets on the day of travel to limit the chance of being kidnapped themselves upon arrival in either Afghanistan or Pakistan.

7. (S//NF) The GDSS officials stated that hawaladars are usually unwitting when they transfer money that ends up with the Taliban. They further noted that Taliban financial supporters are likely to transfer smaller amounts across multiple hawalas to minimize suspicion.

8. (S//NF) SSD officials discussed the Taliban and Haqqani Network’s suspected use of front companies to raise and move money. They were familiar with Haji Khalil Zadran, a Kabul-based Haqqani Network financial facilitator who has visited the UAE, but were not able to provide any details on him.

9. (S//NF) GDSS officials were familiar with XXXXXXXXXXXX who reportedly provides funding to the Taliban/Haqqani Network, according to U.S. intelligence. The GDSS officials stated that they do not believe XXXXXXXXXXXX is loyal to the Taliban, and noted that he has cooperated with Pakistani authorities, as well as with Afghan President Karzai. They pointed out XXXXXXXXXXXX’s past visits from former Guantanamo Bay detainee Mullah Zaif, but noted that such visits-which may have resulted in financial support-have ceased. GDSS continues to monitor XXXXXXXXXXXX although at present they do not believe that he is a Taliban financial manager. Mendelsohn suggested that he may be a pragmatist who maintains relationships with legitimate authorities, but the USG has current information that suggests he is still involved with the Taliban.

10. (S//NF) GDSS discussed at length the history of the Haqqanis. They specifically highlighted Jalaluddin Haqqani’s success in exploiting images of civilian casualties in Afghanistan for fundraising purposes.

(S//NF) Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wa al-Sunna

11. (S//NF) Mendelsohn also raised Afghanistan and Pakistan-based extremist and terrorist groups, to include Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) and Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wa al-Sunna (JDQ). UAE security services were not familiar with the names of specific UAE-based LT members shared by GRPO and Treasury, but promised to follow up on the information. Mendelsohn raised the UAE-based NGO Dar al-Birr as an organization suspected of supporting JDQ. GDSS was familiar with the organization and pledged to investigate the matter.

OLSON


Bron: WikiLeaks

Monday, 11 January 2010, 05:47

S E C R E T RIYADH 000061
NOFORN SIPDIS
TREASURY FOR U/S STUART LEVEY AND AA/S HOWARD MENDELSOHN STATE FOR S/SRAP RICHARD HOLBROOKE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2020 TAGS: ECON, PREL, EFIN, KTFN, SA SUBJECT: POSITIVE TREASURY ENGAGEMENT WITH MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
Classified By: Acting DCM Lisa Carle for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. On December 13, 2009, Treasury Department Acting Assistant Secretary of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis Howard Mendelsohn, along with GRPO officers and Treasury analysts, met with senior Saudi Mabahith officials to discuss suspected Taliban-related financial activity in Saudi Arabia. Prior to this meeting, Treasury and GRPO officials shared with Mabahith detailed information on the financing of the Taliban and other terrorist and extremist groups based in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Mabahith pointed to the General Intelligence Presidency (GIP), Saudi Arabia’s overseas intelligence agency, as having the lead on Taliban matters for the Saudi Arabian Government (SAG). Mabahith pledged to disrupt any Taliban-related financial activity in the Kingdom, including fundraising carried out by Taliban leaders participating in reconciliation efforts. Mabahith asked GRPO and Treasury to provide additional detailed and actionable information to assist in its investigations.

2. (S/NF) During the course of the multi-hour intelligence exchange session, GRPO and Treasury analysts walked through the previously shared intelligence, which suggested that Taliban-related finance officials have visited Saudi Arabia in order to raise funds. Mabahith pledged to follow up on the information provided, to work through intelligence channels to share information and results, and submit additional requests for information. END SUMMARY.

(U) Taliban/Haqqani Network

3. (S/NF) Mendelsohn acknowledged the important steps the Saudi government has taken to combat al-Qaida financing, and highlighted the importance the USG places on combating Taliban financing. He stated that the Taliban receives significant money from narcotics trafficking and extortion, but noted that the U.S. believes that the group also receives significant funds from the Gulf, particularly from donors in Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

4. (S/NF) Mabahith agreed that the Taliban is a serious threat and stated that Saudi authorities can more easily target al-Qaida financing since the group’s members are frequently Saudi nationals, often with Saudi addresses and phone numbers. Taliban/Haqqani network fundraisers, however, usually enter the Kingdom from Afghanistan or Pakistan, and may use fabricated travel documents, according to Mabahith. Mabahith also acknowledged that the Hajj represents an opportunity for terrorist fundraisers. The same officials further acknowledged the historical ties that existed between Saudi Arabia and the Taliban, suggesting that lingering sympathies may create a potential donor base in the Kingdom.

5. (S/NF) Mendelsohn stated that senior Taliban officials travel to Saudi Arabia to discuss reconciliation issues, but said they also conduct fundraising activities while in the Kingdom. Mabahith initially responded that Taliban reconciliation issues were handled by the GIP and stated that the Mabahith has very little insight or coordination with the GIP in this area. After further discussion, Issa said that even if Taliban fundraisers travel to Saudi Arabia under the auspices of reconciliation, Mabahith officials would arrest anyone who breaks Saudi law while in the Kingdom.

6. (S/NF) Treasury analysts provided information on XXXXXXXXXXXX three senior Taliban officials who have made multiple fundraising visits to Saudi Arabia, according to U.S. intelligence. (NOTE: Information available to the USG and shared for this exchange included telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, and passport information for crosschecking against Saudi customs databases. END NOTE.) Mabahith was not familiar with the individuals and pledged to follow up on the identifying information provided by GRPO and Treasury. GRPO and Treasury analysts also shared names and phone numbers of multiple Taliban and Haqqani associates known either to reside in or travel to the Saudi Arabia.

7. (S/NF) Reviewing a list of several full or partial names of suspected Taliban donors in the Kingdom, Mabahith recognized XXXXXXXXXXXX, a prominent Saudi who reportedly gave XXXXXXXXXXXX $30,000 in September 2008. Mabahith had no information regarding XXXXXXXXXXXX’s financial contributions to the Taliban, but speculated that the money could have come from a trust or a charity that was associated with XXXXXXXXXXXX, rather than from XXXXXXXXXXXX himself. Mabahith pledged to investigate XXXXXXXXXXXX and stated that it would not hesitate to “press him” regardless of his social status. Mendelsohn emphasized the importance of taking actions to delegitimize Taliban fundraising, just as the Saudi government has worked hard to delegitimize al-Qaida and deter donors from giving money to the group.

8. (S/NF) Mabahith also detailed the SAG’s new fingerprinting system. Mabahith suggested that the system will likely be more effective against Taliban fundraisers, who travel through official points of entry, than it will be against al-Qaida-affiliated foreign fighters, who enter the country illegally. Mabahith also stated that this system should reduce the effectiveness of forged travel documents used at official points of entry. They pointed out the country’s large borders, highlighting the continuing challenges they expect to encounter.

(S/NF) Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wa al-Sunna

9. (S/NF) Mendelsohn also raised USG concerns about Pakistan-based extremist group Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wa al-Sunna (JDQ) and its involvement in attacks against coalition forces in Afghanistan. GRPO and Treasury passed names and other identifying information of suspected Saudi Arabia-based JDQ donors and affiliates. Mabahith pledged to investigate the names and follow up through intelligence channels.

(U) Al-Haramain Foundation

10. (S/NF) Mendelsohn commended Mabahith for its successful operations exposing and disrupting the terrorist support activities of the Saudi-based NGO al-Haramain Foundation (AHF), and pledged USG support for their investigation. Mabahith confirmed that more than 40 AHF-affiliated individuals had been arrested as a result and that Mabahith had a strong case against former AHF Director Aqil al-Aqil. Mabahith candidly noted that Saudi authorities were embarrassed about the way they had handled Aqil al-Aqil, since they had previously arrested and released him based on an earlier lack of evidence. SMITH


Bron: WikiLeaks

Monday, 05 November 2007, 10:25

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001838
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP, S/CT, EEB/ESC/TFS
TREASURY FOR U/S LEVEY, A/A O’BRIEN
DHS FOR DHS/ICE, FINANCIAL AND TRADE INVESTIGATIONS,
KDELLACOLI, JGALLION
EO 12958 DECL: 11/05/2017
TAGS EFIN, ETTC, KTFN, PTER, KCRM, PREL, AE
SUBJECT: UAE: FOLLOW-UP ACTION REQUEST ON ILLICIT CASH
COURIERS
REF: A. SECSTATE 152088 B. 06 ABU DHABI 3872 C. 06 ABU DHABI 2281 D. 05 ABU DHABI 4592 E. ABU DHABI 1293
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b and d).

1. (C) Summary: Post has worked with the UAEG to have it focus on the issue of bulk cash smuggling. DHS/ICE has twice provided training to customs officials and DOJ/OPDAT will be providing money laundering prosecutorial training this December (which will have a bulk cash smuggling component). The USG proposed conducting a joint DHS/ICE – Dubai Customs cash courier operation in April 2006. This October, the UAE Central Bank Governor, who serves as the UAE’s Chairman for the Joint Terror Finance Coordinating Committee, informed us that the UAEG did not wish to participate. (Note: Post still understands that the Central Bank Governor will be replaced and will raise this with his successor. End Note.) The UAE has regulations requiring declarations for cash imports of over USD 10,800, but no regulations covering cash exports. End Summary

2. (C) Post appreciates the opportunity to provide an update on our efforts to focus the UAEG on addressing the issue of bulk cash smuggling. DHS/ICE provided training to Dubai police and customs officials on detecting and investigating bulk cash smuggling cases in September 2005, and the issue has been raised at each of the U.S. – UAE Joint Terror Finance Coordinating Committee (JTFCC) meetings since their inception in January 2006. In the April 2006 JTFCC meeting, the U.S. side proposed holding a joint DHS/ICE – Dubai Customs cash courier operation. UAE Central Bank Governor Sultan Nasser Al-Suwaidi requested training before moving forward with any operation. That training was provided in June 2006 (ref c).

3. (SBU) Al-Suwaidi then requested that post work with the UAE Central Bank and Customs to provide a “gap analysis” of the relevant U.S. and UAE regulations. In post’s initial draft of a gap analysis, we determined that the UAE has no regulations on declaring cash exports, only on cash imports (ref b). We continued working with the Central Bank and with other members of the UAEG to address the UAE’s stated and unstated concerns about a joint cash courier operation. Based on concerns the UAEG stated about having non-UAE nationals publicly involved in the operation, DHS/ICE revised the proposal and Ambassador passed it to Al-Suwaidi on August 1, 2007. Al-Suwaidi promised to have the UAE’s JTFCC review it. In October, during his visit to the U.S., Al-Suwaidi told Treasury U/S for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey that the UAE did not wish to pursue the proposed DHS/ICE – Dubai Customs cash courier operation with the USG, arguing that having U.S. DHS/ICE officials visible in UAE airports would not be acceptable. He did agree to continue a two-way discussion about certain at-risk flights and suggested the December meeting of the UAE’s National Anti-Money Laundering Committee. Post still understands that the UAEG plans to change the Governor of the Central Bank. We will raise this issue again with the new governor, whenever that person comes on board.

4. (C) Specific responses to questions follow (see 05 Abu Dhabi 4592 and 06 Abu Dhabi 3872 for more details).

(U) Status of Host Nation Laws:

—————————

— UAE Federal Law 4 of 2002 is the relevant law

(SBU) Key Elements of UAE Federal Law 4 (2002) with regard to bulk cash smuggling):

——————————————— ———-

— The law permits the import and export of any amount of currency. It requires, however, that cash and travelers checks worth 40,000 dirhams (USD 10,800) be declared. There are no requirements to declare exports of cash or to declare other bearer negotiable instruments such as bearer bonds, 3rd party endorsed checks, etc.

— Although there is a requirement to declare cash imports, the UAE does not provide customs declaration forms to airlines, etc (as does the U.S.). While there may be signs

ABU DHABI 00001838 002 OF 002

at some ports of entry laying out these requirements, it is not clear that they are at all points of entry.

— Although UAEG officials have the authority to seize undeclared cash, they do not have an administrative procedure for asset forfeiture. All cases must be brought to the courts. UAE officials have requested assistance in training prosecutors and judges in the understanding the importance of these cases and in how to make the case.

— The UAE Central Bank Governor has stated that the UAE would need to revise its regulations to deal with declarations on cash exports. As far as we are aware, these regulations have not yet been amended.

(C) Status of investigations into bulk cash smuggling:

——————————————— ———

— The UAE is still largely a cash based society and Emiratis are used to carrying large amounts of cash. It is not clear that customs officials always initiate action against undeclared cash, nor is it clear how aggressively these cases are investigated or prosecuted. UAE officials have told us that they have investigated these cases and brought them to prosecution, but post has no independent access to records to determine the number of these cases, nor the success rate.

(SBU) Mission Efforts

———————

— In addition to the efforts briefly described in paras 1-2 above, DOJ/OPDAT will be delivering training on December 10-11 on prosecuting money laundering and financial crimes cases to prosecutors from the UAE. DHS/ICE will be delivering a presentation on bulk cash smuggling.

— Embassy will continue to engage the UAEG and Emirate level governments on the problem of cash couriers and the need to develop a plan to address the issue. SISON


2 Comments to “WikiLeaks: Golfstaten Fungeren Als Financieringsbron Voor Terrorisme”

  1. #WikiLeaks : Golfstaten Fungeren Als Financieringsbron Voor #Terrorisme | #VS #AlQaida #Cablegate http://j.mp/gwihmR

  2. avatar Elisabeth says:

    RT @CrethiPlethi: #WikiLeaks : Golfstaten Fungeren Als Financieringsbron Voor #Terrorisme | #VS #AlQaida #Cablegate http://j.mp/gwihmR


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